

Urban WASH Planning Guidance Note



UNHCR Guidance Note on WASH Programming for Refugees in Urban situations

[Ethiopia case study](#)

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February 2018

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1. Introduction

Purpose: These brief guidelines are prepared primarily for UNHCR WASH staff and partners in response to refugees living “out of formalised camps¹” in urban areas, though have applicability to those in camps in urban areas too. However, where refugees live in urban areas without legal status and/or within illegal/informal settlements (slums), the scope for working with them may be curtailed if there are Govt restrictions. These guidelines are not intended for urban areas confronted by large scale armed conflict so will have less applicability because insecurity will often preclude stabilisation, but key ideas should be applied to the extent conditions permit. In conclusion, this guidance is most appropriate where conditions in time and space support stabilisation. (Stabilisation can be thought of as when the most acute widespread risks are past, largescale movements of refugees has ceased/eased and when there is some form of political recognition/ acceptance of the reality of the refugee crisis.)

Drivers; The drivers for producing this guidance note are;

- A. Policy shifts. UNHCR’s Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and Policy on Alternatives to Camps require a new approach. At the heart of the CRRF approach is the idea that more nationally integrated and long-term approach is required.
- B. Scale: Of the 17.2 million refugees under UNHCR mandate², 75% of these are estimated to live out of camps, of which 60% are living in urban areas (though data is difficult to confirm). This means approximately 7 ¾ million refugees live out of camps in urban areas. The majority of these individuals don’t receive any direct humanitarian WASH services supported by UNHCR or partners, though some may receive basic assistance.
- C. Lack of visibility and complexity; The majority of urban refugees who are absorbed within the urban fabric amongst host populations are often not visible. The complexities and relative unfamiliarity

of the urban environment for UNHCR and other humanitarian actors mean that guidance for WASH is considered necessary.

Guiding principles and response objectives; Core responsibility 4 from the World Humanitarian Summit³, asks us to undertake three fundamental shifts in the way we work: Reinforce, don’t replace national systems, Anticipate, do not wait for crises, Transcend the humanitarian-development divide.

UNHCR’s work with refugees in urban areas will be guided by the following key documents (see annex for extracts of the critical points).

1. Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) 2017.
2. UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps, July 2014.
3. UNHCR Global Strategy for Public Health 2014 – 2018.
4. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 23 December 2016; 71/256. The new urban agenda.
5. SDG 6 - Global goals, targets and indicators for drinking water, sanitation & hygiene, as well as SDG 1 Poverty, SDG 3 Health, SDG 11 cities.

2. Enabling environment guidance for UNHCR management

The following key points are overarching, have a bearing on all sectors and require senior UNHCR management/Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) level agreement on how these are dealt with. If these key issues are not addressed, this will severely curtail the ability of WASH programming to achieve integration and coherence, particularly in the stabilisation phase. WASH actors also need to support UNHCR management to resolve these issues. (Please see annex with challenges and justification for thinking behind the following guidance.)

1 The defining characteristic of a camp, however, is typically some degree of limitation on the rights and freedoms of refugees and their ability to make meaningful choices about their lives. UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps - July 2014

2 <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html>

3 <http://sgreport.worldhumanitariansummit.org/>

2.1. Support local, and national Govn't coordination unless impartiality dictates otherwise

UNHCR needs to be able to more directly support local government work, alongside its work with national Government, though the scale of local Government coordination needs to be large enough to be efficient and create coherence across a large enough area. Thus, the default starting point should be to work closely with local Government and aim for integration of refugees into national systems of WASH service provision, unless the capacity, impartiality and performance of local government, which will need to be sensitively and robustly assessed, is not adequate. This means adapting the UNHCR refugee coordination (sector) model and building relationships with relevant Line Ministries, Municipal Authorities, and local partners.

2.2. Support protection through freedom of movement & right to work

In urban areas it is important to understand the direct link between fundamental refugee protection issues such as “freedom of movement” and “right to work” with access to WASH services. Within an urban context WASH services are often accessible to those who can afford to pay, and therefore lack of access may be due to financial and legal barriers. Lack of income may result in refugees being unable to pay for WASH services, or choosing to live where many/all public services are limited. If access to bank accounts is restricted, credit history non-existent and informal lines of credit limited, then payment for service provision may be impossible. In other cases, refugees may be blocked from accessing WASH services and negotiation will be required. Therefore, a Multi-Purpose Grant intervention may resolve access in the short term, but a legal policy change will be required to enable a sustainable solution.

2.3. Adopt multi-year programming in the stabilisation phase to support integrated work

Multi-year planning and budget timeframes are being introduced by UNHCR, and this will support integration with the longer-term planning required for urban areas. Country operations should develop multi-year country level WASH Strategies/Action Plans in protracted refugee situations, which will focus on creating synergy with national development planning and service delivery, and on long term cost saving approaches which are appropriate for local level ownership, operation and maintenance. Multi-year budgeting will allow UNHCR to move away from repeated annual trucking operations and hygiene kit distribution to asset creation but will require bold budgeting allocations to allocate and preserve funds from reactive demands.


2.4. Standardise the way refugees are assessed/monitored across all settlements types

Coherence of assessment of needs and monitoring of protection/services across all settlements types (using the shelter sector classification) and sectors is required to ensure relative prioritisation of needs is possible. This must be disaggregated by settlement typology, in line with shelter sector classifications. For example, it should be possible to make direct comparisons between the needs and service provision in tented camps with those in rented accommodation, rather than it presumed the former are always the most vulnerable. Where UNHCR plays a more operational role in “camps”, requirements for detailed monitoring can be met by these being a subset of an all settlement multi sector monitoring framework. Getting alignment of systems will require a considerable amount of work.

3. Strategic WASH guidance for UNHCR management and WASH

This guidance focusses on stabilisation where time and space conditions permit. During the initial phase of an emergency, direct service provision by UNHCR or its implementing partners in e.g. camp like situations may well take precedence and seemingly leave little capacity for following this guidance. Stabilisation work could also be interrupted by events that requires emergency relief again or even become suspended if a major new crisis occurs. Relief or stabilisation conditions may also vary across locations. Contingency planning should take account of any possible return to emergency. However, it is critical to prioritise the time to shift towards a more strategic support role sooner rather than inadvertently perpetuate parallel structures and unsustainable interventions.

Fig. 1. The focus of these guidelines



3.1. Think stabilisation from the outset and work with development actors

Focus on stabilisation and then integration with development within urban environments from the outset. Where UNHCR engages in predictable multi-year WASH programming and has significant WASH budgets for medium/longer term WASH services for those out of camps, then it needs to engage in and integrate its work to fit within sector level development forums. UNHCR needs to focus on improving long term access to WASH services, linking to SDG 6 sustainable water and sanitation for all, by advocating

for government and development actors include WASH services for refugees within national development plans and using their financing mechanisms to support this.

3.2. Ensure assessments will identify what are the critical issues

In order to make informed decisions about resource prioritisation and to enable WASH programme design, Country Operations will need to conduct WASH access baseline assessments, routine monitoring and data analysis for the entire Population of Concern. This should determine the level of access that urban refugees have to WASH services, and whether sub-standard conditions are a result of: (1) vulnerable population groups being blocked from accessing WASH services (protection issue), (2) a lack of financial means for refugees to access the services (protection 'right to work'/Basic Needs Approach⁴ issue), (3) WASH infrastructure existing prior to influx is inadequate for the increased population (assistance issue). Develop an approach that can understand this rapidly and refine analysis over time.

3.3. Coordinate using a geospatial framework

A coordination framework based upon geospatial levels, with linkages between national down to household level, is proposed as an alternative to vertical sector programming for WASH. The justification for this is that the more vertical sector/cluster coordination approach does not sufficiently support a multi sector approach or acknowledge the different coordination issues at each geospatial level. The table below provides an overview of the WASH sector roles at different geospatial levels during relief and

stabilisation phases. (The Low-Income Community (LIC) level is highlighted in red in the table 1. as the level which should receive strategic focus in the stabilisation phase for UNHCR WASH work – see 3.5 below.)

3.4. Develop and focus on joint objectives with other key sectors

WASH will need to develop and work bilaterally with key sectors on delivering joint service provision objectives where work overlaps at different geospatial levels and with the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) at the household level. Simply put it means WASH spending more of the time in other sector meetings and influencing their plans from within. This will allow WASH to step back to be more strategic during the stabilisation phase and focus at the LIC level.

Joint objectives at LIC level:

- With shelter; to improve LIC settlement planning and support installation of basic WASH infrastructure services.
- With protection/social stability; to create local (Govt and civil society) ownership of WASH community assets as a key means to enhance social stability.

Joint objectives at Building (i.e. multi occupancy) level:

- With shelter; to support shelter sector interventions to deliver within building taps /toilets and on-site WASH e.g. water tanks/septic tanks.

Joint objectives at Household level:

- With BNA and protection; to ensure that Multi-Purpose Grants take account of WASH household level service provision and coping mechanisms.

Table 1: WASH sector roles at different geospatial levels

Geospatial level	Emergency relief phase (e.g. 1-12 months)	Stabilisation assistance phase (1 year plus). Emphasis shifts to collaboration
National	Coordination with key ministries and humanitarian actors	Medium term planning with key development actors; Govt, World Bank, UN Habitat, UNICEF.
City/town/ municipality & service network area	Communicate scale of programme and budget requirements	Strategic influence within humanitarian multi sector/ leadership level and capacity building of utilities/service providers
Low Income community (LIC) area(s) including informal settlements	Temporary short-term service provision and quick localised networked system upgrades	Strategic assistance in partnership with shelter sector, and protection/social stability sectors. Retain close links with health sector.
Building (i.e. multi occupancy)	Temporary short-term service provision; minor building repairs, upgrades	Tactical assistance to shelter sector
Single Household space i.e. room(s) /separated area(s)	Emergency distributions of household WASH support	Advisory guidance on Basic Needs Approach (BNA) & to protection

4 <http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/590aefc77/basic-needs-approach-refugee-response.html>

3.5. Focus on improving WASH services in Low Income Communities, as well as camps

(LICs are synonymous with what is sometimes called the settlements/area-based approach.)

Where significant numbers of refugees in the lowest socio-economic group live out of camps, many/most will live in LICs, often within a similarly poor host population. UNHCR needs to direct its WASH focus at the LIC level, alongside any camp work, in proportion to the WASH vulnerability and numbers both in LICs and the camps. (Working at the LIC level is also equivalent with working at a camp level in so much as it's a focus on a location that contains many vulnerable people set within a larger Govt. administrative area e.g. district, municipality.) Support should be provided to both refugees and host communities. Selection and targeting of LICs will be complex and requires robust criteria and very good monitoring. Budget/capacity constraints necessarily require a rather limited WASH services focus on just some LICs leaving many areas unaddressed, so this focus **must** be complemented with a BNA that targets on the basis of socio economic vulnerability irrespective of whether refugees live in LICs or not. This work on LIC improvements should build on the capacity of existing service providers and coordinate with local Govt ensuring parallel structures are not set up, noting WASH networks often need to be managed beyond the LIC boundaries at a city level.

4. Programme guidance for UNHCR WASH staff

4.1. Supporting WASH access, assessment, monitoring and analysis

In the stabilisation phase WASH needs to be much smarter in its collection of data and adding analytical value, to become a “thinker” rather than a “doer”. A number of real-time interoperable assessment, monitoring, prioritisation analysis and reporting tools⁵ are available to enable country operations to carry out effective evidence-based decision making and needs-based prioritization of WASH activities. Much of the WASH baseline and monitoring data may be obtained from third party data sources such as World Bank (WB), SDG 6 Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP), National Statistics, and other pre-existing data sources.

4.1.1. Alignment with SDG 6 and national urban standards

Adapt UNHCR WASH standards and reporting to be congruent within national Govn't urban standards and sustainable development monitoring systems⁶: Joint Monitoring Programme, Global Environment Monitoring System. Adapt national household surveys to provide real time monitoring of trends that serve humanitarian WASH needs as well as longer term national WASH monitoring. This needs information to be made available beyond Govn't (i.e. not be restricted), be real time, disaggregated by settlement type and wealth quintile and can be achieved by UNHCR and others. Invest in additional capacity and in oversampling in areas of particular concern. Identify and if possible access pre-existing national household surveys to provide a baseline. Integrate core WASH access questions into multi-sector surveys.

4.1.2. Make time and build capacity for analysis and use this as a basis for advocacy

The complexity of urban response and the difficulty of building up a picture of what might really be happening requires good data, combined with thinking time, analytical capacity and willingness to learn. In particular this requires a deeper understanding of WASH finances; from impact on household income to business viability for utilities, as well informal rubbish pickers. Other blockages need to be identified, using e.g. bottleneck analytical tools⁷. This requires joint analysis with other sectors, Government partners and new partnerships with University's and other with analytical strengths. This analysis must then be used as the basis for WASH advocacy to address critical issues and gaps.


4.1.3. Service provider capacity, market and sector functionality assessments

Given the typical role of local Govn't in Solid Waste Management (SWM) and Faecal Sludge Management (FSM) and utilities for water and wastewater, taking a market approach is too limited to identify critical gaps. Start with understanding communal service provision by a WASH service provider's capacity assessment, then understand what the market supplements this with using Emergency Market Mapping Assessment (EMMAs). Work with others who work at the city level; i.e. Govn't, WB, UNICEF, UN Habitat, UNDP, to map sector functionality, the WASH stakeholders in the urban environment, to describe roles in policy, regulation, service delivery and quality assurance.

5 At wash.unhcr.org: WASH Monitoring System (WMS), Water Cost Tool, Standardised KAP Survey and KAP Mapper, GIS WASH Mapper Portal, WASH Manual, Guidelines and Resources)

6 <http://www.unwater.org/what-we-do/monitor-and-report/>

7 <http://www.sanitationmonitoringtoolkit.com/sanitation-monitoring-toolkit/monitoring-the-enabling-environment>

Fig. 2. Getting to grips with WASH finances


4.1.4. Work with Basic Needs Approach/protection assessment and monitoring frameworks

Where an overall household vulnerability assessment is being undertaken, typically led by the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) and protection, they should be supported to lead the process of assessing household vulnerability. WASH must advise on the extent to which the market can meet WASH services (market assessments), where communal WASH services need financial contributions to ensure sustainability (willingness and ability to pay surveys) and whether adequate standards are put in place/continue to be made available (HH surveys to build up JMP⁸ reports). WASH should use this for ongoing household assessment/ monitoring to identify WASH gaps and whether WASH resilience is being built. Accountability mechanisms will also need to be built in so there is refugee/consumer feedback on the service provision which will form part of the means for holding service providers to account. (This will need to be supplemented and triangulated by SDG/JMP monitoring - see 4.1.1 above - possibly along with self-monitoring/reporting using mobile phone technology given challenges with visibility and mobility of refugees out of camps.)

4.2. Supporting WASH service provision at different geospatial levels

This section outlines a series of key actions for WASH provision in the stabilisation phase at each geospatial level. (Details of interventions, many of which are more appropriate to the emergency relief phase, can be found in UNHCR WASH Manual 2017.)

The national level

4.2.1. Working with Protection to support social protection schemes

Support UNHCR Protection colleagues take a lead on ascertaining whether WASH social protection needs are adequately addressed across all settlement types and for new refugee movements, paying attention to critical service provision gaps. Advise on whether social protection schemes e.g. health insurance, social assistance, put in place by UNHCR/ Government are adequate to support WASH needs. Understand whether a lack of money/rights to work or services are a key impediment (see 3.2).

City/town/ municipality

4.2.2. Support local Government capacity to surge in response to refugees (see 2.4)

Working alongside local Government, line ministries, and key utilities, where impartiality, performance and accountability concerns are addressed, is a crucial way to really understand the urban environment as well as provide invaluable support to under resourced local Government. In particular there may be opportunities for staff to spend part of their week working from or within local Government offices, where this can constructively influence local Government planning and prioritisation. Assistance with infrastructure asset management, Integrated water resource management, Water safety planning are key areas of possible support. Where possible align indicators and targets and make WASH data/analysis available (within UNHCRs' protection confidentiality limits) to them.

8 UNICEF/WHO programme for SDG monitoring; <https://washdata.org/>

In specific cases UNHCR could consider supporting infrastructure development projects to increase the availability of urban WASH services.

4.2.3. Work to support local Government and utility urban planning to focus on LICs (see 3.5)

Without compromising humanitarian space/impartial assistance, support municipal authorities and utilities to develop and enhance their urban planning to focus/prioritise on LICs where the urban poor (lowest wealth quintiles) and poorest refugees live. Implicit in this is the need for a longer-term approach and partnership with development actors. Seek to maximise local Government and civil society ownership, while supporting a robust protection framework.

The LIC level

4.2.4. Invest in locally owned asset creation rather than run trucking operations

Create both community and utility physical assets and service organisations, in preference to running expensive water/FS/SW trucking operations (overpriced compared to communal services) which invariably put money in private hands. Models that support host population/refugee, as well as local Government/utility ownership and coping mechanisms can improve social stability and resilience. Water tanks/kiosks, solid waste sorting/holding areas, FS transfer stations, as well as supporting solid waste recycling enterprises, which have standalone value while fitting within regional plans/bigger projects can be created. The relative flexibility of UNHCR funding can be used to seed development financing and catalyse subsequent network connections that are ultimately needed. Pay particular attention to enhancing SWM and FSM local service provider capacity to recycle and reuse in LICs. Conditional cash transfers for WASH

should be used to support the objective of asset creation.

4.2.5. Develop WASH services/networks that work for the poor as well as the utilities

Seek to serve the poorest refugees and host population, rather than just those who can pay the tariffs that often support overstretched utilities. This may include physical infrastructure, tariff reform, governance. Over the medium term this also has to acknowledge likelihood of urban expansion due to economic migration and build resilience.


4.2.6. Ensure Community Support Projects (CSPs) meet public health & social stability needs

Work with Protection/Social Stability when CSPs have a WASH component to ensure these are developed with public health objectives and sustainability in mind, and not implemented solely on basis of social stability /protection objectives or quick wins. Within this find ways to empower municipal authorities who can act flexibly but often don't hold enough budget.

Fig 4: Bringing together public health focus with UNHCR social stability/protection



Fig. 3 trucking services



4.2.7. Support shelter assessment of the housing stock in LICs and prioritise accordingly

The shelter sector leads on housing assessment, including Housing, Land and Property issues (HLP) and as a rule WASH must follow this to support where refugees live in the short term. Midterm planning may determine some people need to move e.g. so that unsustainable trucking operations can cease. Ensure that UNHCR management/HCT are aware of LIC locations/needs so prioritisation of these areas is accepted by local Govt.

The Building (i.e. multi occupancy) level

4.2.8. Work within Shelter sector classification of housing/building types

Shelter sector leads on classification of housing/building types, ideally based upon the Sphere shelter classification. This might include e.g. residential, non-residential types, with condition and overcrowding metrics. WASH must adopt and work within these classifications to support consistency and coherence. These categorisations should also be used by BNA/ protection and be able to geolocate these, particularly within LICs.

4.2.9. Support shelter work on WASH for multi occupancy buildings

Where multi occupancy buildings require on site; water tanks, solid waste collection points, septic tanks, WASH will have to support shelter to ensure building/service contracts include this provision (upstream/downstream service connections may need to be put in place - see 3.3.11). Once social preferences are understood and made provision for within contract specifications, tap and toilet installation can often be left to the shelter sector to manage.

4.2.10. Support refugee occupied buildings by linking into WASH services

Where refugees are living in buildings with sufficient security of tenure and can gain interim or longer term residential status, work with building owners, local Government and utilities to link these into WASH service networks where it is reasonably cost effective. However, it should be noted that the LIC strategic focus means that work on multi occupancy buildings outside such LICs will be by exception and on an ad hoc basis.

The Household level


4.2.11. Limit provision of H/H NFIs by using MPGs & steer this towards service provision costs

Use Multi-Purpose Grants to cover household WASH NFI needs and avoid ongoing distribution of non-essential hygiene items and limit distribution to essential hygiene items. In the longer term effective/reliable service provision by utilities can only be ensured through payment of tariffs (or block subsidies), in which case it will be important to consider appropriate conditionality within MPGs which include WASH services. Otherwise refugees may continue to pay for more expensive water trucking or bottled water, rather than much cheaper piped water services where these can be safely and reliably delivered (see fig 2.)

4.2.12. Reframe and broaden Hygiene Promotion (HP) to be community engagement

Broaden HP so its role is much more about community engagement and getting a broader understanding of how to take better account of the vulnerable populations needs, concerns and capacities. This includes hearing the voices and considering their rights & responsibilities through Communicating with Communities (CwC)/Accountability to affected populations (AAP), seeing people as fee paying or subsidised consumers, and competitors with other vulnerable groups for limited services which may cause tension etc. Recognise the need for incentives and disincentives beyond knowledge and the enabling environment to nudge behaviour.

Figure 5. Community engagement looks broadly at a vulnerable households' concerns




UNHCR Guidance Note on WASH Programming for Refugees in Urban situations

ETHIOPIA case study. February 2018

This case study is an extract from the document: Working towards inclusion Refugees within the national Systems of Ethiopia¹.

1. Introduction

Ethiopia has a long history of welcoming refugees onto its territory. Today, it provides protection to 894,000 refugees and asylum seekers from 24 countries, making it the second largest hosting country in Africa and the sixth hosting country worldwide.² Refugee demographics vary, with an estimated 420,000 South Sudanese living along the Southwestern border, 253,000 Somali refugees residing along the Eastern border, and 169,000 Eritrean refugees living mainly along the Northern border, and other groups living both in urban and rural areas of the country.³



1 <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/integration/5a55ed8c4/working-towards-inclusion-refugees-national-systems-ethiopia.html>

2 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016, 2017.

3 UNHCR, Ethiopia Fact Sheet, November 2017.

The Government maintains a policy requiring refugees to reside in refugee camps, however some exemptions have been made for those with serious protection concerns, for health and humanitarian reasons, as well as for Eritrean refugees covered by the Out-of-Camp policy.⁴ Authorities in Ethiopia are also reflecting on an expansion of the Out-of-Camp policy, giving priority consideration to respond to the new refugee influx, and in particular to those arriving from South Sudan. To date, more than 100,000 South Sudanese have arrived since January 2017.⁵ Recognizing that many seek to remain close to border, and some do travel home for brief 'go-and-see' visits, authorities in Ethiopia are considering to relax the encampment restrictions for this group.

The institutional responsibility for the implementation of all policies relating to refugees and returnees lies with the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) under the National Intelligence Security Service.⁶ ARRA is the main Government entity working on refugee affairs with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and administers the refugee camps with financial and technical assistance from UNHCR and other aid agencies in accordance with the 2004 Refugee Proclamation. It is responsible for overseeing the security of the camps, providing protection and coordinating services provided to refugees. ARRA oversees camp management, general food distribution, implements primary healthcare and education services, and acts as the main liaison with line Ministries that administer national programmes.

Over the last few years, the collaboration with Ministries at the Federal and State levels has grown. ARRA, UNHCR, sister UN agencies and NGO partners are increasingly relying on the technical support of line Ministries to deliver basic services to refugees in key sectors, such as education, health, child protection, and water and sanitation.⁷ The value added of this approach is clear: by facilitating the inclusion of refugees in the national systems, the Government ensures a more holistic, cost-efficient and coordinated response that can benefit both host and refugee populations alike.

The issue of refugee inclusion in the national systems is at the heart of a longer-term approach that needs to be pursued simultaneously with emergency response, in order to build the self-reliance of refugees and the host population as well as the resilience of entire communities to withstand shocks and protect development gains. Its success will be contingent upon effective joint planning, adequate donor support and an ability of all stakeholders to work side by side, in a complementary fashion, in order to deliver on the Government's pledges aimed at ensuring a comprehensive refugee response.

2. Refugee inclusion in the national water system

Water and sanitation are at the very core of sustainable development in Ethiopia. Over the last three decades, significant investments have been made to improve access to drinking water supplies, especially in rural areas, resulting in over 52 million people being able to access an improved drinking water source as compared to only 6 million in 1990.⁸ An estimated 57% of the population now have access to safe drinking water (compared to 14% in 1990) and 28% have access to basic sanitation (up from a 3% baseline in 1990).⁹ These investments have effectively improved health outcomes of the population.

However, challenges remain. Poor quality water, lack of sanitation and hygiene practices are underlying causes of malnutrition, disease, impaired growth and mortality. Children under five are particularly at risk of debilitating bouts of diarrhea and other diseases that kill or stunt their development, including helminthic infections, guinea worm, trachoma, acute watery diarrhea, as well as fluoride and arsenic poisoning. Global research has found that every dollar invested in improving water and sanitation is estimated to result in an average return of 9 USD value in terms of avoidable deaths, more productivity due to less down-time due to illness as well as saved health costs.¹⁰

4 The Government issued the Out-of-Camp (OCP) policy in 2010, providing Eritrean refugees in particular an opportunity to live in Addis Ababa and other non-camp locations of their choice. Any Eritrean refugee in Ethiopia can benefit from the OCP if they have the necessary means to financially support themselves, have relatives or friends who commit to supporting them and have no criminal record.

5 UNHCR, Ethiopia Fact Sheet, September 2017.

6 In the aftermath of the 1973 famine in Ethiopia, the Government established the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. It was then renamed as the Commission for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness, and worked on forced displacement issues until the early 1980s when ARRA was created.

7 Ethiopia's tiered government system consists of a federal government overseeing regional states, zones, districts (*woredas*) and neighborhoods (*kebele*). At present, Ethiopia is administratively structured into nine geographical regions— Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, Somali, Beneshangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations nationalities and Peoples, Gambella and Harari – and two administrative cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa Administration Councils.

8 UNICEF, Evaluation of the UNICEF Ethiopia Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) Country Programme Document, January 2012-June 2016.

9 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Health, Health Sector Transformation Plan 2015/16-2019/20, October 2015.

10 UNHCR, Ethiopia Refugee Program Strategic Plan 2014-2018 - Public Health Sector.

The Government has put in place various policies, strategies, sectoral development plans and institutional arrangements to ensure access to clean water supply and sanitation. The responsibility for the development and provision of these services is shared among the Federal Ministries (water, health, education and finance) and their respective regional bureaus, zonal and woreda/town offices. The sector is predominantly financed by the national Treasury, which on average account for 76 percent of the total budget allocated for water supply and sanitation.¹¹ Providing access to improved services is among the most important government priorities classified as “pro-poor” but it remains largely underfunded, and will require resource mobilization from external partners.

Water and sanitation service provision in refugee camps should be considered within this broader context. In response, ARRA and UNHCR, together with partners, effectively operate a parallel system to the national one to ensure that refugees have access to a package of potable water and sanitation that meet minimum service provision standards close to their dwellings, and remain involved in designing priority hygiene responses.¹²

Daily water supplies to the refugee camps are provided by the NGO partners either through water schemes or by water trucking to the camps.¹³ The unit cost of water is relatively high in most of the refugee locations, mainly as a result of low yielding water sources, high depth of ground water, long distances from source to camps, and the technology employed for abstraction, treatment and conveyance.¹⁴

Achievement of minimum UNHCR standards in water, sanitation and hygiene varies from one camp to another primarily as a result of the status of camp (emergency, transition or protracted) and the type of investment.¹⁵ By the end of 2016, 17 out of the 25 camps had achieved the minimum standards for water provision of water (according to the standard of 20 litres per refugee per day).¹⁶ These standards have been reached with the support humanitarian financing and alternative funding

will be needed to ensure sustainable access to water, unless the refugees are able to have livelihoods options and pay for the water themselves.

Of the 12.6 million litres of water treated and supplied daily, 1.95 million litres (15%) goes to the hosting population.¹⁷ The amount of water supplied to the host population will vary from camp to camp, and according to the season of the year. For older camps, the percentage to the hosting population is higher than for the newer camps.¹⁸ Every year, from April to June, there are also major water shortages in the Eritrean refugee camps of Adi Harush, Mai Aini and Hitsats due to low ground water potential, deterioration in water quality over time, rising hosting population and inadequate funding to support operation and maintenance.

The high unit cost of providing water, the limited financial resources for water provision during protracted humanitarian crises, compounded by climate change causing cycle of drought as well as flooding, have led the Government, humanitarian and development actors, along with donors, to consider new models for water provision to refugees and host communities. Ethiopia’s willingness to include refugees in the national water system makes it stand apart from other more traditional humanitarian responses found in other countries. In many respects, its experience is likely to shape future water programming in other refugee camp settings.

2.1 A paradigm shift: An integrated water system for refugees and host communities

Some of the oldest refugee camps in Ethiopia can be found in Jijiga, where UNHCR has been providing water supplies to refugees since 1988. In 2013, UNHCR calculated that it was providing in Kebribeyah camp 70% of the water to host communities and only 30% to refugees. The water destined to host communities was pumped into a water tank managed by the Woreda Water Bureau, which in turn sold the water to the host communities. Over the years, Aw-barre Woreda

11 World Bank Group, Ethiopia Public Expenditure Review, April 2016.

12 The main implementing partners in the WASH sector in Ethiopia are: Action for Needy Ethiopians, Adventist Development and Relief Agency Japan, African Humanitarian Action, Danish Refugee Council, International Rescue Committee, Lutheran World Federation, GOAL Ireland, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, UNICEF and World Vision.

13 ARRA only manages water provision in 2 refugee camps (Okugo and Kebribeyah) and has otherwise assumed a coordinating function in the WASH sector for the other refugee camps in the country. The Regional Water Bureau is typically not involved in the provision of water and sanitation services in refugee camps.

14 Of the 26 camps, only 4 camps have water sources located within the perimeter of the refugee camps: Pugnido, Pugnido II, Barhale and Bambasi camps. The remaining 21 camps rely on water sources outside the camps with distances as far as 25 km to central storage reservoirs. All depends on the hydrogeology of the camp.

15 UNHCR utilizes a progressive standards approach with regards to water supply and sanitation, based on domestic consumption. During the acute emergency phase (0-6 months after event), the target is to provide a minimum of 15 litres per capita per day. During the transition phase (6 months – 2 years), the target is 20 litres per capita per day. In protracted situations, the goal is for +20 litres per capita per day.

16 ARRA, UNHCR, WFP, Ethiopia Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) 2016 Report.

17 UNHCR, Ethiopia WASH Factsheet, April 2017.

18 During dry seasons, Awbare and Sheder in Somali region receive many pastoralists from neighboring Woredas, who migrate to the area in search of water and fodder for their livestock. As a result, host community can receive more than 70% of the daily output of water between the months of March and May.

accumulated significant funds from the Aw-barre and Sheder hosting population from the sale of water (mainly for livestock) but continued to rely on UNHCR and ARRA to support the operation, maintenance and rehabilitation efforts of the water system in the area.¹⁹ Such a scenario exists across 17 refugee camps, whereby water management committees in the host community, aided by the Regional Water Bureaus, collect tariffs from users in accordance with federal legislation but do not yet use these revenues to cover the costs of the water schemes.

Recognizing that this model of water management and maintenance is unsustainable over the long term, UNICEF and UNHCR began discussing in 2014 alternatives that could be put in place to benefit both refugee and host communities alike. Upon close reading of the national laws, legal ground was found in the Ethiopian Water Resources Management Proclamation No. 197 of 2000 to advocate for the establishment of a professional water utility management system in a refugee camp setting, as the law requires that a water utility should be established for water systems serving more than 15,000 people.²⁰ ARRA saw in this new water service provision model an opportunity to build a more sustainable system, and supported it.

All stakeholders agreed to pilot the new water supply scheme in Gambella region at the start of the new influx of South Sudanese refugees in 2014, as they knew that the lack of groundwater meant water provision from Itang town would be necessary for both the host community and refugees.²¹ UNHCR and UNICEF carried out an economic analysis in 2014 based on the costs of two years of water trucking (over 13 km) in Kule and Tierkidi refugee camps in Gambella, and found that the associated costs were equivalent to the capital expenditure required to build the entire water network in the camp, after which only the running costs and pumping would need to be covered.

The analysis brought to light the huge savings in investment that could be made by expanding the national water system into refugee hosting areas. On average, it costs 4.49 USD (0.089 ETB per liter) to supply 1000 liters of water by trucking. The unit cost of implementing the permanent water system and

operations costs will amount to 0.32-0.50 USD for same amount of water (1000 liters). For every 1 USD spent on permanent water system 5 USD is saved from current temporary water trucking in place. To break it down further, it costs 2.02 USD per month to supply 15 liters per day to a refugee by water trucking at the moment.

With the empirical evidence clearly supporting the new vision, ARRA, UNHCR, UNICEF and the Regional Water Bureau went ahead with the building of one system that spans the newly established two refugee camps (Kule and Tierkidi) and two towns (Itang and Thurfam). The distribution of the water would be done with a pipe network covering 100 km. The large infrastructure development, known as the Itang integrated water project, allowed for economy of scale, resulting in reduced running costs and simpler monitoring of the water quality for the entire system.

The new Itang integrated water system has been functioning in two refugee camps since early 2016, and is currently being extended to one additional refugee camp and two neighboring towns. In the first phase of the project, water was taken from six boreholes²² along the Baro River and pumped to a series of storage tanks and a pumping station located Itang.²³ Priority was given to the construction of the water system in Kule and Tierkidi camps, as the host community had hand pumps and understood that the system would be extended to them.

At the end of 2016, the construction of the new Ngueyyiel refugee camp had begun to accommodate an additional 60,000 refugees who had arrived in September 2016 from South Sudan. This emergency led to a second phase of the project, which saw the expansion of the water system to a third refugee camp, through the installation of a parallel pipeline to the existing boosting station. The extension of the water system to adequately cover Itang and Thurfam towns is also being done.²⁴

Overall, the host community has been supportive of the project from its inception, as the piped public water supply system that served Itang town had been non-functional for many years due to failure of the electro-mechanical components. Thurfam, a business transit

19 The Water Management Committees in Aw-Barre and Sheder charge 20 ETB per household per month. In Aw-barre and Sheder around 1350 and 1000 households respectively are benefiting from the UNHCR supported water supply systems. Hence, the monthly income of the WMCs is around 27,000 ETB and 20,000 ETB in Aw-barre and Sheder respectively.


20 The Proclamation is accompanied by the Council of Ministers Ethiopian Water Resources Management Regulations (No. 115/2005).

21 UNICEF supported UNHCR through the deployment of two WASH experts to support the development of the Itang water system. These deployments played a key role in sharing expertise, harmonizing inter-agency approaches and facilitating the linkages with line Ministries and ARRA. For more information, please consult: UNHCR-UNICEF, Joint Review of the UNICEF Deployments to UNHCR, Ethiopia, Gambella, May 2016.

22 With financial support from UNHCR, IRC drilled six shallow boreholes along the Baro River in 2014, and in 2015 World Vision drilled an additional 3 shallow boreholes.

23 UNICEF built the collection chamber and boosting station and main pressure line connecting the chamber and the water stations. IRC built the service reservoir and in camp pipe network for the Tierkidi refugee camp, while World Vision built the same installations in Kule refugee camp.

24 A large reservoir is under construction by UNICEF and will be connected with the water kiosks of the city.



center that has grown exponentially in size with the arrival of the refugees, had no water supply system of its own. The center relied on vendor-supplied from 7 km distance, which drew water from Itang hand pumps and transported the water using donkey and horse carts and light vehicle mounted tankers.²⁵

Such innovation in durable infrastructure was made possible thanks to several development partners who contributed to the Itang integrated water system. The main donors were the KfW German development bank, which contributed 61% of the investment, the Humanitarian Response Fund, the Italian Cooperation Agency, the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), UNICEF and other minor contributors. The Regional Water Bureau in Gambella and UNICEF are the two entities responsible for the project design and implementation, while ARRA and UNHCR are responsible for coordinating the in-camp works. UNHCR also played an advocacy role to enable WASH development funds to be directed to refugee and host community water projects, and has been involved in the development of the UNICEF proposals and reviews.

2.2 A more sustainable approach to water management

Governance mechanism - The Itang integrated water system is a first in the country, connecting refugee camps with the local communities. A total of 250,000 people will benefit from the new water

system (75% or more are refugee beneficiaries) once the construction of the entire water system is complete. Its system of governance has also been newly engineered. Rural communities typically manage the water resources, by establishing committees at the Woreda level that are comprised of volunteer members. However, instead of relying on community members, the primary stakeholders in this project decided to professionalize the management of the water system, with the hope that its structure will remain once humanitarian actors leave the area.

The Regional Water Bureau has the responsibility of establishing the Integrated Itang Town Utility. Given the large presence of refugees, it revised Proclamation No. 49/1999 in Gambella in February 2017, expanding the size of the utility board to include an ARRA representative as well as three members from the refugee central committee.²⁶ Once established, the water utility will need to be technically supported in accordance with UNICEF's "Build-Capacity-Build-Transfer" methodology.²⁷ The International Rescue Committee has been selected for the capacity building of the water utility until it becomes self-sufficient.²⁸ Once the handover is complete, the Itang utility board will provide the policy directions to the utility and the technical support to ensure the sustainability of the system.

Financial mechanism - Sustainability of the entire water system will depend on the financial management of the water. Ethiopian water resources management policy favors the adoption of site-specific water service charges, which looks at ensuring equitable and inclusive delivery of water supply services for the least privileged

25 Zenas Engineering Plc., "Willingness and Ability to Pay Analysis of Itang and Thurfam Residents: Volume I", April 2016.

26 The board will appoint the General Manager and Deputy Manager of the utility, who will report to the Regional Water Bureau.

27 As the theory goes, a firm that wins the construction mandate to build the water system and operate it for one year will also have the responsibility to train the water utility to operate the system, maintaining specific service level benchmarks before the system can be fully transferred to the utility (at which point the contract is paid).

28 The third phase of the project is responsible disengagement by IRC to the utility in 2018. IRC has planned a 6 months to handover, followed by a reduced presence in the region. This approach was agreed upon by the key stakeholders of the Itang project during a workshop in February 2017. See for further reading: Zerihun Associates, "Inception Workshop on the Implementation Modalities: Convergence towards a Unifying Implementation Model".

population group. The primary stakeholders of the project thus commissioned a business case study to determine the appropriate levels of tariffs to charge, based on the ability and willingness of Itang and Thurfam urban population to pay for the water supply services.²⁹ The business is based on zero subsidy.

The research found that the creation of the water system had effectively reduced the price of water for the host community to an average of 9 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) per cubic meter in Itang and Thurfam towns.³⁰ The host communities will continue to pay reduced tariffs for the water, while UNHCR and ARRA cover the water provision costs for refugees. In the future, and with the introduction of cash-based interventions and livelihood opportunities in the refugee camps, the utility will start to sell water by the cubic meter to refugees. The overall costs of water provision will also likely go down as UNHCR will no longer have to cover the NGO overhead costs to manage the water provision in camps.

This progress notwithstanding, the challenge remains of ensuring that all the revenue from the water sales covers the costs of the capital, operation and maintenance, as well as those of service deployment. Most water supplies around the world are subsidized or rely on complex cross-subsidies. Additional rigorous and fully inclusive cost analyses of the capital, as well as the running costs of the Itang project, will need to be conducted overtime to match the realistic estimated income from institutions and water kiosks.

2.3 Ripple effects in other regions of the country

Conflict mitigation - Ensuring safe and accessibly water supplies to both refugees and host communities help to mitigate conflict. The building of the Itang integrated water system has already allowed for a positive narrative to be told about the arrival of refugees, who are more often blamed by host communities for depleting natural resources rather than facilitating access to them. The Itang host community now benefits from a sustainable, resilient water supply system, which is a marked improvement from the past, where members of the host communities used to queue to collect water.

Without the presence of refugees, a rural community in Ethiopia like this one may have waited many more years to see the installation of such a low cost and safe water supply system.

Innovation spurred elsewhere - The experience in Gambella has prompted similar discussions in other parts of the country, including in Assosa, Jijiga, Melkadida and Shire. Yet each project is specific to its regional context. In Shire, for instance, the conversation has revolved around the feasibility of building a water pipe network connected to a dam built in 2014 for local irrigation purposes. An environmental and socio-economic impact assessment done in 2015 established that water can be used both for agriculture and human consumption. DFID and the European Union subsequently provided in 2016 sufficient funds to build a distribution network sourcing water from the dam and pumping it into the Adi Harush and Mai-Aini refugee camps and surrounding host community areas.³¹ By having a holistic approach (involving water safety plans) and investing resources in more resilient designs for refugees, these investments can be leveraged to satisfy the needs for the host population. ARRA is supportive of finding a long-term solution to water as a conflict mitigating strategy, together with the Regional Water Bureau, UNICEF, UNHCR and donors.

In Melkadida in the Somali region, UNHCR and ARRA have been able to build a water system when the camps were established. The area is arid and sparsely populated, so the water provision largely focused on meeting the refugee needs, and as the numbers in the host community increased, the water pipe network was gradually extended from the camp to the host population areas. As a result, the focus in Melkadida is less on building an integrated water system, and more on ensuring its sustainability.³² A community-based water management model was established in 2015, leading to a gradual handover of the operation and water supply system. In order to further reduce costs, UNHCR and ARRA have also sought to move away from fuel-based powered system of assistance to a solar power system.³³

The innovations happening in the water sector are being replicated for sanitation and hygiene too. While there is a relatively high latrine coverage rate of about 63% for refugees, emphasis is being placed on anticipating long-term problems (including epidemic

29 A total of 231 households were selected for the survey, using systematic random sampling methods. Field observations were used to enrich the quantitative data collection process.

30 For more information, please read the report by Zerihun Associates, entitled "Revised Business Plan and Tariff Setting for Itang Town Water Utility". The plan puts into perspective how the water system can sustainably run, recover costs and operational maintenance without needing external support.

31 DFID is funding a 5 year self-reliance project and the EU is funding a 3 year Regional Development and Protection Programme. Both started in October 2016 and are in the inception phase.

32 Discussions have been primarily with the Woreda Water Bureau, as the refugee camps are physically far from the Regional Water Bureau.

33 There are currently 5 water schemes in refugee camps in Ethiopia using solar energy for pumping. IKEA, KFW and the EU have committed funding to implement additional solar projects until 2018.

outbreaks) that will occur from the waste produced by refugee camps.³⁴ The focus now is on trying to build longer-term, “waste to value” sanitation options in the refugee camps, including the urine diversion dry toilets, tiger worms that convert human waste into useful fertiliser, biogas latrines and briquetting from solid waste.³⁵ The other priority area is to support municipalities to manage sludge both in adjacent Woreda towns by providing them with vacuum trucks and construction of sludge drying beds. In Gambella, for instance, such investments are significant given that the municipality did not have adequate capacity.³⁶

2.4 Coordination in the water, sanitation and hygiene sector

Coordination in the WASH sector is quite advanced in Ethiopia. The country launched in 2014 the ONE WASH National Programme (OWNP), which currently covering 6 key components: rural water supply, rural sanitation and hygiene, urban water supply, institutional WASH and water quality. It brings together the Federal Ministries of Water, Education, Health and Finance, as well as all donors and implementing partners around one plan, one budget, and one report. OWNP has a budget of 2.5 billion USD over 5-7 years, as it has secured blended financing assistance (loans, grants) from UNICEF, DFID, the World Bank Group, the African Development Bank and the Government of Finland through the Consolidated WASH Account.

In the future, it may be worthwhile integrating the refugee WASH coordination mechanism (which UNHCR and ARRA co-chair) into the ONE WASH programme (under the emergency sector co-chaired by UNICEF and the Ministry of Water). This merger may only take place once the Refugee Proclamation is revised on the basis of the Government’s pledges of September 2016, which aim to facilitate the inclusion of refugees into national systems.

34 A total of 39,000 family latrines were functional and in use as of the end of December 2016. Comparing this figure to the total number of households in all camps for the same period (about 155,000 if we consider only camp based refugees) and assuming that 2.5 households/families share one latrine, the required number of latrines comes to approximately 62,000. This extrapolation yields a latrine coverage rate of about 63%.

35 These “waste to value” interventions are being funded by the Gates Foundation, the US Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration and UNHCR’s Innovation Fund.

36 UNHCR provided a vacuum truck (previously the municipality had to rent one truck that was stationed 350 km away) and capacity training.


UNHCR Guidance Note on WASH Programming for Refugees in Urban situations

LEBANON case study. February 2018

1. Overview of refugees in country

The humanitarian situation in Lebanon, driven by the Syrian refugee crisis has impacted Lebanon since 2011. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), a joint Government, UN and non Govt agency strategic framework considers both vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees (displaced Syrians¹) as well as old and new caseloads of Palestinian refugees. Refugees are distributed throughout the country, with notable concentrations in some locations. 251 most vulnerable cadastres have been identified in 2013 (as shown on map 1). Refugees are mostly in urban areas, except in Bekaa, which is more rural. The scale of needs is massive with nearly 30% of the country's current population being either Syrian or Palestinian refugees² which is placing a huge ongoing burden on Lebanon.

Map 1. Vulnerable localities (from LCRP)



The Government policy is to not have large scale refugee camps (which is distinctly different from nearby Jordan) which means refugees are very disbursed throughout the country. There is a prevailing move towards work on stabilisation, which entails amongst other things, a move towards all but the most vulnerable refugees having to take on more costs/ expenditure, and to some extent management of their own basic services. The country is politically fragmented, making working relationships between the national level and municipal level very challenging. For this and other reasons the crisis in Lebanon is undoubtedly particularly complex.

2. Coordination complexity

Within the LCRP provision for WASH features within a range of sectors; Basic Assistance (unconditional cash allowance for water and hygiene), Social stability (Solid Waste Management - SWM), Shelter (work on Sub Standard buildings) and the WASH sector itself (see figure 1). The WASH sector is thus highly disbursed/ fragmented, for some understandable reasons, but this reality presents coordination challenges as WASH issues feature in many other sector forums in which WASH actors often don't find time to contribute to.

Figure 1. WASH within other sectors

Sector	Level at which activities undertaken	Activity
Water	Water establishment network level 	Water and wastewater networks
Social stability	Municipal level 	Solid waste collection
WASH (shelter)	Settlement – sub standards buildings. Outside buildings	Septic tanks serving sites
Shelter	Settlement – substandard buildings. Within building 	Within building plumbing
Basic assistance	Households 	Cash allowance makes provision for water purchase and for hygiene items.


¹ Designation agreed as per LCRP

² Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020

Furthermore, different sectors/agencies plan and implement using different geospatial geographical units/levels, (see figure 2);

- WASH works at settlement level for Informal Settlements (small tented camps).
- Shelter, including WASH in buildings, works at cadastral (a local administrative unit) level.
- Health works at cadastral level.
- Social stability works at municipal level.
- UNDP works with the Lebanese Host communities Support Project clusters.
- WASH works at regional level with utilities.


Figure 2. Different geospatial units/levels




Syrian refugees live in 3 main settlement types; around 18% of refugees live in Informal Settlements (IS), 12% in so called non-residential (i.e. not intended for long term habitation) buildings and 70% renting in residential buildings. These all require varying levels and types of WASH related support, though work in ISs has many of the characteristics of camp service provision and is dependent upon UNHCR and others to support. The shelter sector has undertaken useful work to categorise if and how shelters/building are Sub-Standard (SSBs), whether they are residential or non-residential. This takes into account building condition and whether these are overcrowded. The informal settlements have a slightly different classification of *in need*, as opposed to sub-standard, making direct shelter comparisons harder.

In essence this classification highlights the assumption that all those in informal settlements are presumed to be continually in need, which invariably draws assistance to them and so away from sub-standard buildings. None the less the shelter sector has been able to present a picture of unmet need across each of these 3 main shelter types (see figure 3).

Figure 3. Condition of shelter type (LCRP)




227,000 people in informal settlements² **156,000 people in non-residential buildings¹**



The WASH sector which works closely with the shelter sector has moved more towards use of the same shelter/housing shelter sector classifications, enabling them to present data in a consistent way, as depicted in the LCRP for access to latrines (see figure 4). This classification also notably uses SDG 6 definition for improved and unimproved latrines (see below for standards/SDGs).

Figure 4. Latrine by shelter type (LCRP)

Number of Syrian households that have access to improved or unimproved latrines by shelter type. (UNHCR ongoing household profiling of registered Syrian refugees)



3. Working with other sectors

As noted above WASH related activities are fragmented. Social stability/cohesion is a significant sector/programming theme in the Syria response and in particular in Lebanon where many SWM projects have been undertaken under the social stability sector. It was observable that SWM was relegated to the status of a *means* of supporting social stability. The *end* of effective coordination and effective implementation of SWM was often lost amidst pressing social stability concerns. This has led to projects that are driven by visibility of intervention but not often adequately planned and sustainable.

The converse has also been true. The UNICEF led Thrive project initiative sought to bring together health and WASH programming, but initially neglected to make social stability /protection a key joint objective. This ran the risk that investment prioritisation could neglect social tensions, which might be as critical at this stage of the response as public health concerns. It was recommended that UNHCR advocate for inclusion of social stability as a key driver for prioritisation of projects.

The disbursal of refugees across 3 major household/settlement types in Lebanon has made comparative assessment of WASH vulnerability hard. For IS UNHCR WASH standards are used to determine the extent of service provision. Residential and non-residential buildings are assessed to determine whether they are sub-standard buildings, including whether these have sufficient toilets and taps, but this does not relate directly to camp type standards applied to IS. While there was constant monitoring of standards in IS with information available on a dashboard, there was no systematic countrywide comparative analysis of the WASH gap in residential and non-residential SSBs.

The Basic Assistance sector uses the Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees (VASyR) to provide an assessment of overall household needs. This assessment used a consistent methodology across all settlements types, so does provide a way of comparing relative need, irrespective of where refugee live (though it was not applied to host populations). Assistance packages, generally cash with some winterisation goods, are provided to those determined to be most vulnerable and the cash allowance includes provision for purchase of WASH related goods. Some WASH goods could be purchased from the market with this (unconditional) cash allowance, but purchase of collective WASH services e.g. network connections, would not be possible so households may have remained WASH deprived even with cash in their pocket.

4. WASH programming

At the outset of any major new crisis humanitarian actors use Sphere as the international reference point and UNHCR uses their own internal WASH standards. Though both these sets of standards are considered to have applicability across a range of settlements types, they perhaps retain better applicability to camp situations. Though Sphere is currently under revision there is no direct relationships between either Sphere/ UNHCR standards and the SDGs³. This does present something of a challenge for alignment of humanitarian and development efforts, making comparison between services e.g. non-refugees in low income communities and refugees in IS harder and of course does not allow humanitarian monitoring to link with national development monitoring. This is now being addressed in Lebanon through the LCRP which seeks to move towards use of SDGs, to align monitoring humanitarian WASH efforts with longer term efforts to support safely managed drinking water services and household toilet provision. This will lead to the much better understanding of measurement of the longer-term impact of all interventions.

As in Jordan, the amount of funds spent on trucking operations, i.e. water in/faecal sludge and solid waste out, has been massive and a huge drain upon budgets. In the LCRP it was noted that “The Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) estimates that more than two thirds of all resources received through appeals since 2015 have been spent on water trucking, latrine construction and desludging for families displaced from Syria living in temporary shelters and informal settlements. At least 60 percent of the 227,780 persons displaced from Syria now in informal settlements still rely on trucked water”. The status of refugees and where they live often remains temporary and this limits scope to create durable longer-term WASH assets.

Reducing/stopping trucking operations is notoriously difficult and challenges UNHCR and others across the world. In 2013 UNHCR commissioned International Reference Centre to look at life cycle costing⁴ in order to make the business case for earlier adoption of more durable approaches as alternatives to pouring considerable resources into trucking operations in particular. In 2017 a strategy on Provision of Wastewater Services for Informal Tented Settlements in Lebanon was drafted as a way to move towards more cost effective/sustainable Faecal Sludge Management (FSM). Recommendations were also made around increased recycling of solid waste, relooking at household water treatment and reducing the liquid load needing to be trucked away as means of reducing the scale of the trucking operations.

³ Globally, in 2018 UNHCR will be producing an annual report on WASH services to refugees and will align reporting to the JMP.

⁴ <https://www.ircwash.org/projects/life-cycle-cost-approach-refugee-camps>

UNHCR embarked upon the implementation of its largest ever permanent infrastructure project in 2015. The European Union funded DEVCO project, with a budget of 14.8 million Euros over 2-3 years, is a bundle of 9 water projects across 6 Municipalities in the North, and 3 in Bekaa. This has been a complex undertaking for UNHCR, though ultimately will be completed and functional. The DEVCO project, while bringing political leverage for UNHCR has created a host of unforeseen bureaucratic and other challenges (which have not yet been deeply reviewed). UNHCRs' business systems, short programming timeframes, etc, make it ill equipped to take on such large projects. However, across Lebanon, particularly in the later years of the Syrian refugee crisis, UNHCR has created numerous small/medium WASH assets. Projects of this size do much to reduce operational costs associated with trucking and are a much better match with UNHCR's business systems and planning timeframes. It should also be noted that Non-Revenue Water losses amount to about 48% for Lebanon, and so addressing system functionality is sometimes more important than new infrastructure investments.

Back at the start of the crisis, Hygiene Promotion (HP) work grew from an early focus on the IS, so in essence building from a traditional camp-based approach to HP. Clearly in the early days refugees arrived in IS locations which had little in the way of latrines, washing facilities and hygiene items and hygiene promotion work was conducted in this context. At this stage, the majority of people in IS have their own latrines, while some of those in SSB have at least 1 latrine/toilet for no-more than 15 people. Hygiene kits were distributed once per year before, but now these are only given out to selected households.

It may be that much of the current HP/Behaviour Change programming remains caught in a traditional acute crisis camp delivery HP modality. The LCRP makes the case for a shift towards a wider community engagement approach and away from a narrower hygiene promotion focus. This is driven in part by a desire for refugees to take on some of the burden of service provision and in doing so costs. Anecdotally it seems as if the move away from hygiene promotion and evolution towards something that looks more like community engagement is yet to happen. This is hard to do in what are often urban environments, where refugees are disbursed amongst a variety of settlement types.

5. Learning and adaptation for urban (out of camp) crisis

(Numbers in brackets correspond to key guidance within the main guidance note.)

Key themes

1. Sector fragmentation and complexity of administrative units

The lack of geographical alignment of programming units/levels across different sectors and different local government administrative/geospatial units makes coordination of WASH programming particularly complex and less effective. **Recommendation;** Use a geospatial framework for coordination rather than vertical sector coordination. (3.3)

2. Working across a variety of settlement/housing types

The shelter sector lead in the classification of settlement housing types. This classification must also be coherent across settlement types and not treat IS differently. Without coherence it makes it extremely difficult to compare WASH needs and gaps across settlement types, and so drive relative prioritisation. **Recommendation;** WASH needs to use the same categorisation as shelter to have better sector alignment and prioritisation. (4.2.8)

3. Social stability & basic assistance - driving coordination through joint objectives

Both social stability and basic assistance sectors include a significant component of WASH, but often don't have enough WASH input and presence in planning and coordination. **Recommendation;** Develop joint objectives with other sectors as one critical way to strengthen ownership/coordination and improve WASH outcomes within other sectors. (3.4)

4. Determining household WASH Vulnerability

Determining household WASH Vulnerability is difficult because it can be a result of a lack of cash, lack of services and /or denial of access to services. **Recommendation;** WASH needs to work closely with protection and BA to use their overall vulnerability assessment as a proxy for WASH assessments, but also supplement this with some public service and market assessments. (4.1.3/4.1.4)

5. Humanitarian Standards, SDGs and impact

The LCRP has tried to move humanitarian monitoring and reporting towards using JMP metrics to report against SDG 6. **Recommendation;** Build upon this initiative to support alignment of humanitarian work with development sector goals globally. (4.1.1)

6. Small/medium Assets not trucking operations, and at least 2-year programming

There is a well-recognised need to withdraw from trucking operations, and invest in asset creation. Large projects are invariably outside UNHCRs reach given UNHCR programme timeframes and business systems. **Recommendation;** Focus on small and medium sized projects/asset creation, which particularly deliver benefits for Low Income Communities. (4.2.4/4.2.5)

7. Recasting HP/BC programming as wider community engagement

HP needs to be adapted for the urban environment and middle-income populations but this is not as straightforward as it seems. **Recommendation;** The LCRP highlights the need to promote wider community engagement and utilise refugee capacity to support service provision delivery/ management and contribute more to payment of fees for service delivery. Learn from this experience and apply globally. (4.2.12)


UNHCR Guidance Note on WASH Programming for Refugees in Urban situations

TURKEY case study. February 2018

1. Overview

Turkey is the world's largest refugee hosting country. UNHCR reports from Oct 2017¹ state that there are over 3.5 million (3.2 million Syrians) refugees in Turkey with more than 90 per cent of refugees living outside camps in urban and peri-urban areas. The greatest numbers/concentrations are in Istanbul and 3 provinces in Southern Turkey bordering Syria (see map 1). The majority of refugees arrived after the onset of the Syria war in 2011. The refugees in Istanbul are distributed within this significant sized metropolis that has the capacity to absorb these. The Southern provinces adjacent to Syria have had to cope with massive influxes of Syrian refugees and also have proportionality higher number of refugees (relative to host population) than other provinces, and so their absorption capacity has been particularly stretched. It is significant that Turkey has adopted an approach to Syrian refugee crisis which is: i) non-camp with 90% refugees outside camps, and ii) Govt financed, with little international contribution initially needed or expected. Being a middle-income country with well-developed services and an initial view that the crisis would not be protracted were key factors to support this approach. The approach is certainly an enlightened one and in line with the UNHCR's Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).

Map 1. Syrian refugee population in Turkey by province



¹ UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet - October 2017


2. Organisation of Turkish Government Assistance

Turkey is committed to streamlining assistance to Syrian refugees through existing national institutions, and demonstrates a high level of ownership, leaving a relatively small capacity gap for the international community to fill. The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) is the main national Govt agency responsible for organising the response to the Syrian refugee crisis, supported by key line ministries. AFAD has taken the lead in supporting the 0.25 million refugees in camps, with central gov line ministries and municipal authorities taking the lead role in supporting the remaining 3.25 million refugees in urban (out of camp) locations. The Turkish Govt reports², that around \$25 billion from Government / private sector and civil society have been utilised since the crisis began, with very little international assistance either through funding or service provision. The Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs has reported a budget for WASH of \$5 billion for infrastructure to support the Turkish host population and refugees. Urban WASH infrastructure upgrades have been financed by “provincial Bank” long term loans, International financing (JICA lending authority), Turkish Govt State water authority loans and Turkish Ministry of Development has supported municipalities with infrastructure financing.

AFAD as the sole authority the creation of new camps and for determining the terms of camp management has spent a substantial amount on services for the refugees in 25 main refugee camps. UNCHR has declared the Turkish-led and Turkish-financed camp management as “emergency response of a consistently high standard”. Additional payments from the national level have been made to provinces hosting refugees out of camps, with financial allocations made based upon a simple formula for the number of refugees present in each province. Municipalities are then able to invest in service upgrading for both host and refugee populations in areas where required. Expenditure disaggregation is not available, so it is not known on what and where money has been spent and the extent to which refugee, along with host populations have been supported.

Urban authorities have carried the heaviest load in terms of provision of WASH services, and since 2011 have made significant progress in development of infrastructure to expand WASH services for the increased population. However, it is acknowledged that many refugees live in abandoned buildings and in informal settlements in un-serviced areas of the city and have limited access to basic WASH services, particularly in the provinces adjacent to Syria where refugee concentrations are highest and the refugees often the poorest. The World Bank notes in their report³ the strains of hosting Syrian refugees are felt especially in cities in the southeast of Turkey and there are tensions with Turkish communities relating to competition over jobs, rising rent prices, strains on municipal services and infrastructure, and cultural differences. The World Bank (WB) report (p8) also noted that “the quality of the housing stock utilised by refugees has also been raised as a concern, with one rapid assessment reporting that only 25 percent of respondents have access to heating and only 35 percent have easy access to toilets and shower facilities”. A summary overview from Tufts university⁴ included some macro level data on water network coverage derived from the Turkish Statistical Institute in 2014 (see map 2.). This suggests that for example the Gaziantep province network coverage was around 81-85% (it is not known whether this includes the Syrian population). This shows that there were some gaps in piped water coverage in some key refugee hosting locations, though whether reliable and safe alternatives were available is not known.

Map 2. Water supply network coverage by province (Tufts University)



Despite these issues, there were no significant WASH related epidemics reported. Overall a picture emerges of a sometimes oversaturated and overstretched private housing market with its associated service provision stretched beyond capacity in some critical locations.

2 <https://suen.gov.tr/en/istanbul-uluslararasi-su-forumu/4-istanbul-uluslararasi-su-forumu/ozel-oturum/> see AFAD data 2/5/17

3 Turkey's Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Road Ahead. WORLD BANK – DECEMBER 2015

4 https://sites.tufts.edu/gis/files/2016/01/Hojun_Song_RunnerUp_2017.pdf

3. Spotlight on locations with high Syrian populations; Istanbul, Gaziantep Kilis⁵

In broad terms large cities (like Istanbul) and large-scale service providers have greater capacity to respond to massive population growth due to refugee influxes. Small towns/cities (like Kilis) need more support from national government and/or international community. Gaziantep and Kilis provinces are adjacent to the border with Syria and were faced with some of the earliest arrivals of Syrian refugees in 2011, quickly rising to numbers of refugees that were high relative to the host Turkish population. This has 3 particular implications;

1. These areas had to gear up quickly to respond to a massive new and unplanned for population.
2. The WASH (and other built environment) services absorption capacity was greatly /over stretched.
3. The presence and needs of so many refugees could easily create social tensions.

Gaziantep. The city of Gaziantep (population 2 million) has had a population increase of 450,000 refugees. Many are living in sub-standard and abandoned buildings. They access toilets in mosques and practice open defecation in vineyards because there are no toilets in the buildings where they are living. The city engineers have worked on improving city water networks and wastewater networks where required. There has been \$500 million investment in water and sewerage infrastructure.

Kilis. The city of Kilis has seen the most population growth (in relative terms) of any city in Turkey, with refugee population of 140,000 now outnumbering the local population of 70,000. The city has struggled to solve the water and sanitation problems and faced technical and financial difficulties. It has however been supported by the broader municipality of Gaziantep. They are now investing in 2 dams to increase water supply to the city.

Istanbul. 600,000 Syrian refugees are believed to be living within Istanbul. Total population of the city is around 15 million. The vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Istanbul undertaken by Supportlife in April 2016⁶ indicated that around 95% of refugees lived in houses and apartments where water supply and sanitation was adequate. (It should be noted that the total sample size was for this assessment is unclear.)

4. Overview of international assistance

The overall international humanitarian assistance is framed within the 2016-17 Turkey Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP), and within the overall Syrian crisis 3RP-Regional-Strategic-Overview 2017-18. The 3RP partners support AFAD through the provision of camp facilities and non-food items to camp residents. The Camp Coordination and Camp Management sector support AFAD in the management of camps in south-eastern Turkey⁷. The 3RP plans include a resilience component under basic needs which looks at supporting the hosting communities and this is coordinated by UNDP (Resilience Response). Under the basic services sector, the 2016/17 Turkey 3RP sought to assist 1.7 million refugees/0.2 million host population under the refugee component, and 0.4 million refugees/0.5 million host population under the resilience component. Food security and protection of livelihoods remain a top priority and an urgent need for Syrian refugee households living outside of camps. A geographic targeting approach is used in the absence of access to registration data and to concentrate limited resources to localities hosting high numbers of refugees.

The Activityinfo tool, in conjunction with the Refugee Assistance Information System (RAIS) provides some data on household level analysis. Basic assistance targeting does generate a household level analysis but data is not publicly available. Multipurpose cash and winter in-kind assistance is provided to people that have been assessed as socioeconomically vulnerable through an interagency assessment. In August 2017 UNHCR began a pilot project to give direct cash transfers to support shelter improvements. Interestingly the percentage of refugees living below the poverty line is not recorded in the 3RP-Regional-Strategic-Overview (2017-18), while it is for other Syrian refugee hosting countries. However, it does state that that the majority of Syrian refugee households are entering a “cycle of asset depletion”, with their savings gradually exhausted and levels of debt increasing. It also notes that identification of the needs among Syrians in the host communities remains the biggest challenge facing the sector partners.

Comprehensive data on settlement types is unknown beyond the approx. 0.25 million Syrian refugees in camps with the rest in urban (and peri urban) areas. Unlike in Lebanon there is no publicly available (from AFAD, UNHCR or elsewhere) quantification of how many people live in different settlement/building types; i.e. habitable residential buildings, overcrowded residential buildings, incomplete residential buildings, non-residential buildings etc. However, a draft

⁵ Data on Istanbul, Gaziantep, Kilis reported by Murray Burt drawing from the 4th Istanbul International Water Forum

⁶ data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13065

⁷ UNHCR Turkey factsheet Oct 2017. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCRTurkeyFactSheet-October2017.pdf>

cash gap analysis report⁸ has used data from eight organizations and 50,000 households which contains detailed information on shelter type, while data from six organizations and 31,000 households contained information on shelter conditions (poor, very poor, etc.). However, there was no mention of water, sanitation or health.

The 3RP outlines a longer-term vision is to continue to encourage urban planning at the local level to respond to existing challenges, where currently substandard shelter conditions have often been compounded by an increase in demand and strain on basic services provided by local municipalities. The shelter sector uses cash as a principle modality to address winterisation and general maintenance needs of shelters. The shelter sector (which effectively does not exist for Turkey as it is within basic assistance), continues to move towards support to refugees in urban locations based upon the inter-agency vulnerability analysis of households and might be the right vehicle for understanding more about household level WASH vulnerability. For Syrians living in host communities, WASH challenges were also related to cost and reliability of services.

5. International WASH


The requirements for WASH interventions, i.e. the gap left by govt support at the service level seems small, though there are noted sanitation and hygiene concerns. WASH work is contained within Objective 3 of the basic services sector of the Turkey 2016-17 3RP which states; Targeted populations live in satisfactory conditions of sanitation and hygiene, and this was planned to be met by delivery of hygiene kits to all/ most refugees in camps and some out of camps. The 3RP reported hygiene kits were distributed to

around 0.25 million people by Sep 2015 for that year and the plan contained a budget of \$14.67 million for 1.94 million Hygiene kits for distribution in and out of camps. The cash allocations to the most vulnerable provide scope for purchase of WASH goods and services, though the cycle of assets depletion suggests this will be further compromised over time. The response and budget allocations appear to have been overwhelmingly for hygiene kits. While there is no post distribution monitoring and analysis available, it seems unlikely that the well-developed markets of Turkey justify ongoing purchase of hygiene kits at such scale.

The Turkey response is notable in so much as there is no national level WASH (or shelter) coordination platform under the UN led 3RP, though a non 3RP WASH sub national coordination platform existed in Gaziantep. This is reflected in the coordination structure, (fig 1) which shows that a WASH Working Group (WG) led by UNICEF existed in Gaziantep in 2016.

Thus, any WASH interventions are effectively to be found within the Basic Needs and Essential Services sector, which is primarily cash-based. Interestingly there was no basic needs sector coordination at Gaziantep province level. There is a very good Wat/san piped network capacity in Turkey and so an emphasis on cash response is partly a reflection of the quite small gap in WASH service provision overall. This suggests an absence of a dedicated WASH coordination platform is understandable. The Turkish Govt response itself coordinates its WASH response on a sector basis through the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs. UNHCRs own 2016 planning document noted there is a need to provide technical expertise and training to Govt and there is also a need to support coherence of the response amongst NGOs particularly in Southern Turkey. The 3RP 2017-18 and the Save the

Figure 1 Coordination structure (UNHCR turkey operational update, Jan-June 16)



8 Cash gap analysis report Draft for comments

Children (SC) report⁹ highlighted the importance of providing municipal level support for both coordination with international organisations and national NGOs. Both the 3RP and SC identify the importance of supporting service providers in key locations to respond to increased service demand through capacity strengthening and service delivery (upgrading and expanding service coverage and improving service efficiencies).

UNHCR's interventions aimed at improved sanitation and hygiene in refugee hosting areas have been limited due to scarcity in resources and implementation capacities. UNHCR makes most grant contributions directly to the Turkish Govt who provide a range of services. Information is not available on what funds are used for, though UNHCR states it will support the Government initiatives through the provision of support to build and renovate community sanitary facilities in the camps, as well as capacity building and raising awareness of refugee hygiene matters. In the first half of 2016 UNHCR provided 21,102 hygiene kits to address some of the health needs of the urban Syrian refugee population. Issues related to health and hygiene are expected to remain of concern. Shower, toilet and shelter containers have been provided to frontline institutions to improve sanitary conditions as part of the Mediterranean response.

6. Learning and adaptation for urban (out of camp) crisis

This section outlines some conclusions from the experience in Turkey. This need to be seen in the context of a massive and overall very successful Turkish Govt response. (Numbers in brackets correspond to key guidance within the main guidance note.)

1. WASH sector Coordination

Coordination is complex and could be improved in those locations carrying high refugee caseloads near the Syrian border. **Recommendation:** Support Govt coordination capacity at the provincial and municipal levels enabling them to better connect to international and national organisations. The numbers and proportions of refugees in Gaziantep province mean this is a key location that needs this type of support. (2.4)

2. Focussed WASH programme support to overstretched provinces

As outlined above Turkey has shown it has significant refugee absorption capacity (all sectors) and was able to mobilise further resources to support surge

requirements when the refugees arrived. However, the absorption capacity of locations in provinces that have had to deal with e.g. a doubling of population are clearly more stretched. The scope for social tensions to arise in such locations is also noted. **Recommendation:** Provide direct budget support, in conjunction with coordination support (see Rec 1. Above). The ability to do this depends upon being able to negotiate protocols with national Govt to permit UNHCR to provide local level complementarity to directly support local Govt actors. (4.2.2/4.2.5)

3. Data and analysis for the out of camp caseload

The dependence upon the private household market to support most refugee needs and the absence of a comprehensive picture of where and how this is overstretched means the extent of household level WASH need is not known in great detail.

Recommendation: Govt and UNHCR to be able to be much better at gathering and analysing WASH data for those living out of camps. Given Govt data is not made publicly available and is anyway disbursed, having staff working within the Govt structure could unlock data/analysis and provide the basis for internal advocacy to Govt and the international community where gaps are identified more systematically. (4.1.2/4.1.4)

4. International WASH response defaulting to distribution of hygiene kits

Unsurprisingly, given scale of need, there is limited shortfall in Turkish government capacity to address WASH. The international community has chosen particularly to focus on hygiene materials in out of camp situations, which has been met through provision of a substantial amount of hygiene kits, despite a reasonably strong market in Turkey. The 3RP and other documents allude to other interventions, but these have not been undertaken at scale and don't appear well developed. **Recommendation:** Identify ways to support WASH services out of camps beyond the limited impact hygiene kit distribution which predominates. (4.2.11)

5. Access to and purchase of services

Access to labour markets and freedom of movement (as per host country obligations under 1951 Convention) is essential so that refugees can pay water bills and reduce dependence on humanitarian assistance and make WASH service provision sustainable.

Recommendation: Undertake an analysis of the extent to which this is working in conjunction with livelihoods and protection sectors through livelihood and market assessments to provide a long-term analysis of where problems exist and how these can be faced. (3.2)

9 SCF report Humanitarian situation analysis of Syrians under temporary protection in turkey. Sep 2016

UNHCR Guidance Note on WASH Programming for Refugees in Urban situations


UGANDA case study. February 2018

Uganda case study - a focus on Kampala within the wider context

1. Overview

Uganda is Africa's largest refugee hosting country with a total of over 1.2 million refugees and ranks among the top three refugee hosting nations in the world. Despite the ongoing influx of refugees Uganda continues to uphold its out of camps policy, including the provision of freedom of movement and the right to work. While many South Sudanese refugees live in new settlements in the NW of the country, refugees from South Sudan and other countries live in other locations with an increasing number settled in Kampala (see map 1). The rural settlements are receiving support from Government, UNHCR and other organisations. Refugees in Kampala, many of whom are older caseload Ethiopians, Somali, Congolese and others, don't receive direct support from the international community.

Map 1: Refugee locations in Uganda (UNHCR Monthly Snapshot. Sep 2017)



2. Organisation of assistance to refugees in Uganda as a whole

Uganda is one of the countries that has adopted the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) approach. The Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHOPE) strategy reflects this approach as it seeks to; build ownership/capacity among local governments and community institutions; improve basic social service delivery; expand economic opportunities and sustainable livelihoods; address environmental degradation in refugee-hosting areas. The 2017 Revised South Sudan Regional (multi country) Refugee Response Plan - Jan-Dec 2017 also places emphasis upon; Peaceful co-existence with local communities and Durable Solutions. The WASH sector has developed objectives around access to community and household latrines, water systems and environmental health campaigns. The overall response budget has risen from just over \$100 million in 2013 to about \$550 million in 2017. The Budget for water and sanitation was \$110 million for 2017¹ and for UNHCR is \$55 million for 2018². The WASH-Strategy-2017-Uganda-Refugee-Settlements does not mention Kampala and does not include any WASH interventions in Kampala.

Coordination in Uganda is structured over four levels: 1. Leadership level; 2. Multi-sector inter-agency level; 3. Sector level; 4. Regional / settlement level (localised inter-agency / sector coordination mechanisms). The coordination structures for humanitarian WASH are aligned around ministerial level responsibilities and divided into WASH sub sector groups. There are 5 main WASH coordination forums in Uganda³; The Water and Sanitation Technical Working Group; The WASH Emergency Coordination Group; The Sanitation Working Group; the Uganda Water and Sanitation Network; Public Health Inter-Sector Coordination. There have not been any humanitarian forums working on Kampala to date.

Despite the aspiration to adopt CRRF principles, the humanitarian WASH Sector Coordination Meeting on 1st Feb 2017 noted that the response (which does not include Kampala) faced a number of challenges. Specifically; traditional humanitarian response is not addressing sustainability and ownership concerns; there is a mostly supply driven – hand out, rather than demand led model; there are different approaches to programming in host and refugee communities; parallel co-ordination structures. There is an acknowledged need to strengthen WASH sector coordination, and improve linkages between settlement and country level coordination⁴. There was also an identified need to ensure that refugee issues are included in District Development plans; and align humanitarian response


and common programming with the SDG/Sector-wide approach. Overall this might suggest that short term humanitarian funding timeframes, along with many traditional service delivery dominated approaches of humanitarian actors don't easily lend themselves to adaptation to the ReHOPE strategy, despite the positive enabling environment conditions created by the Ugandan Govt.

3. Kampala⁵

Kampala has about 1.75 million residents with a significant urban poor population. The refugee population has nearly doubled since 2012 with a significant increase in the past year. The registered refugee and asylum-seeker population residing in Kampala was 94,958 in 2017. However unofficial estimates suggest there are another 100,000 unregistered refugees living in Kampala, so with the officially registered refugees is a number comparable to the largest refugee settlements in the North West.

In 2014 approximately 32% of Kampala's residents resided in informal settlements according to Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). Kampala's informal settlements are characterised by "poor physical infrastructure, including a lack of paved roads, minimal rubbish collection and inadequate drainage systems along with a persistent risk of flooding and presence of unhygienic and unsanitary practices". The location of informal settlements is shown on the map 2 below. KCCA has identified a series of satellite cities, earmarked for further development to incorporate projected population expansions, as shown in the map 3 below.

Map 2: Location of informal settlement in Kampala. (Slum Dwellers International)



1 UGANDA Comprehensive Refugee Response Plan 2017 Humanitarian Needs and Requirements


2 UNHCR GA2018-Uganda-eng

3 From Humanitarian-WASH-Sector-Coordination-Proposed-Model 2017

4 Notes-from-the-National-Humanitarian-WASH-Sector-Coordination-Meeting-WASH_01022017

5 Notes draw heavily from IRC report Arua Municipality and Kampala Urban Context Analyses - July 2017

Map 3: KCCA map -proposed satellite cities in the Kampala physical development plan



The KCCA strategic plan 2015-16 aims to steadily step up efforts to upgrade the city slums by a variety of measures such as; creation of the slum upgrading fund, developing of an integrated human settlement plan, providing housing incrementally improved over time, creation of land banks; implementation of a relocation program for slum improvement, upgrading unplanned settlements and identifying areas where urban low-cost housing estates can be constructed. With increasing commercial developments, slums are rapidly being transformed by the private sector without government intervention. The pace of change is rapid and is forcing some low-income residents to go to other slums or the outskirts of the city.

4. Situation of refugees in Kampala

As refugee numbers in Kampala have been relatively low in comparison to the entire city population, KCCA has not undertaken any specific planning for refugees to date. However, there is increasing recognition by KCCA officials of the challenge and opportunity of refugee presence in the city and a desire to incorporate refugees into future resilience planning. So KCCA is in the process of establishing and chairing a forum for coordination of refugee affairs, alongside developing a comprehensive urban-specific refugee response program.

In Kampala, the majority of refugees are scattered in the city's low-income areas, often settling in already poor communities and informal settlements prone to floods and diseases. There are certain neighbourhoods where refugees from the same country of origin

concentrate: Somalis in Kisenyi and the Congolese in Katwe, Makindye and Masajja, Ethiopian refugees in Kabalagala. Kisenyi community is transforming on a daily basis therefore prompting refugees to move to other informal settlements.

Refugees who opt to stay in Kampala rather than the designated refugee settlements are expected to be self-reliant. The Ugandan Refugee Act of 2006 permits refugees the same access to services as Ugandans, so refugees can access local government services if they have enough money and they don't face discrimination or perceived discrimination in facility fees or quality of services. The World Bank states that the refugee Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) is an average 38% compared with Uganda's 74%⁶. In general, the Government of Uganda and UNHCR do not provide accommodation or material assistance to asylum seekers and refugees living in Kampala. As explained by Refuge and Hope International⁷, urban refugees are often confronted with issues similar to those the local urban poor encounter but they also face additional challenges, though in many circumstances, Ugandan poor may be equally or more vulnerable than refugees in Kampala.

In 2012 UNHCR organised a round table for refugees in urban centres to discuss new approaches and modalities for assisting self-settled refugees in the capital⁸. Kampala has a large presence of community-based, refugee-run organisations. However, there is a lack of coordination of NGO-provided services both on a technical and geographic basis within Kampala. The International Rescue Committee report states that UNHCR does not take a leadership role in Kampala, unlike in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

5. WASH in Kampala⁹

Provision of improved and adequate sanitation services is one of the most significant development challenges in Kampala City, which is experiencing rapid population and economic growth. In Kampala, most of the population (about 90%) use on site sanitation technologies. KCCA recently carried out a survey on the status of toilets in Kampala and the report shows that about 50% of the residential sanitation facilities in Kampala are shared. Each shared sanitation facility (toilet block) on average serves about 5.4 other households, with an average household occupancy of 5. Unsurprisingly the sharing of toilet facilities is most common in informal settlements.

KCCA has come up with minimum standards for onsite sanitation and funds are being sought to raise awareness of these standards and carry out enforcement measures. However very few landlords

6 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/ugandas-progressive-approach-refugee-management>

7 <http://www.refugeandhope.org/refugees-in-Uganda>

8 RSC Working Paper Series No. 95

9 Data from emails exchange with KCCA Projects Coordinator Innocent Silver

can manage to put up facilities that meet these standards as they have no access to credit facilities and therefore can only afford substandard facilities which are a health hazard. At the moment there is no commercial bank that is offering credit for such projects/plans. If funds were available which could be accessed by landlords at a small interest rate, possibly facilities that meet minimum standards could be constructed.

Solid waste management in Kampala has improved. In the past KCCA has been collecting solid waste at no fee from informal settlements that house refugees, but it lacked the capacity to collect all the solid waste generated. Recently a Public Private Partnership was created and in the contract informal settlements are subsidised so the private sector is expected to collect from informal settlements at a very low price. Residents in informal settlements can pay as little as less than \$1 dollar per month. There is also need to sensitise residents on this new solid waste PPP to realise better results. Laws governing solid waste management in the city are in place but needs to be enforced more consistently.

The National Water and Sewerage Cooperation, the body in charge of providing safe water to residents, devised pro-poor services to ensure that people living in informal settlements have access to clean safe water. All the spring wells in the city have been declared unfit for human consumption due to contamination of the underground water sources. Nevertheless, there is still a substantive number of people who are still using water from these spring wells for consumption, so sensitisation and enforcement is also required.

The humanitarian WASH sector has developed its WASH standards for use in refugee settlements but these did not have in mind the urban environment. The KCCA Projects Coordinator considered that these humanitarian standards don't have direct applicability in Kampala. This makes it very hard to make any meaningful service level comparisons between Kampala and the refugee camps. While there are laws and bi-laws guiding sanitation practices in the city they are not widely known and enforced. So, while Kampala is facing great sanitation challenges, compared to large refugee settlements in the country, the situation is still better in Kampala. KCCA needs support to carry out regular monitoring of the sanitation status of informal communities in particular. Activities like sensitisation on best practices and community mobilisation have to be undertaken, though transportation constraints limit KCCAs' ability to do this.

6. Learning and adaptation for urban (out of camp) crisis

(Numbers in brackets correspond to key guidance within the main guidance note.)

Key themes

1. How is alignment of humanitarian and longer-term development achieved?

Despite the enabling environment in Uganda which supports better alignment of humanitarian and longer-term programming, alignment has been reported as a challenge for humanitarian actors working in the rural settlements. It does not appear to be an issue in Kampala, because the city has some level of absorption capacity and does not make separate provision for refugees. However, the new refugee settlements in the North West had to be created from scratch in very short time frames, but in doing so created parallel structures, different approaches, etc. **Recommendation:** UNHCR could learn from Kampala planning processes and coordination mechanisms (which don't make separate provision for refugees) to understand the extent to which this can be applied in the rural refugee settlements. (3.1)

2. Is there a need to support municipal capacity to respond to surges of refugees?

The surge of migrants and refugees is placing a significant new demand upon Kampala, with refugees contributing perhaps as much as an 11% population increase. The burden of care falls to KCCA. The city has had to absorb refugees but has not made particular provision for them. UNHCR and other international organisations don't offer coordination support, guidance or programme in Kampala in any significant way. KCCA understands it has to change this way of working going forwards given the scale of new arrivals and now start planning and responding to their needs. Yet it remains without international humanitarian support. **Recommendation:** UNHCR could support KCCA gauge the scale of unmet WASH need for refugees and the host community, and understand what issues they face; money/access /limited services in order to identify potential solutions. UNHCR could then put this in context with services in the refugee settlements in other parts of the country. (4.2.2)

3. Is there a need to focus on Kampala's low-income areas/informal settlements?

In particular refugees are congregating in low income areas/informal settlements where services are already inadequate and overstretched. This may also cause/increase tensions between communities competing for resources. KCCA has indicated that support to resolve poor sanitation in the low-income communities

in informal settlements could be useful. A focus on addressing some of the physical and legal barriers in informal settlements, along with longer term planning for formalisation and decongesting of these settlements is required. **Recommendation:** UNHCR could undertake mid-term planning and work with KCCA to support refugees, along with host populations, in both informal settlements and perhaps even city expansion for Low Income Communities, within the KCCA masterplan. (3.5/4.2.1/4.2.4)

4. WASH approaches across refugee settlements, host communities & Kampala

There are different approaches and standards for work in rural refugee settlements, host communities and where refugees live in Kampala. While WASH standards have been agreed for refugees in rural settlements, to what extent are these also applicable and used in Kampala? KCCA has indicated that refugees and host populations in the informal settlements have an average of 27 users/latrines (KCCA target not provided), compared to the post emergency rural refugee settlement target of 20/latrines. However systematic monitoring against agreed standards, which also vary from rural to urban, does not occur in Kampala. Without comparable WASH service provision across all areas, it is very hard to highlight the most critical shortfalls and so prioritise limited resources. **Recommendation:** UNHCR align WASH standards for refugee settlements to fit within national standards that take account of urban/high density areas and build monitoring systems with measurement against SDGs and advocate where there are critical gaps. (4.1.1)

5. Absence of household vulnerability assessment for refugee in Kampala

Household vulnerability assessment does not extend to refugees living in Kampala as it is assumed that they are able to be self-reliant. Even where WASH services are available through the market, the ability of refugees to be able to consistently purchase such services without undue drain on household income is unknown. Household vulnerability analysis appears to be a significant gap. This highlights the need for vulnerability assessments that cover all settlement types, and an ability to build a picture of relative needs rather than assume greater self-reliance in urban areas is consistently achievable. **Recommendation:** UNHCR share its overall vulnerability assessment tools with KCCA with a view to build these into the city poverty and vulnerability analysis. (3.2/4.1.4)

Urban WASH Planning Guidance Note