

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

# Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities

## Indonesia country report

(Aceh and Nias)

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

TEC

April 2006

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

# IMPACT OF THE TSUNAMI RESPONSE ON LOCAL AND NATIONAL CAPACITIES

## Indonesia Country Report

(Aceh and Nias)

**Elizabeth Scheper**
*with contributions from*
Smruti Patel and Arjuna Parakrama

**April 2006**

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## ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| ACF | *Action contre la faim international* (Action Against Hunger International), France |
| APIK | *Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan* (Indonesian Women's Association for Justice) |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| AusAID | Australian Government Overseas Aid Program |
| BAKORNAS PBP | *Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penangguilangan Bencana Dan Penanganan Pengungsi* (National Coordinating Agency for Natural Disaster and Refugees Relief), Indonesia |
| BAPPEDA | *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (District Development Planning Agencies), Indonesia |
| BAPPENAS | *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional* (Ministry of National Development Planning), Indonesia |
| BRIMO | Special Operations |
| BRR | *Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi* (Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency), Indonesia |
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency |
| CBO | Community-Based Organisations |
| CfW | Cash-for-Work |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| CRS | Catholic Relief Services |
| DINAS | Dinas Penerbangan Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Air Force) |
| ERTR | Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery [Programme] |
| GAM | *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement), Indonesia |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GTZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH |
| Hivos | *Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking* (Humanistic Institute for Development Cooperation), the Netherlands |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IFRC | International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| INGO | International Non-Governmental Organisation |

| | |
|---|---|
| KDP | *Program Pembangunan Kecamatan (Kecamatan* Development Programme, a district programme by the World Bank) |
| KP | *Komnas Perempuan* (National Commission to Prevent Violence Against Women), Indonesia |
| LPAM | *Lembaga Pencerahan dan Advokasi Masyarakat* (Nias Community Advocacy and Enlightenment Council), Indonesia |
| MSF | *Medicins sans Frontiers* (Doctors without Borders), France |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| PASKA | *Program Pengembangan Aktifitas Sosio-Ekonomi Korban Konflik Aceh* (Socio-Economic Activities Programme for the Conflict Victims in Aceh), Indonesia |
| TAPOL | The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign |
| TEC | Tsunami Evaluation Coalition |
| TNI | *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Army) |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNESCAP | United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNIFEM | United Nations Development Fund for Women |
| UNV | United Nations Volunteers |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WALHI | *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* (Indonesian Forum for Environment) |

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The 26 December 2004 earthquake shifted the tectonic plates and pushed down the coastal shelf of northern Sumatra. The consequences were dramatic: the earthquake caused a series of tsunami waves, some measuring 12 metres high along the southern Aceh Jaya district and wreaking death and destruction in Indonesia's Aceh and North Sumatra provinces and other coastal communities.

As the country closest to the epicentre, Indonesia suffered greater devastation than any other nation, accounting for 80 per cent of all deaths and 47 per cent of all those internally displaced. In addition to 127,358 fatalities, 533,770 people were displaced, and nearly 94,000 remain missing. Compounding the tragedy, another severe earthquake hit the region on 28 March, resulting in additional 893 deaths and extensive structural damage on the islands off the Aceh coast.

Large stretches of coastal land were swept away, others have been permanently submerged or remain subject to flooding at high tide, posing significant long-term consequences. Entire communities need to be relocated, as rebuilding in their original locations is not feasible without erecting complex infrastructures.

Indonesia's economy was equally devastated, with approximately 40 per cent of private-sector losses occurring in the housing industry. An estimated 25 per cent of the labour force became unemployed, raising the total unemployment rate to over 30 per cent in the disaster area.

### Pre-Tsunami Capacities

Although Aceh accounts for 30–40 per cent of Indonesia's oil and gas exports,[1] its economy remains based on rural subsistence farming and fishing. Local self-sufficiency is supported by informal community groups centred on local mosques. Yet a protracted conflict between government and armed separatist forces – leading to prolonged periods of martial law and significant restrictions on the media and civil society – had reduced the capacity of provincial authorities before the tsunami. Women in the eastern and central parts of Aceh suffered greatly from the conflict. Although at the time of the tsunami there was a developing momentum toward peace, the public's confidence in the government had been significantly undermined.

Nias Island is one of the least developed regions in Indonesia. It has suffered long-term neglect, compounded by geographic isolation and the economic and political marginalisation of the island and its predominantly Christian inhabitants. While the tsunami's effect on Nias was relatively mild, the 28 March 2005 earthquake left 839 dead and over 6,279 injured. It also crippled the island's infrastructure, hampering relief operations.

Very few international agencies were present in Indonesia before the tsunami disaster, largely due to the conflict and resulting inaccessibility. Some had previously worked in Aceh, but withdrew after the re-imposition of martial law in 2003. The limited number of local non-government organisations (NGOs) was focussed mainly on advocacy and human rights, as mobilising communities for development work was not permitted.

**National and International Capacity**

Due to the region's remoteness, weak local government capacity and the scale of the disaster, the Indonesian national government could not effectively address the immediate relief needs in Aceh and Nias. Although the National Coordinating Agency for Natural Disaster and Refugees Relief (BAKORNAS PBP) had an ad hoc disaster management structure, supported by special boards at the provincial and district levels, such structures were wiped out by the tsunami. Because BAKORNAS had no contingency plans, it was unable to provide operational capacity and coordination for national and international responses. There were no clear coordination procedures for national or international actors, making the initial relief response ineffective.

In the absence of national coordination capacity, international agencies were left to initiate and coordinate their immediate relief responses on their own. However, few international aid agencies had prior work experience in Aceh and, therefore, did not possess the requisite contextual knowledge or stakeholder networks. This made it difficult to assess local stakeholder capacities. Under severe pressure to deliver swift relief assistance to displaced survivors, nearly all international actors opted for operational programmes and flew in large numbers of humanitarian sector specialists to assess and address the immediate needs. While this decision facilitated a faster response during the earliest response phase, it proved to be an inappropriate and unsustainable approach in transitioning to recovery and reconstruction.

High staff turnover hampered the ability of international agencies to build institutional memory in terms of contextual knowledge and relationships. To implement large operational programmes, international agencies acquired contextual knowledge and local language skills *in situ* – by hiring Acehnese staff,

attracted by higher salaries and challenging programmes, away from local organisations. This 'brain drain' weakened the capacity of local organisations, which had already incurred dramatic human and physical losses in the tsunami disaster. This hindered the efficiency and ownership of recovery programmes and slowed down the transition from the recovery phase to the reconstruction and development phases. In Nias, an additional cultural insensitivity was noted, as virtually all international agencies' local staff had an Islamic background and lacked familiarity with the Christian cultural context of the island.

**Local Capacities**

Given the scale of the disaster, the loss of leadership and the collapse of government institutions, communities had to cope on their own immediately following the tsunami. In its wake, survivors sought refuge at higher altitudes and lived on fruits and coconuts in Aceh Jaya – or were taken in by family and neighbours in urban areas of Aceh Besar. Depending on an area's proximity to the capital and scale of destruction, it took humanitarian workers up to ten days to reach affected communities, as was the case in Krueng Sabee. In the meantime, villages and towns with strong leadership initiated their own rescue and relief efforts in the spirit of the Acehnese tradition of *gotong royong* (voluntary mutual assistance). While relations with local government were strained, community cohesion and horizontal social capital had remained strong.

However, village leaders were disempowered by their limited involvement in the planning of aid programmes. A general breakdown of communication between international agencies and local communities was observed during field visits to Aceh Jaya, Pidi, Aceh Besar and Nias. Overwhelmed by new obligations and responsibilities brought on by the tsunami recovery process (such as land disputes and logistical problems), local leaders expressed an urgent need for increased interaction with international agencies. Such interaction would have strengthened their planning capacities and helped build horizontal and vertical social capital. More effective coordination and a holistic approach to solving the problems of inaccessible and isolated communities would have yielded better results, and have thus been identified as key areas for improvement in the international response.

Three claim-holder categories can be identified as particularly vulnerable: remote communities with minimal service provision pre-tsunami, vulnerable women, such as poor female-headed households and war widows, and communities affected by violent conflict. The emphasis on relief and recovery during the international response of the first eight months left the needs of vulnerable people under-resourced. The focus on formal housing and livelihoods tended to miss the poorest households who were self-employed or did not possess formal land titles to their homes. While these vulnerable groups were

provided for in camps or temporary shelters, few recovery projects were initiated specifically for the informal sector or squatter communities.

In the remote and underdeveloped coastal zones of Aceh and Nias, the pre-existing lack of basic infrastructure and the dispersed nature of local settlements made it difficult to implement large-scale reconstruction projects. Many remote, marginal fishing communities did not receive any assistance. To reach and rebuild such communities, a flexible approach based on partnership agreements with community-based organisations (CBOs) is indispensable. Flexibility is also needed in dealing with communities where it is difficult to make distinctions – in terms of absolute need – between tsunami-affected coastal and conflict-affected inland areas. The economies of these communities are interlinked, as goods produced in one area are brought to markets in the other. Therefore, inland communities should be considered as affected by the tsunami and included in reconstruction programming. Differences in standards and timelines between tsunami- and conflict-recovery programmes could, if not carefully managed, unintentionally exacerbate inequalities and tensions.

**Quality and Accountability**

At the time of this evaluation, public accountability of international efforts toward intended claim-holders (or 'downward accountability') was virtually non-existent. One indicator of this is the difficulty the evaluation team encountered in obtaining project documents, budgets and progress reports. Various initiatives are attempting to address this shortcoming. Although not operational at the time of this evaluation, the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Donor Assistance Database system is designed to document donor involvement in the reconstruction phase. In addition, the Indonesian government's Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) is expected to increase transparency by playing the role of a broker in planning and monitoring of the reconstruction process. Commensurate with their current roles, international agencies have also begun to consider alternative forms of downward accountability.

The role of the media as advocate for vulnerable groups is much less prominent in Aceh and Nias than in the comparable communities of Sri Lanka and Thailand. In Indonesia, years of protracted conflict have restricted freedom of expression, and many affected districts are without newspapers or television coverage. To overcome this information and communications gap, more international assistance should be provided to facilitating the flow of information – for example, through the rehabilitation of radio services, wall newspapers and news booths. National advocacy NGOs are playing an increasingly prominent

watchdog role to advocate for the rights of women and vulnerable groups, especially in the issues of land rights, forced relocation, corruption and traditional interpretations of Shari'a law.

**Conclusions**

International tsunami assistance had a positive effect on peace and governance in Aceh province. This was not entirely intended, and has yet to be strategically exploited to the full. International aid agency presence exposes this hitherto closed region to new participatory development approaches and good governance concepts. This exposure may have a positive impact on downward accountability and inclusive, rights-based development processes in the new autonomous region of Aceh. The new political space needs to be recognised and actively utilised by international agencies involved in the tsunami response, as the window of opportunity is potentially narrow.

Specific gender-based needs were identified in most assessments, yet few gender-sensitive approaches were observed in housing and livelihood recovery programmes. However, both international agencies and local NGOs with a specific women's mandate have developed interesting pilot initiatives that can serve as models for improved women's involvement in the reconstruction phase.

At the time of this evaluation, the need for mutually accountable partnerships between international and local actors was increasingly acknowledged. While the initial tsunami response was highly appreciated, frustration and disappointment among civil society organisations (CSOs) and claim-holders have grown during the recovery phase. Housing and livelihood projects have been slow, and the participation of local communities in recovery programmes has been limited. To reach the most vulnerable communities, international actors need to rely on and invest in local organisations, as well as build their capacity as key actors in a sustainable development process. In the long term, this will hopefully end the systematic exclusion and discrimination of marginal, rural communities.

Finally, the humanitarian aid system's structural weaknesses, exposed by the unprecedented magnitude of the international tsunami response, provide valuable lessons for future disaster responses. More creativity and flexibility is required to engage national and local capacities in the recovery process and to build disaster risk reduction skills. Despite Aceh's and Nias's vulnerability to natural disasters, government and international aid agencies displayed a surprisingly low level of awareness of the need to plan for disaster risk reduction.

## Recommendations for International Agencies

### *1. Sustain a respectful engagement with local and national capacities*

- Recognise and validate, at both individual and institutional levels, national and local capacities in the local context, particularly in the immediate recovery phase;
- Enhance skills to identify local and national capacities, thereby fostering mutually beneficial partnerships and reducing dependence on foreign experts;
- Enhance contextual knowledge and increase community participation in accordance with international standards;
- Provide institutional support to CBOs, including capacity-building in order to repair 'brain drain' damage and applying fair grant-making standards;
- Initiate crisis preparedness programming, in order to significantly improve the quality of emergency response at the local, national and international levels; and
- Develop the basic elements of an appropriate community-based disaster preparedness plan – in partnership with local communities and local and national governments – in order to build relevant local capacities, thereby reducing vulnerability to future disasters.

### *2. Improve equity, inclusion and downward accountability*

- Reach vulnerable groups currently overlooked in the asset replacement programme, particularly in remote, under-resourced areas of Nias, Aceh Jaya and East Aceh;
- Incorporate experiences of local pilot projects to better address problems facing women, including land ownership, inheritance, Shari'a law interpretations and access to information;
- Strengthen the role of the media as an independent monitor and advocate in Aceh and Nias; and
- Establish transparent public information and accountability systems and boost opportunities for claim-holders to set their own agendas.

### *3. Foster an enabling policy framework and safe environment*

- Employ creativity and flexibility in humanitarian relief systems, in order to engage the capacities of vulnerable groups and meet their specific needs;

- Strategically utilise the new political space in Aceh province to strengthen the peace and democratisation process; and
- Improve cross-fertilisation of tsunami and conflict-recovery programmes in order to guarantee equal standards and timelines to avoid tensions that could exacerbate inequalities and endanger the peace process.

## INTRODUCTION

The 26 December 2004 earthquake shifted the tectonic plates and pushed down the coastal shelf of northern Sumatra. The consequences were dramatic: the earthquake caused a series of tsunami waves, some measuring 12 metres high along the southern Aceh Jaya district and wreaking death and destruction in Indonesia's Aceh and North Sumatra provinces and other coastal communities.

As the country closest to the epicentre, Indonesia suffered greater devastation than any other nation, accounting for 80 per cent of all deaths and 47 per cent of all those internally displaced. In addition to 127,358 fatalities, 533,770 people were displaced, and nearly 94,000 remain missing. Compounding the tragedy, another severe earthquake hit the region on 28 March, resulting in additional 893 deaths and extensive structural damage on the islands off the Aceh coast.

Large stretches of coastal land were swept away, others have been permanently submerged or remain subject to flooding at high tide, posing significant long-term consequences. Entire communities need to be relocated, as rebuilding in their original locations is not feasible without erecting complex infrastructures.

Indonesia's economy was equally devastated, with approximately 40 per cent of private-sector losses occurring in the housing industry.[2] Land tenure and home ownership problems have been further aggravated by the loss of personal documents and local government databases. An estimated 25 per cent of the labour force became unemployed, raising the total unemployment rate to over 30 per cent in the disaster area. As a result of the tsunami, Aceh's economy is projected to contract by about 14 per cent in 2005, which would lead to an additional 600,000 people dropping below the poverty line.

While the humanitarian community reacted quickly, engaging national and local capacities proved to be a challenge. Civil society in Aceh had been repressed for 30 years, due to the protracted conflict between the state and an armed liberation group, the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM, the Free Aceh Movement). Aceh has been subjected to military rule and martial law since 1989, which has curtailed the freedom of association, assembly and expression. Consequently, only a few international aid agencies had pre-tsunami development programmes in Aceh.

The Indonesian government and GAM signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 15 August, bringing an end to a long period of bitter conflict. The tsunami inflicted extensive losses on both sides – in terms of

cadres, infrastructure and community-based support systems essential to sustaining armed struggle. In addition to the tsunami reconstruction process, there is now the need to reconstruct mountain villages that had been extensively damaged in 20 years of conflict.

Nias Island is one of the least developed regions in Indonesia. It has suffered long-term neglect, compounded by its geographic isolation as well as the economic and political marginalisation of the island's predominantly Christian inhabitants. The tsunami was relatively mild on the island, leaving 122 dead, 18 missing and 2,300 displaced people. In contrast, the 28 March 2005 earthquake left 839 dead and over 6,279 injured. The earthquake caused an escalation of fear among the island's inhabitants, so much so that 10,000–20,000 people left the island. Seventy thousand people have been directly affected by the earthquake. The earthquake destroyed homes, schools, places of worship, roads, piers, bridges, health facilities and other government buildings, crippling the local infrastructure and administration. This destruction of infrastructure greatly hampered the relief operation.

**Methodology**

This evaluation is part of a four-country study, which includes Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Three sets of national and local capacities are reviewed:

1) The capacity to *respond* to the disaster as shown by those affected, CSOs, local women's organisations and local and national government. This includes the capacities of women, men and other vulnerable groups in the affected communities to participate in decision-making related to relief and recovery efforts, local governance, resource mobilisation, planning, protection, advocacy, training and livelihoods recovery;
2) The capacity of community members to *access* services and markets for livelihoods. This includes access to relief- and recovery-related services of government, and the capacities of the private sector to recover and create livelihoods; and
3) The capacity of community members, CSOs and local governments to *ensure* accountability and quality of service delivery.

This evaluation focuses on five key stakeholder groups: international agencies, national and local governments, local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs) and community/beneficiaries. The response is divided into three phases: immediate emergency (up to two weeks), early recovery (up to three months) and transition from recovery to reconstruction and development (from four to eight months).

The six core questions for the evaluation are:

1) How local and national capacities changed as a result of the tsunami response;
2) How well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in providing relief and recovery assistance;
3) What intended and unintended changes to local and national capacities occurred as a result of the tsunami response by international actors;
4) To what extent transition, risk reduction and recovery programming, planned and implemented, influenced local and national capacities;
5) What lessons can be learned for efforts to strengthen local and national capacities for future crisis response and recovery; and
6) What gender differences occurred, and how the experiences of women and men varied.

The core evaluation team, composed of Arjuna Parakrama, Smruti Patel and Elisabeth Scheper, paid a three-week visit to Aceh province and Jakarta from 14 September – 3 October 2005. Local support was provided by the national consultant Abdur Rofi and data analyst and translator Riza Syahputra. Semi-structured interviews, focus groups and key informant discussions were conducted with key stakeholders. Case studies of good and bad practices were collected, and a claim-holder survey was conducted among 1,000 tsunami-affected individuals in four districts, in order to assess the effectiveness of the tsunami response in building local capacities from a claim-holder's perspective. The claim-holder survey was carried out between October and November, in partnership with the Aceh NGO Forum (also known as 'Forum LSM Aceh'), a local NGO advocacy network with 78 member organisations.

The team selected four research districts in close consultation with locally based Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) members, applying three criteria:

1) Sites with severe tsunami damage and different geographic and economic baseline characteristics (for example, 'Ground Zero', the provincial capital, the conflict-affected east coast and the remote island of Nias);
2) Sites where TEC members support tsunami programmes of special interest (for example, local government capacity-building projects, housing programmes in the centre and periphery, CBO livelihood projects and self-help groups); and

3) Sites with projects that cover different vulnerable groups to study good and less successful practises (for example, local women's groups, Cash-for-Work projects, youth programmes and projects targeting groups such as tsunami-affected war widows and remote fishing communities).

Four districts were visited for an average of two to three days each:

1) Banda Aceh (the provincial capital where most international agencies are based);
2) Calang and Krueng Sabee (Aceh Jaya district, the hardest hit and remote southern coast);
3) Sigli and Pasi Lou (Pidie district on the tsunami- and conflict-affected east coast); and
4) Nias (the remote, predominantly Christian island in the North Sumatra province, with limited international assistance).

The team visited projects being implemented by United Nations (UN) agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Volunteers (UNV), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as projects of international NGOs, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), Oxfam International, Muslim Aid, Islamic Relief and the Humanistic Institute for Development Cooperation (Hivos).

At the local and national government levels, members of key ministries of planning and social welfare, the Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), District Development Planning Agencies (BAPPEDA) and the Indonesian Air Force (DINAS) were interviewed. National NGOs dealing with transparency and accountability, gender equality and capacity building were met in Jakarta, while the team visited a range of local NGOs, particularly women's groups, in Aceh and Nias. At the community level, the team interviewed local community leaders and members of most vulnerable groups to document best practice cases, including the *posko* (community command post) of Krueng Sabee, war widows affected by the tsunami in Passie Lou, and the remote, overlooked fishing communities in Nias.

In order to consult a wide group of stakeholders at critical stages of the evaluation process, the team conducted four workshops. On 15 and 18 September, the team participated in TEC consultative briefing workshops in Jakarta and Banda Aceh, in which it facilitated group discussions. The Capacities team also gave two debriefing presentations in Banda Aceh and Jakarta on 27 September and 3 October, respectively, for all parties that had participated in the evaluation process. Lists of participants are

presented in Annex 1. Exit stakeholder workshops were held in Banda Aceh and Jakarta – on 27 and 28 of April 2006, respectively – to validate the findings of the report.

The key constraints to this evaluation were:

- Limited access to project documents, budgets, and financial and narrative progress reports of TEC member agencies;
- To reach more stakeholders, the team split up for most of the mission time, resulting in logistical issues such as lack of translators and other communication problems; and
- It was not possible to meet with all stakeholders due to scheduling conflicts and numerous monitoring and evaluation missions visiting the area.

Issues specific to the survey included:

- Survey results were not available until late November due to delays caused by Ramadan, translation and data entry. The coding of the data took well into January.
- It proved impossible to identify local NGO partners in each of the four research districts, because they were either non-existent, not experienced to do research, or already overwhelmed by tsunami activities. Hence, the number and geographic reach of questionnaires was limited. Therefore, the team appreciated that the Aceh NGO Forum possessed experience in conducting election monitoring and voter education surveys and was prepared to partner in the exercise. The Forum assisted by selecting member organisations in three districts and sending experienced interviewers to remote locations where local NGOs do not operate.

The report is presented in five chapters. Chapter One gives a brief overview of national and local capacities at the time of the tsunami and presents a first assessment of the direct impact of the disaster. Chapter Two presents the findings of international and local humanitarian responses according to three humanitarian aid phases: immediate relief, recovery and transition from recovery to reconstruction. Chapter Three analyses the impact of the tsunami response on five cross-cutting regional themes: land and displacement, migrant labour, the conflict and tsunami nexus, disaster risk reduction, and vulnerability, marginality and the empowerment of women. Chapter Four summarises the findings and good practices in three core capacities: the capacity to deliver, the capacity to access and the capacity to ensure quality of services and accountability. It concludes with recommendations.

# CHAPTER ONE: NATIONAL AND LOCAL CAPACITIES AT THE TIME OF THE TSUNAMI

## 1.1. Context

Aceh was an independent sultanate until the twentieth century, having fought off repeated attempts by the Dutch to colonise the area. In 1904, the Dutch finally won control. In 1945, after a brief occupation by Japan during World War II, Aceh became part of the newly independent state of Indonesia. Aceh has a long tradition of trading with fellow Muslims from India, the Arabian Peninsula and the Ottoman Empire. Aceh's unique culture includes a more conservative form of Islam than other parts of Indonesia. Combined, these two cultural aspects strengthen the Acehnese identity as an ethnic group distinct from the Javanese and other Indonesian peoples.

The GAM separatist movement emerged in 1976. When the resistance turned increasingly violent in 1989, Aceh became a 'Military Operational Area' and remained largely under military rule until the end of the Suharto regime in 1998. President Wahid initiated the first peace talks with GAM during the political '*Transformasi'* (the time of the East Timorese independence). Law number 44, acknowledging the 'Special Characteristics of Aceh', was passed in 1999. Aceh was granted autonomy under Law 18 in 2001 and introduced Shari'a law in 2003. However, martial law was reinstated in March 2003–2004, when both ceasefire agreements of 2000 and 2002 were violated. New military offensives and forced relocations resulted in approximately 130,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). At the time of the tsunami, preparatory work on the 'Aceh Social Reconstruction Agenda', a cross-sector initiative of the government and civil society, had just commenced. Most registered IDPs had returned home, and only 1,800 remained in camps.[3]

## 1.2. Poverty, Marginalisation and Vulnerable Groups

Out of Indonesia's 33 provinces, Aceh ranks fifth in terms of poverty, with 29.8 per cent of the population living below the national poverty line in 2002.[4] Its ethnically homogenous population lives mostly in rural areas of subsistence farming, fisheries and related informal-sector businesses. Aceh generates almost a quarter of Indonesia's offshore oil and gas production, which represents nearly half of the province's revenues. Poverty has fuelled the prevailing Acehnese nationalist sentiment of the national government exploiting the region. Unsustainable mining practices, illegal logging and destruction of protective mangrove forests for commercial shrimp farming have resulted in environmental degradation. Economic investment in the province has been hampered by protracted conflict.

Historically, resilience has been the outstanding Acehnese characteristic, making local communities strongly self-reliant. Women have always played an important role in community life, though they have little public involvement in decision-making in the political domain. Most community-based organisations are informal and related to community mosques (*meunasah*), such as the *avisan* (mothers' group which focuses on vulnerable people and funeral arrangements, using simple lottery systems to generate local funds), *magliyan masdi* (youth groups) and *yasinan* (prayer recital groups). Other traditional networks include those built around livelihoods, such as *Panglima Laot,* a coastal network of village leaders formed to regulate the community fishing industry.

In Nias, the majority of the population are farmers and fisher folk. Tourism is a major source of additional income, particularly in the south. There has been a steady decline in tourist arrivals over the last three years, due in part to nascent conflict among traditional clans. The limited transportation facilities to and within the island make it hard to widen the tourist base; for example, the ferry from Gunung Sitoli takes 12 hours to the mainland, and it is another eight hours from there to Medan. Lack of basic governance and development frameworks in Nias significantly reduces the accessibility and flow of information to and from marginalised communities.

### 1.3. Governance and Civil Society

Extended military rule in Aceh has diminished public confidence in the government. This has been compounded by high levels of corruption, poor service provision and restrictions on the media and civil-society engagement. A pre-tsunami survey by Gajah Mada University concluded that the bad reputation of local government stemmed from corruption, collusion and nepotism.[5]

There are serious gaps in the scale and quality of basic social service delivery, in both urban and remote rural areas. Rural public health and education services are of substandard quality due to poor infrastructure and the difficulty of attracting and retaining qualified staff.[6] Financial establishments such as banks and credit institutions are largely absent outside of towns and do not have provision to borrow without collateral. As a result, small farmers, fisher folk and micro-enterprises are heavily indebted to local moneylenders (*taukes*).

The Decentralisation Act and the special autonomous status of Aceh province have implications for capacity building. Indonesia's Decentralisation Act dates back to 1999–2000, when the laws on Regional Governance and Fiscal Relations between the Centre and the Regions were passed. Both laws envisaged a two-year preparatory period with the understanding that regions would need continuous support to handle

decentralised responsibilities. At the request of the Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS), GTZ (a Germany-based international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) conducted a needs assessment in 2001; the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) built a database of donor support for the decentralisation process; the Asian Development Bank funded the Ministry of Home Affairs to develop a module entitled 'Capacity Building to Support Decentralised Administrative Systems' and the World Bank launched the *Kecamatan* Development Programme (KDP). The strategic decision to empower the district-level instead of provincial administration through the Decentralisation Act clearly reflects concerns about creating powerful breakaway provinces. Ongoing local government capacity-building strategies have, therefore, bypassed provincial structures, and public confidence in provincial parliamentarians is consequently very low.[7]

Several local student movements emerged during the early days of the political transformation process of 1998. One example is the Coalition of Acehnese Students for Reform, or KARMA, known for civil-society initiatives that address conflict causes, including advocacy work on democratisation and human rights, and for providing humanitarian support and counselling for people affected by the violence. Political confrontations with the military and local government occurred as Aceh continued to move in and out of military rule. Few organisations were active in strengthening community participation, resource mobilisation and promoting sustainable livelihoods, and only a small group of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) maintained a local presence. Most agencies that arrived in 1998 left when the conflict escalated again in 2003.

A survey of the impact of the tsunami on local NGOs, conducted in February 2005 by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and *Missi Sejati Perempuan Indonesia* (MiSPI), identified 189 groups, including those in areas not directly affected by the tsunami.[8] Of the international organisations with a local pre-tsunami presence in Aceh, the World Bank ran KDP, while bilateral agencies including USAID, the Australian Government Overseas Aid Program (AusAID) and CIDA conducted local government trainings under the Decentralisation Act. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Save the Children (and periodically MSF) were engaged throughout in programmes for conflict-affected people, while a small number of other INGOs were funding local advocacy groups working on democratisation, peace-building and gender.

### 1.4. Disaster Mitigation Context

The National Coordinating Agency for Natural Disaster and Refugees Relief (BAKORNAS PBP), chaired by the vice president, is responsible for managing natural disasters as they occur. The Board is activated in times of disaster and is composed of relevant ministers (for example, ministers of social services, health and public works), Indonesian National Army (TNI) commanders and chiefs of police. BAKORNAS PBP is represented at three levels: the national BAKORNAS PBP secretariat, provincial district committees chaired by the governor, and district secretariats, chaired by the *Bupati* (an elected district head). Although the region is highly vulnerable and earthquake-prone, no disaster risk reduction or early warning programmes existed in Aceh or Nias before the tsunami.

### 1.5. Immediate Impact of the Tsunami

The loss of 166,364 lives from a population of 220 million amounts to only 0.08 per cent. However, it translates to 4 per cent of the population at the provincial level. This huge death toll directly affected the ability of communities and extended families to establish effective self-help resources. Many leaders died, and community groups fell apart as a result of displacement. An estimated 60 senior civil society leaders perished in Aceh province.[9] Local authorities lost over 5,200 staff members, 3,000 civil servants died and another 2,275 were reported missing.[10] In addition, there was extensive damage to facilities and infrastructure. Central government directives and the dominant presence of the armed forces in Aceh had long discouraged local officials from independent initiative, and after the human tragedy and destruction of the tsunami, the local government system effectively collapsed.[11]

Damage outweighed loss by an average ratio of 66 to 34, with 71 per cent of the damage being to private properties and 29 per cent to public. Nearly a third of the overall damage was within the housing sector, and the infrastructure and productive sectors were damaged by 14 and 8 per cent, respectively.[12] While the offshore oil and gas sector suffered little damage, the agriculture and fishery sectors, commerce and various types of wage-employment in urban areas sustained the main economic losses. The private sector, including family businesses, suffered 77 per cent of the total damage and loss. An estimated 80,000 small enterprises, which had provided income to some 140,000 people, were destroyed. The number of micro-enterprises lost is not known. The agricultural sector faces additional challenges with flooded land and years of soil degradation, while the fishery sector was already suffering from over-fishing and heavy indebtedness to local moneylenders. Although the impact on national gross domestic product (GDP) for 2005 is estimated to be only 2.7 per cent, the total damage and loss amount to 97 per cent of the GDP for Aceh province. As a result of the tsunami, the per capita income for the people of Aceh could decline by as much as 32 per cent in 2005.[13]

The tsunami affected poor and affluent communities alike. Among the victims, women and children suffered the most losses. Villages along the Aceh Jaya coast, such as Padan Datar, lost nearly 80 per cent of their female populations. This has been attributed to both the time of the disaster (8 am, when many women were preparing food indoors, while part of the male population was in the foothills collecting fruit or out fishing) and to differences in physical strength and ability to survive the force of the waves. UNDP staff estimates that, overall, the death toll was 60 per cent female and 40 per cent male.

Exacerbating the situation, the 28 March earthquake in Nias damaged a large number of homes, schools, places of worship, roads, piers, bridges, health facilities and other government buildings, crippling the local infrastructure and administration.

# CHAPTER TWO: FINDINGS

## 2.1. Immediate Response

***National response***

In the afternoon of 26 December, when the severity of the disaster was realised in Jakarta, the vice president of BAKORNAS PBP was sent to Aceh to assist local district management boards in assessing the damage. He carried US $5m from private funds, as BAKORNAS PBP is an ad hoc structure without contingency budgets for emergencies. Upon his arrival, it soon became clear that all district disaster management secretariats in Aceh had collapsed, along with most other government offices, including TNI and the police.[14]

The next day, the government, overwhelmed and unprepared for a disaster of this magnitude, requested international assistance and gave permission to foreign military teams to begin search and rescue operations. These operations were quickly aborted, as no survivors were found. The focus then shifted to clearing debris, recovery and burial work, in order to reduce the risk of infectious diseases. The Indonesian Marines played a key role in providing humanitarian assistance to the remote Aceh Jaya district, which had become inaccessible after all roads were washed away. In addition to delivering emergency relief, the Marines also provided coordination, governance and security assistance during the first three months. TNI and BRIMO (Special Operations) coordinated most of the search and recovery work in Banda Aceh. They were aided in the recovery and burial work by Muslim youth groups from all over Indonesia, and by assistance from the military of 31 countries. Most notable was the assistance provided by the United States aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln. The aircraft carrier happened to be passing through the Strait of Malacca on return from a tour of duty in the Middle East and played an important role in conducting the first humanitarian needs assessments.

On 29 December 2004, BAKORNAS PBP formed a Special Coordination Unit for Aceh in Jakarta.[15] The Ministry of Home Affairs dispatched 156 staff members to assist in the relief coordination and set up 'command post' (*posko*) systems to coordinate the emergency response at the district level. Ad hoc measures were taken to provide human resources to deal with multi-agency responses at the national and provincial levels.[16] In Aceh, however, international rescue teams noticed little of the national coordination and guidance provided by Jakarta.

In Nias, the poor to non-existent road system and minimally functioning internal administrative systems hampered the delivery of emergency relief, particularly in the post-earthquake context, when most of the island was affected. The systemic underdevelopment of Nias has proven both an obstacle and an alibi to a less-than-satisfactory international response to the crisis.

***International response***

As the tsunami struck during Christmas holidays, international agencies faced logistical challenges in organising an immediate response. Banks were closed for the year-end accounting process, and most institutions had only skeleton staff on duty. The exception was USAID, which had local mechanisms in place to respond to anthropogenic disasters. Stockpiles of medicines, dry rations and tents were quickly released and distributed in Aceh province in collaboration with the US Navy. IOM, which had a pre-tsunami local presence, turned into a veritable trucking company, distributing goods overland. However, an evaluation of this USAID relief effort by the United States Institute of Peace concluded that, while the USAID emergency response was timely, the delivery of relief assistance was ad hoc, unfocussed and slowed down by too many coordination meetings.[17]

It took UNHCR two days to reach Aceh with personal funds of staff members and visiting relatives. Though UNHCR has been operating under a country agreement with the Indonesian government since 1979, this relationship was sensitive.[18] UNHCR worked closely with the Ministry of Public Works in its shelter programme and chaired a shelter working group of agencies involved in organising shelter for displaced survivors. Various coordinating offices were opened within a week of the disaster. The United Nations Disaster Management Assessment and Coordination team was formed with OCHA participation. The Disaster Mitigation Unit of UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery provided technical support to the Flash Appeal and the Damage and Loss Assessment, and facilitated the recruitment of a qualified team of UNVs from India, together with the UNDP regional office in Delhi. The absence of contingency and disaster preparedness plans proved to be a constraint on the response of UN agencies during the early days.

The UN launched a joint Flash Appeal on 6 January 2005, which included four projects under UNDP's Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme. This was an early recognition of the urgent need to rebuild the capacity of local governments to coordinate the reconstruction and development phase. OCHA established a Humanitarian Information Centre in Aceh to share information with international aid agencies arriving in the province. The Flash Appeal generated ample funding for

immediate responses. Thus, instead of additional funding requests at the mid-term review, extensions of project periods beyond the original end date of 30 June were sought and given.[19]

International appeals, coupled with extensive global media coverage of the disaster, led to historically high levels of donations to the relief and recovery process. For the first time in history, INGOs became the main humanitarian assistance actors, with more funding than that of UN agencies and bilateral donors combined. The majority of the private donations went to IFRC and 10 other NGOs, including Oxfam International, CARE International, World Vision International and Caritas Internationalis.[20] This put pressure on the delivery capacity of INGOs and prompted them to scale up their institutional capacity to deliver.

The first INGO teams arrived in early January to assess the situation and respond to appeals for assistance to refugee camps. For example, Oxfam International provided water and sanitation infrastructure, and MSF contributed medical assistance. Save the Children and IOM, with a prior presence in the region, mobilised their resources to assist in the logistical coordination of relief supplies delivered via helicopter from navy vessels. All international agencies made opted for operational programming, as local capacities were deemed to be too damaged and scattered to be mobilised in the immediate relief efforts.

**Box 2.1: *Muhammadiyah*–UNICEF's Child Protection project in Sigli, Pidie District**

*Muhammadiyah* is a national Islamic umbrella organisation that started work in Aceh 4–5 years ago. Among other areas, it is involved in post-conflict trauma healing programmes financed by the Asia Foundation. Other areas of activity include child protection, nutrition, advocacy, human rights and formal education. In the tsunami response, *Muhammadiyah* has been cooperating with UNICEF, Oxfam International, CARDI, Save the Children and the district education offices.

In the immediate emergency relief phase, *Muhammadiyah* worked with UNICEF in the registration of children and family reunification. Women and children's centres were set up in the first week of January to address registration, reunification, recreation, psychosocial assistance, basic services and temporary accommodation for unaccompanied children through traditional *musjids*. The *Muhammadiyah* centre in Sigli was staffed by 20 volunteers, trained by UNICEF in different technical backgrounds. Another 44 volunteers were deployed in two IDP camps (Darusalam and Ule Kareng districts), and there were 40 additional staff from Banda Aceh. A small mobile team visited *pesantren* (religious boarding schools) to register children. In the IDP barracks of Sigli, *Muhammadiyah* provided psychosocial support to children who had been affected by tsunami and conflict traumas. The centre for children aged between 12 and 17 encouraged playing and learning together. The Japanese government provided a mobile medical clinic to tour the barracks, with medicines supplied between April and August.

On the whole, *Muhammadiyah* was satisfied with their cooperation with international organisations and felt it had a transparent relationship in which mutual commitments were kept. Major problems cited were the short funding duration, which made it difficult to plan for the long term, and 'very bureaucratic procedures'.

### *Local Response*

Given the scale of the disaster, the loss of leadership and the collapse of government institutions, communities had to cope on their own immediately following the tsunami. In its wake, survivors sought refuge at higher altitudes and lived on fruits and coconuts in Aceh Jaya – or were taken in by family and neighbours in urban areas of Aceh Besar. Depending on an area's proximity to the capital and scale of destruction, it could take humanitarian workers up to ten days to reach affected communities, as was the case in Krueng Sabee. In the meantime, villages and towns with strong leadership initiated their own rescue and relief efforts in the spirit of the Acehnese tradition of *gotong royong* (voluntary mutual assistance).

While relations with local government were strained, community cohesion and horizontal social capital had remained strong. 'Local people demonstrated the ability to organise themselves into CBOs, analysing their situations and making decisions for response action.'[21] Marked differences were observed between communities, even those quite close to each other. For an account of remote communities in Nias, see the case study in Annex 2. Physical damage to community buildings also affected social institutions. As

mosques are the centres of social life of the Acehnese communities, their destruction undermined local groups.

According to the OCHA survey, 27 per cent of the 189 local NGOs operating in pre-tsunami Indonesia lost staff to death or disappearance. A further 25 per cent lost infrastructure, with destruction of their offices, files and documentation. Over half (52 per cent) of NGO staff members lost homes and family members in the tsunami. In addition, 64 per cent of civil society groups cited serious 'mission drift', as concentration on relief work had caused a shift in focus from their normal mandate. Aceh-based NGOs were further hampered by the loss of 20 per cent of their executive staff members to recruitment by international aid organisations. Eighty-eight per cent of local NGOs cited rising prices of property, salaries and vehicles as significantly hindering their ability to meet day-to-day operational costs. Other factors that adversely affected organisations' post-tsunami capacities included lack of access to the field, loss of strategic partners or contact persons, loss of equipment and loss or damage to documents and files.[22]

### 2.2. Early Recovery Phase

***National responses***

While BAKORNAS PBP was in charge of the emergency response, BAPPENAS began to work on a master plan, also known as The Blueprint. The first Recovery Framework was presented at the Annual Consultative Group meeting on 19–20 January 2005 and envisaged a six-month emergency relief and recovery phase, with reconstruction efforts starting in mid-2005. In a master plan titled 'Moving toward a Reconstruction Strategy', BAPPENAS and the international community listed six guiding principles:

1) A people-centred and participative process, where the administration listens to and understands the feelings and aspirations of the people;
2) A holistic approach – rebuilding based on a comprehensive strategy;
3) Effective coordination for consistency and effectiveness among sectoral and regional programmes at national and local levels;
4) Drawing a distinction between rehabilitation – achieving minimum standards – and reconstruction, with a clear strategy for each;
5) Focus on services and institutions, rather than projects;
6) Incorporating fiscal transparency and effective monitoring into the rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes.[23]

A successful reconstruction strategy was designed to result in five outcomes: restoring people's lives, restoring the economy, rebuilding a system of local government that represents the people's aspirations, ensuring the provision of basic services and implementing a province-wide regional development plan.

The Blueprint, drafted by BAPPENAS and presented in April, reduced the relief phase to three months (January–March). The rehabilitation phase was aimed at bringing public services up to an acceptable level and solving legal problems through the settlement of land rights. The Blueprint called for the reconstruction phase to take place between July 2006 and December 2009, with implementation tasked to BRR and BAPPENAS monitoring progress. The Syiah Kuala University of Banda Aceh contributed to drafting The Blueprint, and UNDP provided technical assistance and funding to the planning process while continuing to assist government agencies. Though the importance of consultation with – and engagement of – local capacities was included in planning documents, such good intentions have not translated into implementation.

***Provincial and district government***

By Presidential Decree, BRR replaced the Provincial Disaster Coordination Board and will continue in that role for a period of four years. BRR is directly accountable to the president and is funded through international donations. Its chairman is appointed by the president, and the governor of Aceh is the vice chair. The centralised nature of BRR was problematic from the outset, particularly in relation to issues of decentralisation and autonomy, trust, decision-making and accountability. Interviews with local line ministries highlighted the tensions between the decentralised and autonomous provincial administration and the centrally coordinated BRR. This resulted in dramatic differences in resource allocation between government institutions and raised valid questions regarding the long-term sustainability of reconstruction efforts. While the coordination of reconstruction processes cannot be provided by provincial authorities alone, there is a strong need to clarify the roles of different authorities in rebuilding local governance capacities. Planning, coordination and monitoring are further hampered by lack of accurate data, yet existing data is not sufficiently used.

In Nias, local NGOs identified a variety of local initiatives and capacities, including the age-old tradition of *gotong royong*. However, INGOs constantly bemoaned the lack of local capacity and tended to hire staff from outside the region. For example, of the three staff members in the UNDP office in Gunung Sitoli, only the driver was a resident of Nias, and all were Muslims in an area that is over 80 per cent Christian. A significant number of older residents speak only the local language (*Bahasa Nias)*, and education is conducted in this language in the more remote schools.[24] This leads to additional

communication issues for non-residents, exacerbating an already difficult situation. All of the above increases the growing sense of discrimination among the Nias population.

***International agencies***

During the first two months, an estimated 300 INGOs arrived in Aceh to assist in the relief effort. As most of these agencies lacked local experience and facilities, they spent the first three months providing relief supplies, conducting need assessments and building their own staff and infrastructural capacity, often by attracting the best and brightest staff from local organisations.[25] The lack of contextual knowledge limited their ability to assess local capacities. Dozens left after the first few months, having completed their work or lacking institutional resources to match the scale of recovery operations. Yet well over 200 remain operational, of which 178 had registered by 1 October 2005.

Much has been said about the influx of large numbers of foreigners. Some argue that this tempted agencies to set up their own offices, rather than work through existing local organisations. Alternative views stress that the agencies' operational presence was required, 'because of the scale of the destruction and because there weren't indigenous NGOs or civil society networks to even remotely cope.'[26]

Many agencies tended to treat coordination with Aceh government officials in Banda Aceh and community levels as an afterthought, rather than a key and necessary ingredient for successful response.[27] National concerns over the influx of large numbers of outspoken international agencies in the restive Aceh province increased. UNHCR, which was the first international agency to set up an operational presence in Calang district on 15 January, became the first victim of the backlash. With its long history in refugee protection and shelter, UNHCR was able to provide tents and relief items to 100,000 persons on the west coast. In partnership with IFRC, it proposed a pilot permanent shelter project in Krueng Sabee, with a view to replicating it in other communities down the west coast – a project that could yield up to 25,000 permanent houses in Aceh Jaya district. As political pressure mounted, UNHCR was urged to withdraw from the region by the end of the emergency phase on 26 March. The government explained that, as Aceh did not have a refugee problem, there was no need for UNHCR's involvement in the recovery phase of Aceh Jaya. The UN Resident Coordinator, in meetings and letters to the government, made an unsuccessful effort to persuade the government to change its position. Over the next four months, the shelter sector, including transitional shelter in Calang, was left untouched.

At the time of this evaluation, 70 per cent of the survivors in Calang still lived in camps or elsewhere with relatives. According to UNHCR, this represents a serious lack of management, more so than a lack of

coordination. Since the establishment of BRR, UNHCR has commented on a marked improvement in government coordination. A new Memorandum of Understanding was signed in June; partnerships were forged with IFRC and Alliance, and UNHCR staff returned to Krueng Sabee and Calang in July, commencing construction of the first 400 permanent houses by the first anniversary of the tsunami.[28]

**Box 2.2: The *Posko* (Community Command Post) of Krueng Sabee**

Krueng Sabee is a trading village on the sea, located 20 kilometres south of the Calang district town. Unlike most other communities on the Aceh Jaya coast, the community managed to reorganise itself shortly after the disaster, coordinating relief aid and planning and organising recovery and reconstruction of their villages. This was in marked contrast to the nearby town of Calang, where community cohesion vanished in the tsunami waves. Nine months later, the displaced communities were still in camps, had not managed to appoint new leaders and waited in frustration for external assistance to rebuild their lives.

The tsunami killed 20 per cent of the community in Krueng Sabee (1,480 villagers); nearly 70 per cent of the victims were women. The 5,500 survivors initially took shelter in the hills, later moving to higher ground eight kilometres inland. No help was received for the first 15 days; the village was deserted, in ruins, and navy helicopters could not land. The villagers lived off coconuts and fruits in the forest. On 10 January, a group of villagers managed to alert aid helicopters and, at last, food drops were made. Fights broke out and, initially, only the strongest men – and none of the women – got supplies. On 12 January, two village leaders took charge to organise the food drops. They cleared landing areas and negotiated with helicopter pilots on the times of food drops, so that supplies could be collected by the leaders and distributed each day at five pm according to village needs.

On 13 January, the village leaders set up a *posko* (community command post) to represent the people in daily coordination meetings with aid workers. Two local teams were appointed. One team collected data on surviving families and needs and coordinated the search and rescue (burials), while the second team coordinated emergency aid and food distribution. With the *posko* up and running, people started to return from the mountains. Early in February, schools were opened in tents. Villagers made furniture from waste materials and built a local mosque, which provided a venue for participatory meetings and information exchange. In addition, the *posko* convened workshops with INGOs, government and local leaders to plan how to best rebuild villages.

In discussions with local leaders and UNHCR staff deployed in the village during the immediate relief phase, four factors – which may explain the difference and level of self-organisation and self-help in Krueng Sabee as compared to other communities along the Aceh Jaya coast – were highlighted:

1) The culture of working together in the town was preserved from the first days after the tsunami;
2) Strong village leaders survived the tsunami;
3) Krueng Sabee is an historic centre of trade and entrepreneurship; and
4) Data collection in the first weeks after the disaster gave the community a better perspective of its needs and provided a basis for proactive dialogue with humanitarian aid agencies.

Recommendations from Pak Yussuf, the *posko* director, to improve tsunami assistance include:

- Improve planning for sustainable development;
- Set up information centres in the community to facilitate tsunami assistance;
- Empower communities to handle their own needs assessments: 'People *can* collect data; they *do* understand;' and
- Set up community posts to negotiate with international agencies.

In September, the DEC evaluation concluded that the most effective international agencies were those that moved their staffing structures to long-term contracts at an early stage. A main problem for DEC members was reported to be the high salaries paid by UN agencies and their willingness to directly 'poach' staff (meaning to make direct offers without interviews or informing current employers). Another problem highlighted was that the salaries and/or benefits paid to locally hired Acehnese were lower than for national (Indonesian) staff:

> While it is understandable that this might cause disharmony, it is probably an inevitable consequence of the growing and positive trend towards internationalisation. The problem may be that managers have not been sufficiently proactive in handling the consequences of this development and its appearance of unequal treatment.

International agencies aimed to move into livelihoods work quickly, but ran Cash-for-Work (CfW) programmes in the initial recovery stage to clear areas for reconstruction and get affected population out of temporary shelters. International agencies claim that CfW programmes played an important role in community revival, but most of these programmes were still running on a large scale by September. This prolonged period has created tensions in some communities, where a loss of voluntary spirit to work cooperatively has been observed. However, in communities where self-organising capacities were recovered, CfW programmes provided a much-needed source of financial inputs toward restarting livelihoods.[29]

***Local NGOs***

Some local organisations lost up to 40 per cent of their staff to poaching by international agencies and faced serious difficulties in maintaining their own programmes – let alone stepping up to a more prominent role in the reconstruction process. Nonetheless, approximately 200 local organisations were registered in Aceh province by April. Most are found in the towns and along the northeast coast toward Lhokseumawe. Local NGOs are absent in the remote southern Aceh Jaya district, with the exception of Krueng Sabee.

The international community remained sceptical about local capacities:

> Some NGOs are well versed in the 'discourse' of participation, yet in their programs very limited participatory philosophy or practices are apparent. There is a tendency to be dependent on the founder/village head director, on external assistance, and to become project rather than mission-driven.[30]

The international community tended to be more reserved in its critique during interviews, and some even acknowledged their own role in the weakening of local capacities: 'Because of the damage to the local NGO sector, the Acehnese people have not been able to develop a common platform regarding what the reconstruction of Aceh should be.'[31]

Because most CBOs lacked the skills to plan projects and draft proposals in a logical format and in the English language, they had trouble accessing the grant programmes of international agencies. More experienced local NGOs criticised international agencies for the limited grant size and short time frame (maximum of three months) per project, as well as tedious monitoring procedures such as monthly reporting. International agencies justified such criteria by asserting that they were providing grants to young and inexperienced organisations. Other CBO grievances included lack of civil society consultations, aloofness and slow decision-making and disbursements on behalf of international agencies.

***Communities***

A general breakdown of communication between international agencies and local communities was observed during field visits to Aceh Jaya, Pidi, Aceh Besar and Nias. In Nias, more effective coordination and a holistic approach to solving the problems of inaccessible and isolated communities would have yielded better results, and have thus been identified as key areas for improvement in the international response. Without such coordination, village leaders were disempowered by their limited involvement in the planning of aid programmes. As they were drawn into community-based recovery programmes, CSOs voiced a need for capacity building in participatory community development, grass roots mobilisation and institutional development. CSOs felt that this was needed in order for them to cope with vast increases in staff, changes in structure and approach and expansion to new areas. Yet at the time of the mission, only the first initiatives in these areas were in preparation, notably the NGO support network of Oxfam International and UNDP's civil society research and pilot initiatives.

Some good practices to strengthen public dialogue and participation were noted. IOM organised multi-agency surveys to assess the needs of local communities. In February, 2,111 respondents in 12 districts were interviewed, and a focus group discussion was held in each of the 71 disaster-affected sub-districts. '[Civil society leaders] acknowledged that the dialogue required to reach a community consensus on the decisions regarding reconstruction takes much time ... and the pressure for quick action is strong from victims and donors alike.'[32]

Another good example is PeRAK's mapping exercise in Pidie district. During March–May 2005, PeRAK Pidie (Pidie People's Economic Development), with support from YAPPIKA (The Indonesian Foundation to Strengthen Civil Society Participation, Initiatives and Partnership) and the Aceh Development Fund, carried out a participatory mapping exercise with IDPs from 13 tsunami-affected sub-districts in Pidie. Among the key findings were: the disempowering effect of the loss of religious and social infrastructure; relief supplies that do not meet people's priority needs; conflicts among communities caused by unequal relief provision; deep concern over loss of livelihoods and the need for start-up capital and new livelihood assets; and the strong desire of people to work rather than wait for assistance in IDP camps.[33]

### 2.3. Transition to reconstruction and development

***National government***

The transition to reconstruction and development got underway only in September, at the time the evaluation team visited Aceh and Nias. The Blueprint had generated little confidence as a planning and coordination tool since its launch in April. Most international agencies had already decided on their programmes. The planning process was not as participatory as initially envisaged, due to the collapse of local government structures and post-disaster chaos. The Blueprint contained only a few concrete references to the assistance required by local agencies. In an attempt to remedy participatory shortcomings and increase its local ownership, BRR initiated its own participatory planning process in 10 communities, and most international agencies noted an immediate improvement in government coordination and troubleshooting capacity when BRR became operational. UNHCR's return, for example, was achieved through the mediation of the BRR chief.

Disaster risk reduction remained a low priority for the national government during the reconstruction phase, and disaster awareness and risk management programming was still limited at all stakeholder levels. A need to draft new regulations to respond more effectively to natural disasters and develop new structures and skills for risk reduction was recognised by BAKORNAS PBP. With assistance from OCHA, it was working on a new structure that would transform the BAKORNAS secretariat into an operational agency and enable it to take on a new role of initial emergency response, in addition to its existing coordination responsibilities.

The continued cessation of hostilities is crucial for recovery and reconstruction. Both sides have played an active role in the immediate post-tsunami relief effort. A peace agreement was signed on 15 August in Helsinki, bringing an end to 30 years of bitter conflict. The agreement strengthened the autonomy by

bestowing special rights and privileges. Amendments passed to Indonesian law allowed Aceh-based parties to participate in politics, mandated that 70 per cent of the country's natural resources are to stay in Aceh and sanctioned the use of the Acehnese regional flag, crest and hymn.[34] Jakarta will continue to control the province's finances, defence and foreign policy. Two hundred unarmed monitors from the European Union and member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) arrived to oversee the peace process. The debate as to whether the scale of the disaster and the international tsunami response played a key role in ending the conflict in Aceh continues. The important implication for the international tsunami response is that a rigid distinction between tsunami- and conflict-affected communities could renew tensions, resentment and possibly trigger local violence.

### *Local government*

Strengthening the capacities of government and civil society for sustainable recovery and risk-reduction is among the components of UNDP's Aceh Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme (ERTR). To facilitate such capacity building, UNDP established operational offices in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, along with a logistics office in Medan. In April, additional offices were opened in Calang (Aceh Jaya) and in Pidie.

**Box 2.3: Local Government and International Agencies in Aceh Jaya**

As the district headquarters of Aceh Jaya, Calang housed the local government offices, all of which were completely washed away in the tsunami waves that hit the town from three sides. Nearly 50 per cent of the 300 civil servants who worked there died. UNHCR, the World Food Programme and the *Bupati* arrived in Calang in the second week and set up offices in tents to begin emergency programmes for IDPs. Other UN agencies – including UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA and the International Labour Organization (ILO) – followed. From the outset, UN agencies coordinated their efforts and agreed on sectoral divisions of labour, with UNCHR responsible for building 25,000 permanent houses and some schools, UNICEF responsible for primary and secondary schools and UNDP for government capacity building and vocational training. INGOs focussed on relief activities for IDPs in tents and barracks, and all engaged in CfW programmes.

The director of DINAS returned to Calang in May. Without an office, equipment and staff, he tried to assemble data and submit proposals to work on livelihood reconstruction. In July, UNDP built temporary office structures, and five more staff members returned. Gradually, donations of items re-equipped the office. By September, DINAS had completed a database on lost small-scale enterprises and the informal sector. DINAS then made a small grants proposal to provide micro-grants to replace previous businesses. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed to rebuild five markets, with 11 more in the planning stage. By mid-September, the local government had 12 staff, but understaffing remained a significant constraint. Government procedures prevented districts from recruiting staff directly, and the annual staff drive took place only in October. As a temporary measure, the *Bupati* started to recruit more staff on temporary contracts.

BAPPEDA and DINAS highlight the same capacity-building needs: budgeting and financial management, planning and programming, technical skills and infrastructural support. One problem highlighted repeatedly was that organisations needed continuous back-stopping – instead of only one training session.

UNDP supported a range of CfW programmes implemented by several agencies, including local NGOs (*Panglima Laut* and *Matahari* Foundation) and Islamic Relief, an INGO. Programmes included: labour-intensive waste and debris collecting, as well as sorting and recycling projects (in collaboration with municipal sanitation departments); several larger port rehabilitation projects (starting at Ulee Lheu port in Banda Aceh); and the provision of a grant to the National Archives to restore, register and digitise land registration records.

The slow process of alternative land acquisition has been the major bottleneck to implementing permanent shelter programmes for IDPs. Aceh-based international aid agencies have been reluctant to use funds for land purchases. Some INGOs (Oxfam International, Cordaid and IFCR) explained that their mandates did not allow purchase of land for private purposes, though interviewees were unaware that this had happened in other tsunami-affected countries. The Autonomy Act makes the provincial government responsible for generating funds locally – in order to restore the infrastructure damaged by the earthquakes and meet land acquisition needs to resettle IDPs. BAPPEDA officials in Aceh stressed that this was a major reconstruction hurdle. By September, several initiatives to end this stalemate got underway. At the national level, the Land Consolidation Act was drafted to facilitate smoother land acquisition for tsunami survivors, with BRR playing the role of a broker to generate interest among the international community. The UN Aceh tsunami response coordinator for BRR, who was appointed in August, took up pressing housing sector concerns, such as the need for transitional housing and speeding up the land acquisition process.

***International agencies***

The transition started rather late, due to limited INGO development staff capacity and the INGO need to familiarise themselves with the local development context first. In August, a UNDP team trained CBOs and local governments in sustainable livelihood frameworks. The team noted that international assistance was still overwhelmingly focussed on basic needs provision, placing little emphasis on future sustainability.

The strict separation between tsunami, earthquake and conflict recovery further challenged the development of a strategic and holistic approach to reconstruction. Coastal and inland areas are interconnected through markets and production lines. Therefore, it would have been more effective to include inland communities in tsunami livelihood recovery programmes. Some international agencies have addressed this challenge creatively. For example, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

shifted its disbursement system from the district to the provincial level, which enabled the Fund to include neighbouring conflict-affected communities in tsunami reconstruction efforts.

INGOs were planning to gradually phase out CfW projects and move to cash grants for small business initiatives. There was extensive discussion about this subject. Save the Children, for example, elected to reduce claim-holder cash payments by 60 per cent and supply agricultural inputs like seeds to make up the difference. The absence of local banking institutions and local NGOs – who could mobilise community credit groups and monitor repayment schedules – was one of the main bottlenecks in initiating micro-credit programmes in Calang. Reluctant to take on such complicated tasks, most INGOs opted for cash grants to households for restarting former businesses. Oxfam International set up a Micro-Business Grant Observation Team that monitors how such cash grants are used and to improve further instalments where appropriate.[35]

UNDP conducted an assessment of Acehnese civil-society capacities and identified five priority needs:

1) Improvement of organisational and technical capacities of CSOs;
2) Provision of technical guidance and capital grants for initiatives that contribute to community recovery, public participation and empowerment of local people;
3) Promoting volunteering and exchanges between CSOs with different geographic and sectoral backgrounds;
4) Convening local forums for dialogue, learning, policy and reconstruction decision-making; and
5) Developing processes and mechanisms for CSOs to independently monitor tsunami recovery programmes and activities.

Other interesting local capacity-strengthening initiatives under preparation in September included:

- A USAID partnership with Bank Danamon Indonesia provided a partial credit guarantee that will mobilise up to US $16.4m to extend micro-credit to people that 'will be ineligible for grants but will still need working capital and in some cases longer term financing for capital investments in order to regain productive livelihoods'.
- The International Labour Organization (ILO) started: the Livelihoods Recovery through Employment Promotion programme, including vocational construction training; a Start Your Business training workshop; training on labour-intensive rehabilitation of infrastructure; skill

training and financial support for small enterprises and a network of employment services to match job-seekers with contractors engaged in reconstruction projects.

- ILO also seeks to support the rebuilding of trade unions and has been organising training on negotiation and collective bargaining, for example, for members of the Agriculture and Plantation Workers' Union in Aceh Timor.

***Communities***

A June 2005 IOM and USAID study[36] indicated that a significant percentage of tsunami-affected people in Nias want to return to their previous home locations in order to continue economic activities. However, livelihood programmes have been slow in starting, with only 7 per cent receiving support so far. The preferred types of livelihood support in the IOM assessment were capital (70 per cent), materials (51 per cent) and training (24 per cent), with respondents permitted to include more than one preference. However, even six months after the tsunami and three months after the earthquake, 67 per cent of the population still listed food supplies as their most immediate need, while only 28 per cent listed livelihood support. This underscores the fact that the emergency relief phase in Nias had not yet finished. Food and water supply, temporary shelters and medical services were still a priority in the more remote regions.

Three claim-holder categories can be identified as particularly vulnerable: remote communities with minimal service provision pre-tsunami, vulnerable women, such as poor female-headed households and war widows, and communities affected by violent conflict. The emphasis on relief and recovery of the international response during the first eight months left the needs of vulnerable people under-resourced. The focus on formal housing and livelihoods tended to miss the poorest households who were self-employed or did not possess formal land titles to their homes. While these vulnerable groups were provided for in camps or temporary shelters, few recovery projects were initiated specifically for the informal sector or squatter communities.

In the remote and underdeveloped coastal zones of Aceh and Nias, the pre-existing lack of basic infrastructure and the dispersed nature of local settlements made it difficult to implement large-scale reconstruction projects. Several marginal fishing communities in Pidi, Aceh Jaya and Nias did not receive any assistance. To reach and rebuild such communities, a flexible approach based on partnership agreements with community-based organisations (CBOs) is indispensable.

The evaluation team concluded that there was unintended bias toward the richer population and insufficient inclusion of the most vulnerable people, including the landless and self-employed. This is a

surprising finding, as the core group of INGOs have explicit target-group policies on the inclusion of vulnerable groups. It appears that the speed and size of construction programmes – and the engagement in sectors alien to core mandates – limited the room for participation of marginalised groups during the planning stage. As to the implementation phase, the team concluded that the lack of flexibility to adjust projects to the needs of the most vulnerable groups has lead to a failure to engage and improve local capacities to access services. No special projects for the most vulnerable communities were integrated into larger scope housing and livelihood programmes, and there was a lack of monitoring and evaluation of services to marginalised groups.

**Box 2.4: Issues in Aceh Besar**

The team attended a meeting of the *Chamat* (mayor) and *Mukims* (village council leaders) in Aceh Besar. While the village council felt that its main role was to stand up for communities and build a better future in partnership with key players, it found difficulty in responding during the early days. Oxfam International had built some temporary houses, but some were not occupied, as people feared they would not be eligible for permanent houses later. A community consultation process resulted in the decision to build 50 houses and the formation of a reconstruction committee. People did not participate in designing the houses, but took part in the construction, earning a wage.

Permanent shelter is a top priority to most families, with preference given to widows with children. Village leaders stressed the need to build a seawall to stop the flooding, before planning permanent housing programmes. The main criticism was that the process of most UN agencies was very slow and bureaucratic. Nine months after the tsunami, UN-HABITAT had just started the planning process with a specialist from India. The cumbersome process includes filling out many forms, supplying photos and creating profiles of owners. A salaried reconstruction committee will be selected from among villagers.

Village leaders expressed the need for more information. They requested background on other disaster situations, processes and mechanisms used. Claim-holders' participation in public decision-making, like in the land-mapping exercise, is new to the Acehnese society. The village heads felt the burden of additional responsibilities and acknowledged they needed training to cope with new community demands for access to basic services. They complained that communities were now demanding that village leaders negotiate better deals with international agencies.

The role of community leadership is changing. In the new political space, village leaders feel they are losing control, being unaccustomed to people questioning their authority. In the post-tsunami era, international and local NGOs often bypass village leaders and approach communities directly. This has caused problems of duplication of efforts and coordination, as well as undermined the village leadership's authority. However, when problems arise in the community later, it is the community leaders who have to address them – adding to their frustration.

## CHAPTER THREE: CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

### 3.1. Land, Displacement and Relocation

Land and displacement issues are key to Aceh's recovery. The tsunami caused significant geological changes. Large stretches of land sank by an average of 80 centimetres and, without large-scope infrastructural rehabilitation, remain unsuitable for permanent habitation. Alternate land needs to be allocated or acquired in order to relocate affected villages. This has proven to be a complicated and slow process. The availability of government land is limited, and locations are often not suitable. International agencies have, so far, refused to contribute to the purchase of additional land. In this context, the initial decision of humanitarian agencies to forgo transitional shelter construction was rash. In Sri Lanka, a similar decision was revisited in March, but in Aceh it took key stakeholders seven months to act. A transitional housing plan was under preparation at the time of this evaluation. In Pidie district, the BAPPEDA director painted a management nightmare picture. While 9,553 permanent houses are required, by late September, the government had signed Memorandums of Understanding for only 4,000 units. Several of these Memorandums had already expired, and it remained unclear whether international agencies were going to keep their commitments. Only 300 houses had been completed to date. For an account of Muslim Aid's experience, see the case study in Annex 2.

An IOM and USAID survey of attitudes on the relief and reconstruction process revealed that people overwhelmingly wanted to return home, or at best be relocated close to their home villages.[37] Among claim-holders, there is great concern that temporary or permanent relocation projects do not pay sufficient attention to maintaining community integrity. Moreover, when faced with the prospect of relocation, IDPs – who previously experienced *forced* relocation during military rule (*reloksi pengungsi*) – feel anxiety, but international agencies have not been sensitive to this issue.

Humanitarian aid systems in Aceh tend to discourage private community initiatives, as food and other relief supplies were discontinued for IDPs who decided to leave the camps to rebuild their homes and livelihoods on their own. Creative and flexible solutions – designed to speed up resettlement processes and reduce frustration over such issues as resettlement compensations and the flexibility in the supply of replacement tents – often clash with bureaucratic procedures. Hence nine months later, most of the IDPs were still living in tents and simple barracks under trying circumstances.

### 3.2. Migrant Labour

Migrant labour is an issue that predates the tsunami, particularly for citizens affected by the conflict in eastern districts. While the evaluation team found evidence of temporary migration (such as IDPs moving to stay with family members elsewhere), there was no evidence of permanent migration after the tsunami. Discussions with government officials in the Aceh Jaya district reveal that some poor workers from other parts of Sumatra are migrating *into* the district – workers who hope to obtain land titles and find employment in reconstruction programmes. Overall, the affect of the tsunami and international response on migrant labour is probably less prominent in Indonesia than in Sri Lanka and Thailand.

### 3.3. Protection and Women's Empowerment

Prior to the tsunami, 19 per cent of Acehnese households were headed by women. Such a high percentage is attributed to the prolonged conflict, which caused large numbers of male casualties and migration of men to other parts of Indonesia to avoid detention. The situation in the eastern districts of Indonesia somewhat resembles that of the north and east of Sri Lanka, although the conflict intensity was much higher in Sri Lanka, with 70,000 casualties compared to Aceh's 15,000. The tsunami recovery and reconstruction strategy has several negative effects on vulnerable women:

- Inflexibility in the humanitarian aid system has failed to make exceptions for the specific situations of affected women, particularly female-headed households;
- Insufficient protection in IDP camps makes them unsafe for women and girls;
- Insufficient international legal assistance is provided with respect to land tenure, inheritance and guardianship disputes, which are further complicated by traditional Shari'a law interpretations;
- Loss of access to sustainable livelihoods and limited access to economic recovery programmes has been more pronounced for women;
- Limited access to information is particularly problematic, as information sources remain male dominated; and
- Limited opportunities, capacity and leadership exist among women's grassroots and advocacy organisations, hindering their ability to influence mainstream relief and reconstruction efforts.

The team interviewed 11 agencies with a special focus on women.[38] All highlighted similar concerns of protection, livelihoods and inclusion in participatory decision-making. Women in Aceh face insecurity issues at three levels: physical, economic and psychosocial. Protection is a high priority. Physical security has been reduced, because families were broken up and moved to IDP camps. Furthermore, the higher number of female casualties increased the pressure on female survivors to care for extended families and

to remarry, the latter most notably on the Aceh Jaya coast. To uphold religious customary laws in the face of the influx of foreigners in Aceh, the Shari'a police have been enforcing regulations more strictly. Such regulations place stringent restrictions on the public behaviour of women. In the area of economic security, female survivors experience difficulties with land titles, inheritance and guardianship.

*Komnas Perempuan* (KP), the National Commission to Prevent Violence Against Women, appointed a special *rapporteur* to monitor the response in Aceh, focussing primarily on settling land disputes and enforcing Shari'a regulations. KP's advocacy agenda includes a new procedural law on land rights, incorporating local wisdom in the drafting of Shari'a canons and dialogues with judiciary and government on its interpretation – for example, on the need for separation of men and women. KP partners with local female and human rights NGOs to collect data and lobby officials. They do little work with international agencies on the ground, because most lack a holistic approach and are caught in a sector-based methodology. While KP identifies the need to recover community safety networks, it notes the lack of interest among INGOs to fund local discourse initiatives.

Women-oriented CSOs noted that most income-generating activities available to female IDPs cannot sustain their families due to such activities' marginal nature (such as weaving mats or producing biscuits). Psychologically, the main problem noted was the inflexibility of international humanitarian response in adjusting relocation, housing and livelihood strategies to suit the unique situation of affected women. For example, tsunami widows cannot opt for a cash donation to rebuild their homes in their relatives' villages, as the 'house for a house' policy provides only for a house on the prior location or newly allotted village land.

**Box 3.1: War Widows of Pasie Lou**

The eastern coast of Aceh province suffered from both conflict and disaster. Pasie Lou, a remote coastal village near Sigli harbour, is located on a barrier island behind the beach and has a low-lying hinterland covered by extended salt ponds. At the time of the evaluation, the village had yet to receive any long-term tsunami recovery assistance from international agencies. The Socio-Economic Activities Programme for the Conflict Victims in Aceh (PASKA), a local female NGO, came to the area in 1998 to organise self-help groups for women in three villages. For a time after the political transformation of 1998, it was easier to move around, form groups and organise demonstrations. PASKA helped village widows initiate micro-credit and health projects for women violated in the conflict. The organisation also assisted children of combatants and war widows in submitting financial compensation claims or negotiating jobs with government institutions. The programme was very successful, and PASKA won several awards.

In 1999, however, the conflict situation deteriorated again, and by 2001, PASKA's projects were closed down, and its staff was barred from the province. The village where it operated is the ancestral place of GAM leaders and was accused of smuggling arms by boat from Malaysia to the front lines in the mountains. TNI burned many homes in the village. In the same year, several male villagers disappeared. The twenty women members of the PASKA group were all widowed in the conflict.

One of these widows, Halima, said that when the earthquake struck, she was working at a fish tank on the beach. Her husband had disappeared in the conflict of 1999. She ran home to grab her two sons (aged 9 and 12) and then headed inland, to escape waves that were two metres high. The family survived and stayed in a village five kilometres inland for five days. Next, they were moved to an IDP camp in the sub-district capital, where they stayed for three months. After that, they were resettled in barracks, where they stayed for another three months. After six months, a group of 10 widows from the village, including Halima, decided to return home on their own. Since her return, she has managed to earn some money in fisheries, collect waste wood with her two young sons. She also paid men in the village a small sum to help her rebuild a simple hut on the foundation of her old home.

Halima and other widows never attend tsunami meetings, because they generally do not attend public meetings. After losing their husbands during the repression, these women adopted the survival tactic of 'lying low and minding their own business'. As a consequence, they have little information on tsunami recovery plans for their village. Though they are well aware of the information gap, they feel safer this way.

These widows were critical of the humanitarian aid process, viewing it as giving hand-outs without providing proper resources to villagers to rebuild their lives. They believe this process has ruined community spirit, and they had witnessed a lot of conflict in IDP camps. This was an important reason for the widows leaving the camp, even though agencies refused to help those who left voluntarily. An important lesson for the international community is not to make distinctions between IDPs in camps and affected people who decide to return to their villages. Halima and her four colleagues recommended that international agencies should:

1) Work with and through local groups;
2) Consider victims of violence, even if they are outside tsunami-affected areas;
3) Be aware of the special needs of those who are affected by both conflict and tsunami;
4) Launch more and better programmes for children, such as distribution of milk, small clothes and simple toys;
5) Ensure that affected families receive Rp 3,000 a day; and
6) Provide assistance to a nearby leper colony of 50 persons.

A 2001 USAID study on post-conflict and disaster communities[39] concluded that, in order to engage women's capacities and increase gender equality, post-crisis recovery and reconstruction programmes should incorporate strategies to address impact on three levels:

1) Socio-psychological impact, such as: displacement and communal frustrations, which can lead to lasting bitterness, anger and hatred;
2) Economic impact, such as: destruction of civilian property during the crisis or conflict and prolonged internal displacement; and
3) Political impact, such as: ineffectual female identities in society and lack of access to information and political power.

These impact areas were addressed by the international and local agencies interviewed for this evaluation. Six such organisations work on women's rights and advocacy, another three work on prevention of violence against women, and the final four – on women's economic and political empowerment. However, women's CSOs felt that their initiatives are unlikely to have lasting impact on strengthening the capacities of Acehnese women, as the environment of the tsunami recovery phase is not conducive to gender sensitivity.

There have been some interesting women-oriented initiatives. EAD and Flower Aceh have developed micro-credit funds and marketing projects for vulnerable women groups affected by both conflict and tsunami. *Purta Kande* and the Indonesian Women's Association for Justice (APIK) work on women's rights, support female *ulamas* in the Shari'a courts and provide moderate advice to the formulation of the canons (local legal regulations that acknowledge Adat and Shari'a laws). UNIFEM, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) and UNICEF, among others, work on gender-segregated data and highlighting the needs of most vulnerable women.

UNIFEM has developed an advanced gender programme focussed on three areas:

1) Women's livelihoods, by establishing credit initiatives and creating places to work, as most vulnerable women are living in barracks;
2) Protection of women, by setting up a working group in collaboration with UNFPA to: monitor Shari'a law security guidelines for legal aid clinics and camp staff and police, develop a canon on violence against women and partner with IOM in the demobilisation process; and

3) Identifying groups overlooked by the international tsunami response, such as the affected war widows in Pidie district.

To enable women's leadership, UNIFEM has sought to appoint gender advisers to work with BRR, to consult with government and INGOs to guarantee women's participation, to map women CBOs and to collaborate with the relatively powerless Women's Empowerment Bureau.

### 3.4. Vulnerability and Marginalisation

Feelings of vulnerability among IDPs were exacerbated by lack of information on programmes and policies that affected them. Most information was available only in English. To analyse information flow to affected populations, the OCHA Public Information Working Group conducted a rapid qualitative survey in 82 communities across 12 Aceh districts. The survey concluded that there was a significant lack of simple and practical information related to reconstruction, particularly information on housing and livelihoods issues. People used the available media, mostly local radio stations, as an alternative. Television was reportedly watched less than before the tsunami, but newspapers were appreciated where accessible. Better use could be made of public bulletin boards, and special strategies are necessary to improve access of women and children to information, which remains largely controlled by men. Some interesting initiatives had started at the time of this evaluation, such as the distribution of 40,000 self-powered radios to IDPs to improve information flow and provide a medium for future disaster preparedness campaigns. BRR and the local government were due to start a public information project and were distributing 50 whiteboards for communities to post announcements.

Three vulnerable categories can be identified in Aceh and Nias: remote and underdeveloped communities, communities affected by conflict and marginalised women. In mid-September, UNESCAP organised the National Workshop on the Impact of the Tsunami on Vulnerable Groups and Women. Held in Jakarta, this workshop was part of a regional series, in which 15 local CBOs participated. The workshop drew up general recommendations, such as the need for increased participation and access to decision-making by vulnerable groups, greater coordination among agencies, and greater transparency and accountability. In particular, attention was directed to several methods of addressing the needs of vulnerable groups and women. Such recommendations are to:

- Incorporate local values and culture in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process and eliminate stigma, discrimination and stereotypes. The reallocation of land and rebuilding of houses should

be: based on local cultural and social institutions and principles; and supported by all government bodies including BRR, NGOs and donors;

- Develop specific qualitative and quantitative indicators to monitor and evaluate progress in a participatory manner. The resulting indicators should conform to human rights laws, Sphere Standards and Humanitarian Accountability Principles;
- Ensure the availability of valid data (disaggregated by gender, age and disability status) and establish a transparent system of dissemination of information that is accessible by everyone, including vulnerable groups and women;
- Ensure that central and regional governments put in place specific policies on housing, land and property for vulnerable groups and women; and
- Support widows and girls in their roles as caregivers and eliminate barriers to their full economic participation. In the area of economics, there is also a need to provide women with a range of non-traditional opportunities.

### 3.5. Conflict and the Tsunami

The legacy of the conflict affects the international tsunami response in a number of ways. First, the conflict ensured a limited pre-tsunami international agency presence. Newly arriving agencies did not have the contextual knowledge to be effective, while also experiencing pressure to become rapidly operational in the reconstruction efforts. Second, international agencies were reluctant to address the large disparities in assistance received by the tsunami-affected and the conflict-affected, who often lived in close proximity. Third, the Indonesian government was highly sensitive to perceived criticism and only reluctantly accepted the large international presence. This made it more difficult for international actors to include the conflict-affected in their activities in order to minimize disparities, thus resulting in uneven resource distribution.

This is supported by the findings of a study funded by the UK government's Department for International Development,[40] which concluded:

> Overall, INGOs show a strikingly blind eye to conflict: seeing it as a background phenomenon as long as security of their own staff is not concerned ... and have very limited understanding of Acehnese politics and society ... INGOs only now are beginning to show some incipient conflict awareness, but have not yet strategically thought through about how their presence and programming can have a positive influence; strategic and policy thinkers all sit in Jakarta or overseas with on-the-ground project managers mostly concerned with operational issues.[41]

The study differentiated between new arrivals and agencies such as the Word Bank and UNDP, who had a longer presence in Indonesian conflict zones. Agencies with a pre-tsunami presence were able to combine disaster relief and post-conflict assistance more strategically. The World Bank in Aceh, for example, has been building conflict resolution into KDP, and the Support Programme for Disadvantaged Areas that includes district-level capacity-building initiatives.

While the international response remains focused on tsunami relief, conflict resolution remains at the core of concerns and priorities for many Acehnese civil-society actors. Similarly, the issue is also important to most ordinary people whose livelihoods and access to decent basic services are intrinsically linked to security, freedom of movement, protection from corruption and extortion.

# CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 4.1. Overview

Overall, there has been inadequate recognition of the extensive and diverse local and national capacities that existed at both institutional and individual levels during the first nine months of the tsunami response. Beyond providing de-contextualised technical support, the international response has not been able to facilitate nascent local or national capacities in a systematic and sustainable manner. This made it difficult to link the humanitarian intervention to long-term structural concerns and might have, in some cases, unintentionally exacerbated inequalities and tensions.

Considered collectively, the international tsunami response has not demonstrated the capacity to: act on locally-expressed needs and conditions; address fundamental issues of equity and inclusion within and across sectors and geographical areas; utilise gender- and conflict-sensitive approaches; integrate poverty and marginalisation concerns; and, most importantly, set in place transparent mechanisms and modalities of downward accountability to claim-holders.

One of the primary problems is the nature of shared action and learning. Building on local capacities is about maintaining respectful dialogue, nurturing relationships and fostering trust. Public dialogue and participation takes more time and requires different competencies than those of international agencies. Overall, the hard conclusion to be drawn from this report is that unless international agencies are able to change their approaches, the international tsunami response will have failed in its stated aim to 'build back better'.

An enabling policy framework and a safe implementation space are essential prerequisites for maximising the positive contributions of local and national capacities to the international tsunami response. The international response could have done more to enhance these conditions in the diverse overarching context within which it takes place. This requires special capacities that need to be prioritised and developed within international agencies. Without such capacities, it is difficult – if not impossible – to target vulnerable and marginalised groups or to open space for dialogue, though some initiatives to address these issues had been started at the time of this evaluation.

From the perspective of the international response, the essential conditions for empowerment of claim-holders include: promoting comprehensive information-sharing; setting up appropriate contextually sensitive communication strategies; developing sustainable community-based disaster preparedness

systems; facilitating inclusive and gender-sensitive governance modalities; and maximising the use of available political space to enable sustained, meaningful participation.

A shift in priorities and perspectives is needed in order to see local capacities as the starting point, and other players' roles should be to support and build such capacities. Other evaluation missions corroborated the conclusion that international agencies have been missing a 'golden opportunity' to increase capacities for disaster mitigation and preparedness at all levels – particularly at the local level – and in so doing, address the issues of justice, inclusion and equity that are the underlying causes of vulnerability and marginality.

The central lesson to be learned from the Indonesian experience is that the humanitarian aid sector could benefit from redefining the fundamental values and principles that guide its work – and against which it could be held accountable. As a whole, the humanitarian sector needs to move forward – from including the right language in policy documents[42] to the application of such values and principles on the ground.

### 4.2. Conclusions in Relation to Core Messages

This report concludes with observations around three core messages arising from the analysis of the response:

***Sustain a respectful engagement with local and national capacities***

The Indonesian national government was ill-equipped to effectively address the immediate relief needs in the affected areas, due to the region's remoteness, weak local government capacity and the scale of the disaster. The national disaster management secretariat was unable to provide the much-needed operational capacity and coordination for national and international responses. The official disaster management structures at provincial and district levels had no contingency plans and were unable to provide operational capacity and coordination for national and international responses. There were no clear coordination procedures for national or international actors, making the initial relief response ineffective.

In the absence of national coordination capacity, international agencies were left to initiate and coordinate their immediate relief responses on their own. The unprecedented global response made INGOs the largest actors in tsunami relief and recovery work for the first time. This altered traditional coordination systems, and INGOs were slow in establishing alternative coordination and public accountability mechanisms. Pressured by spending imperatives, INGOs scaled up beyond their institutional capacities and engaged in sectors that were not in their core mandates, making the recovery phase a process of trial-

and-error. This role reversal also extended to UN agencies, which became directly involved in the capacity building of local civil society and community actors, a role usually performed by INGOs. While some agencies made strategic choices to strengthen national and local capacities, the long-term cost-efficiency and sustainability of this community-level work needs to be reviewed.

Few international aid agencies had prior work experience in the affected areas and, therefore, did not possess the requisite contextual knowledge or stakeholder networks. This made it difficult to assess local stakeholder capacities. Under severe pressure to deliver swift relief assistance to displaced survivors, nearly all international actors opted for operational programmes and flew in large numbers of humanitarian sector specialists to assess and address the immediate needs. While this decision facilitated a faster response during the earliest response phase, it proved to be an inappropriate and unsustainable approach in transitioning to recovery and reconstruction, overlooking local capacities and issues of local ownership.

Over the next six months, international agencies continued short-term employment of foreigners with sectoral – rather than Indonesian – development expertise. The resulting high staff turnover hampered the ability of international agencies to build institutional memory in terms of contextual knowledge and relationships. This hindered the efficiency and ownership of recovery programmes and slowed down the transition from the recovery phase to the reconstruction and development phases. In addition, the high staff turnover created tensions between local, national and foreign staff over differences in remuneration, contract conditions and responsibilities. In Nias, an additional cultural insensitivity was noted, as virtually all international agencies' local staff had an Islamic background and lacked familiarity with the Christian cultural context of the island.

To implement large operational programmes, international agencies acquired contextual knowledge and local language skills *in situ* – by hiring Acehnese staff, attracted by higher salaries and challenging programmes, away from local organisations. This 'brain drain' weakened the capacity of local organisations, which had already incurred dramatic human and physical losses in the tsunami disaster. Further, such staffing practices brought to light the issue of criteria applied by international agencies when assessing capacities of local organisations for potential partnership. While individual Acehnese staff capacities were highly valued and rewarded, collective local capacities – in the form of NGOs and CBOs – apparently did not to meet international planning, management, monitoring, accountability and foreign language standards.

There is the related question of whether quality standards applied by humanitarian agencies are appropriate in the local disaster setting. Civil society in Aceh has limitations to its capacity, but indigenous CBOs at the village level have played key roles in sustaining village communities throughout the 30 years of conflict. A more active engagement with these indigenous capacities would have increased local ownership, sustainability and the effectiveness of the international response. In addition, such engagement would have provided a better early-stage opportunity to link humanitarian intervention with long-term rehabilitation and development. Such a connection could have made a pivotal contribution to the peace-building process and the transition to institutionalised good governance.

Pay attention to the closely interlinked concerns of equity, inclusion and downward accountability
Collectively, international tsunami assistance in Indonesia did not target vulnerable groups during the first eight months, as the prime focus was on asset replacement rather than asset creation among the poorest. The absence of partnership arrangements with local organisations made it harder for international agencies to reach vulnerable groups, especially those located in remote and under-developed zones, such as Nias and Aceh Jaya. Initial attempts were soon aborted, leaving marginal communities without any recovery support.

International tsunami assistance had a positive effect on peace and governance in Aceh province. This was not entirely intended, and has yet to be strategically exploited to the full. International aid agency presence exposes this hitherto closed region to new participatory development approaches and good governance concepts. This exposure may have a positive impact on downward accountability and inclusive, rights-based development processes in the new autonomous region of Aceh. The new political space needs to be recognised and actively utilised by international agencies involved in the tsunami response, as the window of opportunity is potentially narrow.

In Aceh, sensitivity to foreign presence and fears of interference in the peace process have made international agencies very cautious about crossing political boundaries. Programmes that cater to the needs of both tsunami- and conflict-affected communities have remained artificially separated. This cautious approach is likely to negatively influence the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of the post-tsunami reconstruction programme. Differences in standards and timelines between tsunami- and conflict-recovery programmes could, if not carefully managed, unintentionally exacerbate inequalities and tensions, potentially affecting the peace process.

Specific gender-based needs were identified in most assessments, yet few gender-sensitive approaches were observed in housing and livelihood recovery programmes. However, both international agencies and local NGOs with a specific women's mandate have developed interesting pilot initiatives that can serve as models for improved women's involvement in the reconstruction phase.

***Foster enabling policy conditions, safe contexts and mutually accountable partnership conditions***

The scale of the disaster, its impact on local government capacities and new task divisions among key international stakeholders were not conducive to transparency and accountability in the international response. This is illustrated by difficulties encountered by the evaluation team in obtaining project documents, budgets and progress reports. At the time this evaluation was conducted, downward accountability was virtually non-existent, although some initiatives had been started to remedy the situation.

The role of the media as advocate for vulnerable groups is much less prominent in Aceh and Nias than in the comparable communities of Sri Lanka and Thailand. In Indonesia, years of protracted conflict have restricted freedom of expression, and many affected districts are without newspapers or television coverage. To overcome this information and communications gap, more international assistance should be provided to facilitating the flow of information – for example, through the rehabilitation of radio services, wall newspapers and news booths.

National NGOs play an increasingly prominent role as advocates for the rights of women and vulnerable groups, especially related to issues such as land rights, forced relocation, corruption and interpretations of Shari'a law. At the same time, the advocacy capacity of beneficiaries to uphold basic rights and freedoms, develop advocacy agendas set by claimholders and hold service providers accountable is weak, requiring more strategic attention and intervention.

At the time of this evaluation, the need for mutually accountable partnerships between international and local actors was being increasingly acknowledged. The initial tsunami response, however ad hoc, was highly appreciated, but frustration and disappointment among CSOs and beneficiaries grew during the recovery phase, when housing and livelihood projects showed slow progress and opportunities for participation were lost. In order to reach the most vulnerable communities, international actors need to rely on and invest in CBOs and build their capacities as key actors in a sustainable development process which, in the long term, will hopefully end the systematic exclusion and discrimination of marginal rural communities.

### 4.3. Recommendations

***1. Sustain a respectful engagement with local and national capacities***

- Recognise and validate, at both individual and institutional levels, national and local capacities in the local context, particularly in the immediate recovery phase;
- Enhance skills to identify local and national capacities, thereby fostering mutually beneficial partnerships and reducing dependence on foreign experts;
- Enhance contextual knowledge and increase community participation in accordance with international standards;
- Provide institutional support to CBOs, including capacity-building in order to repair 'brain drain' damage and applying fair grant-making standards;
- Initiate crisis preparedness programming, in order to significantly improve the quality of emergency response at the local, national and international levels; and
- Develop the basic elements of an appropriate community-based disaster preparedness plan – in partnership with local communities and local and national governments – in order to build relevant local capacities, thereby reducing vulnerability to future disasters.

***2. Improve equity, inclusion and downward accountability***

- Reach vulnerable groups currently overlooked in the asset replacement programme, particularly in remote, under-resourced areas of Nias, Aceh Jaya and East Aceh;
- Incorporate experiences of local pilot projects to better address problems facing women, including land ownership, inheritance, Shari'a law interpretations and access to information;
- Strengthen the role of the media as an independent monitor and advocate in Aceh and Nias; and
- Establish transparent public information and accountability systems and boost opportunities for claim-holders to set their own agendas.

***3. Foster an enabling policy framework and safe environment***

- Employ creativity and flexibility in humanitarian relief systems, in order to engage the capacities of vulnerable groups and meet their specific needs;

- Strategically utilise the new political space in Aceh province to strengthen the peace and democratisation process; and
- Improve cross-fertilisation of tsunami- and conflict-recovery programmes in order to guarantee equal standards and timelines and avoid tensions.

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[1] Asia Source, available at <http://www.asiasource.org/news/special_reports/marhaban.cfm>.
[2] 48 per cent of total damage according to the World Bank, 32 per cent according to UNDP.
[3] Council on Foreign Relations, 2005.
[4] *Badan Pusat Statistik,* 2004.
[5] TAPOL, 2005.

[6] UNDP, 2005a, pp 11–12.
[7] Burke and Afnan, 2005, pp 6, 27–28, 34, 45.
[8] UN and MiSPI, 2005, p iii.
[9] Interview with Ms Emmy Hafid, director, Transparency International Indonesia (Jakarta).
[10] BAPPENAS, 2005, pp II:8–IV:17.
[11] BAKORNAS Vice President in interview, October 2005.
[12] This official figure seems very low for damage to productive sectors, but it could be explained by high levels of poverty and dependence on subsistence agriculture and informal employment pre-tsunami, with many people working from the home.
[13] BAPPENAS, 2005, p II:1.
[14] A special BAKORNAS meeting on 7 January was attended by only 11 of 600 civil servants.
[15] Co-chaired by Vice-President, Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare and the Deputy Governor of Aceh.
[16] While BAKORNAS praised its relations with humanitarian agencies, it also highlighted problems. First, international agencies did not follow BAKORNAS disaster response procedures. There was a tendency to meet with only high-level ministers, who were not informed about relief operations. Second, the international community did not attempt to coordinate INGO responses (only 178 INGOs are registered). Combined with a lack of trust of local NGOs, this resulted in duplication of efforts and confused communities.
[17] Interview with USAID staff.
[18] Indonesia is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and was not comfortable with the role of UNHCR in Malaysia, where it registered 20,000 Acehnese persons of concern under Temporary Protection. A potential 40,000 people are currently in Malaysia and are not mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding between the government Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement.
[19] UN, 2005, p 59.
[20] Less than 10 per cent of total funds allocated over the next five years is likely to be channelled via the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, administered by the World Bank (Nakamura, 2005, p 20). The Corporate Partnerships in Emergencies website (<www.undp.org/cope>), launched by UNDP to play a matchmaking role between private sector offers and requests from affected communities, generated only a moderate response compared to public donations to INGOs.
[21] UNDP, 2005a.
[22] UN and MiSPI, 2005.
[23] BAPPENAS, 2005.
[24] This was due to the lack of bilingual teachers; government policy is that all schooling should be in Bahasa Indonesia.
[25] *'The other major problem for local groups is their limited capacity, which means that they are in need of strong support in some areas. This has been further exacerbated by the fact that some of the best Acehnese activists have shifted their activities to aid agencies. There are numerous reports of Acehnese activists leaving their organisations in pursuit of higher wages, job security and better records for their CVs by working with international agencies.'* (TAPOL, 2005.)
[26] Alliance Extra, 2005.
[27] Comment from UNHCR.
[28] The field study confirmed other reports on the deep concerns of IDPs, and the need for absolute legal clarity about land and house occupied. Krueng Sabee population bitterly opposed temporary relocation plans and refused to leave their tents.IOM and USAID surveyed the attitudes on the relief and reconstruction process, revealing that an overwhelming majority of people wanted to return home (or, at best, be relocated close to their home villages) and urgently needed livelihood support. Any temporary or permanent relocation needs to maintain and respect the community integrity (IOM and USAID, 2005, pp 22–23).
[29] Comment, UNDP: *'UNDP's rationale in initiating CfW during the early months of the response included ensuring the needs of those who have lost everything were addressed and integrating this within the context of allocating resources to mobilise local capacity. UNDP engaged local NGOs (Panglimalaut, Koalisi HAM and Matahari) as well as national and international non-governmental bodies. Local NGOs had the resources and capacity to implement programmes quickly. Agencies participating in CfW were well-structured. Unfortunately, inadequate resources prevented allocations being assisted. Many commentators maligned CfW due to their own limited understanding of its impact. A recent UNDP study identified the benefits of CfW have, in fact, been numerous. Dislocated communities scattered in tents, barracks and with host families were mobilised to clean up their villages; many people who thought they would never be able to return after seeing the damage became motivated to restore*

*their communities through the collective CfW programmes. CfW did not discriminate; both men and women actively participated in clean-up operations. CfW provided cash to the poor. Studies have shown that 22 per cent used this income to establish a sustainable livelihood.'*

[30] UNDP, 2005a, pp 18–21

[31] Alliance Extra, 2005.

[32] United States-Indonesia Society, 2005, p 1.

[33] PeRAK, 2005.

[34]The agreement also established an immediate ceasefire; called for GAM to disarm its roughly 3,000 fighters by the end of the year; offered amnesty to all GAM members and prison release for those being held by the Indonesian government. Approximately 1,500 GAM members imprisoned for their political activities have been released since late August 2005. The agreement also restricts government troop movements in Aceh and establishes a human rights court (to expose abuses committed during the conflict) and a truth and reconciliation commission in Aceh.

[35] Oxfam International, 2005b.

[36] IOM and USAID, 2005.

[37] Ibid, 2005, pp 22–23.

[38] At the national (*Komnas Perempuan*, APIK, UNICEF, ESCAP and UNFPA), provincial (UNIFEM, Flower Aceh and EAD) and district levels (*Purta Kande*, PERAK, and *Passie Lou* CBO).

[39] USAID, 2001.

[40] Burke, 2005.

[41] Ibid, pp 23–41.

[42] See Annex 3 for a summary of some of these principles.

## ANNEX 1: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

### 1. Indonesian Government

***Ministry of Planning, national and district level***

Dr. Ir. Suprayoga Hadi, BAPPENAS Deputy for Local Autonomy and Regional Development, Directorate for Special and Backward Areas Development

Dr. Abdul Rahman Lubis, BAPPEDA Aceh Director

Mr. Bus Rahmadhani, BAPPEDA Aceh Tourism Planner

Director of Implementation, BAPPEDA Calang,

Mr. Ideris, Director BAPPEDA Pidi

***BRR***

Ms. Cut Hasniati, BRR, Director for Women and Children, Dept for Women, Children and Religious Affairs

Mr. Nurdin Hasan, BRR, External Relations

***Minister of Social Welfare***

Dr. Alwi Shinab, Coordinating Minister

Mr. Budi Atmadi Adiputric, BAKORNAS PBP, Deputy Secretary for IDP Affairs

Mr. Sugeng Triutomo, BAKORNAS PBP officer

***TNI***

General and staff TNI Aceh (AP)

***(Sub)District officials***

Bupati of Calang

Mr. Edward Nailan, Head DINAS Calang Office (Ministry of Industry, Trade & Cooperation)

Mr. Pak Yussuf, Director Posko Krueng Sabee,

Chamat and Mukim of Aceh Besar (AP/SP)

***Other officials***

Mr. Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Member of the Senate

Mrs. Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Member of Parliament (former Director APIK)

**2. United Nations**

***UN***

Mr. Bo Apslund, UN Resident Coordinator

***UNESCAP***

Mrs. Thelma Kay, Chief Division for Emerging Social Issues, Bangkok

***OCHA***

Mrs. Reiko Niimi, OCHA Jakarta

OCHA, Mr. Enayet Madani, Government Liaison Officer, Aceh

OCHA, HIC Aceh, NGO information officer

OCHA, Mr. Jorg Meier, Calang Coordinator

***UNDP Jakarta***

Mrs. Wee, Country Director

Mr. Toshihiro Nakamura, Team Leader, Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Unit

Mr. Patrick Sweeting, Head CPRU

Mr. Kristanto Sinandang, CPRU, former UNDP Aceh manager

Ms. Eugenia Piza Lopez, CPRU Senior Programme Officer

Mr. Riri Fithriadi, CPRU

***UNDP Aceh***

Mr. Simon Field, UNDP ERTR Programme Manager

Mr. Fakri, former UNHCR Calang, UNDP ERTR Programme

Mr. Faisal Fuady, Programme Monitoring Officer

Mr. Gie Siauw, Senior Technical Advisor Shelter

Mr. Novel, Senior Technical Advisor Governance

Mr. Faisal, UNDP/Calang Coordinator

Mr. Basnyet, UNDP/Calang Advisor

Mr. Mubarrack, UNDP/Pidie Coordinator

Mr. Afifuddin, UNDP/Pidie Programme Assistant

Mr. Radja, UNDP/Pidie Technical Advisor Shelter

***UNFPA***

Dr. Bernard Coquelin, Country Director

UNFPA, Dr. Melania Hidayat

***UNHCR***

Mr. Robert Ashe, Regional Representative

***UNICEF***

Mr. Gianfranco Rotigliani, Country Director

UNICEF, Mr.Eduard Pechfiter, Aceh Programme Director

UNICEF, Ms. Rajeshwani Chandrasekar, Programme Officer

UNICEF, Mr.Mufizar, Communications Officer

UNICEF, Mr. Yang Zhembo, Programme Officer Calang

***UNIFEM***

Mr. Saiful Mandi, Country Coordinator

UNIFEM, Ms. Sylvana Augustina, Programme officer Aceh

UNIFEM, Ms. Arabiyani

***UNV***

Ms.Minna Fredriksson, Project Coordinator Aceh Emergency Response

***World Bank***

Mr. Scott Guggenheim, Aceh Coordinator

**3. INGOs**

Cardi, Mr. Herve De Bailenx,

Cardi, Ms. Rebecca Barber, PO

Calang Livelihoods Sector Group discussion: SCF, ACF, IR, Oxfam International, IFRC

Cordaid, Mr. Renee Grotenhuis, General Director

Cordaid, Mr. Thomas den Boer, Country Coordinator Emergency and Rehabilitation Programme

Cordaid, Mr. Adri Darsoyo, Aceh coordinator

CWS, Mr. Scott Campbell, Aceh Director

CWS, Mr. Wayne Ulrich, Crisis Management and Emergencies

Hivos, Mr Ben Witjes, Acting Director Jakarta

Hivos, Ms. Nana Hasdiana, Aceh coordinator

Hivos, Ms. Herwina Prabowo, Block Grant Officer

IFRC, Ms. Aurelia Balpe, Senior Officer, Movement Cooperation Division, Geneva

IFRC, Mr. Peter Camelin, D.H.O.D.

IFRC, Mr. Howard Arfin, Reporting Delegate

International Medical Corps, Mr. Mike Daniels, Deputy Country Director

Islamic Relief

MSF, Dr. Patrick Deschamp, MSF Jakarta

MSF, Dr. Saroosh, Coordinator MSF Pidie District

Muslim Aid Indonesia, Mr. Fadlullah Wilmot, ACEH Programme director

Muslim Aid Indonesia, Mr. Muslim Amin, Programme Officer

Oxfam International, Mr. Patrick McInnis, Partner Liaison Manager

Oxfam International, Ms. Yanty Lascana, former Oxfam Aceh Programme Manager

Oxfam International, Ms. Annette Jansen, Programme Support and Liaison Officer

Oxfam International, Mrs. Sylvia Borren, Secretary General Oxfam NL

Oxfam International, Ms. Marina van Dixhorn, Partner Liaison Deputy Manager

Oxfam International, Mr. Banu Subagyo, Oxfam GB Country Director

**4. Bilateral agencies**

Aceh Peace Monitors, Sigli, Mrs. Pocut Anita and Mr. Jerry Javis

ASEAN Committee of Disaster Management, Dr. Puji Pujiono, Expert on Disaster Management

SIDA, Mr. Ulf Samuelsson, Deputy Head of Mission

SIDA, Ms. Christina Wedekull, Counsellor Post Tsunami Reconstruction

USAID, Mr. Richard Hough, Director of Programming

USAID, Mr. Alex Mahoney, OFDA Programme Officer, Melissa James and two coordinators

AusAID advisor, Mr. Mike Freeman, Development Assistance Specialist

**5. Civil society**

Aceh NGO Forum, Mr. Taf Haikal, Executive Director

Aceh NGO Forum, Mr. Sudriman, Office Coordinator, Mr. Syahrial, Information Coordinator Aceh Recovery Forum, Mr. Salfuddin Bantasyam

Aceh Relief Fund, Mrs. Pocut Anita, Director

CHSE, Sigli, Mr. Asri, Mr.Sanur, Mr. Nabantin
Child Fund, Ms. Nur Arifina, TP coordinator
EDA, Ms. Ratna, Coordinator
Flower Aceh, Ms. Elivra, Director

Indonesian Federation of Red Cross, Mr. Mansyur Busttari, Aceh director
Komnas Perempuan, Ms. Dinny Jusuf, Secretary General, and ?, Aceh coordinator
Muhammadiyah, Mr. Muzakin and Mr. Nusni, Pidie
PASKA, Ms. Farida Hanayani
PeRAK, (Female NGO), Sigli (SP)
Putra Gande (Female NGO), Ms. Rosa
REMDEC, Mr. Handoko, Director, Mr. Fauzi Abdullah, Board member
Transparency International Indonesia, Ms. Emmy Hafild, Director
Youth Organisation, Mr. Biben Akbar
Ir. Teuku Faisal Riza, CV Caixa Consultants, Housing consultants Cordaid

**6. Communities**

Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar
Calang and Krueng Sabee (Aceh Jaya district)
Sigli and Passie Lou (Pidie district)
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## 7. Participants at the TEC briefing capacities workshop in Jakarta, 16 September 2005

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## 8. TEC consultative briefing, capacities workshop in Banda Aceh, 19 September 2005

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## ANNEX 2: CASE STUDIES

### Case Study 1: Islamic Relief's Cash-for-Work Project in Padan Datar

Padan Datar village had approximately 1,500 inhabitants before the tsunami, but only 900 remain. Only 100 of these are women, which would mean that women constituted 80 per cent of the victims. Such a high percentage of female casualties has been attributed to the time of the disaster – 8 am, when the majority of women were preparing food indoors, while many men were outdoors, including a large group that was collecting durian (local fruit) in the forest.

When the evaluation team met the residents of Padan Datar, the team leader, Mr Isudar Ideris, and five team members were resting in a makeshift coffee shop after four hours of clearing land in a joint Islamic Relief and UNDP CfW programme. This project was due to last for 35 days, and the land was designated for rebuilding homes, restarting agriculture and animal husbandry. Twenty-five labourers (each representing a different family) worked in four groups. The daily wage was Rp 35,000 a day, with the team leader earning Rp 50,000 (US $3.5 and 5, respectively). Ideris stated that the planning of land-clearing CfW projects is poor; the villagers often have to re-clean land, because projects are not implemented in time and land grows over.

Livelihood is a prime concern and priority for all. In the past, villagers lived off animal husbandry and some agriculture, but land was severely damaged by the tsunami and will take years to recover. There is no fisheries tradition, as Padan Datar lacks a harbour. Most villagers saved their earnings to invest in livelihood projects, such as small grocery stores, repair shops and food establishments in the makeshift huts that also served as homes.

There is high demand for skills training and loans/grants for different types of livelihood efforts, but villagers have not received any support from DINAS. Several INGOs have collected data and promised to assist with livelihoods, but have yet to take action. Villagers believe that Oxfam International will provide them with loans for businesses, but there is no independent confirmation of this.

Thus far, Padan Datar had received international assistance from UNHCR, UNDP and Action Against Hunger International (ACF). Islamic Relief arrived subsequently to run CfW projects funded by UNDP, planning to start livelihood projects after Ramadan.

**Case Study 2: Remote Communities in Nias**

Bawo Gosali, the closest village to Hilina Walo, is accessible by unpaved road. Even so, emergency assistance here was minimal. Forty per cent of the village's 400 houses were destroyed by the 28 March earthquake, and a further 40 per cent were damaged.

As part of the initial response, tents, rice, sugar and noodles had been received from religious organisations, UNICEF, the World Food Programme and others. However, these supplies were left at the sub-district office at Teluk Dalam and delivered only through the intervention of the Nias Community Advocacy and Enlightenment Council (LPAM). There were no visits from the larger international agencies during the early emergency phase.

Both village schools were destroyed, and the community is waiting for assistance to reconstruct them. Community leaders were frustrated with promises not met and needs assessments that produced nothing tangible. Assistance received was considered inadequate, and what little had arrived had not been distributed equitably. The community was not kept informed, much less consulted, throughout the entire process. LPAM, a local CBO, which before the tsunami concentrated on awareness and advocacy issues, was over-extended and needed support for humanitarian work. Though the community criticised the delays and lack of commitment of the government and donors, it is interesting that there was no suggestion of doing the work themselves.

One hundred and nine people were displaced by the tsunami and earthquake in Luaha Muzoi. It is an isolated and marginalised village in the Lahewa sub-district, comprising 25 households. The villagers' ancestors have lived in this area for at least 200 years, during which time they converted from Catholicism to Islam. The village is at the northwesternmost tip of Nias Island bordering the Indian Ocean; it lies virtually at the mouth of the Muzoi river, outside access being by small boat across it. To reach the area, the evaluation team took an eight-hour motorbike ride, the last 10 kilometres of which was along the beach and included the crossing of six river mouths.

Holi'a'na is an NGO working only in Nias, and is engaged in holistic relief, recovery and development programmes in remote and isolated villages such as Luaha Muzoi. Small and committed organisations such as Holi'a'na and LPAM are able to reach such communities, as well as to work in partnership with affected communities that lie outside the capacity – which includes willingness and institutional opportunity costs – of INGOs and larger national organisations. According to community leaders of Luaha Muzoi, a leading international humanitarian agency finally visited them after many requests – only

to inform them that their settlement was not viable and should be relocated due to lack of potable water. The community rejected this 'technical' assessment: 'Who are they to tell us this? We have lived here for 200 years.' Residents continue using traditional water treatment systems.

**Case Study 3: Muslim Aid Indonesia's Permanent Housing Programme**

Muslim Aid Indonesia is a joint project of Muslim Aid UK and Muslim Aid Australia, although most funding comes from Muslim Aid UK. Muslim Aid Germany also participated in the initial relief effort. Muslim Aid is driven by its faith-based commitment to help the whole of humanity without regard to religion, ethnicity, political affiliation or gender. The organisation claims that 80 per cent of the world's refugees facing ongoing crises and disaster are Muslims. While responding to emergencies, Muslim Aid also works on strategic programmes for poverty eradication, focusing on education, skills training, provision of clean water, healthcare and income generation projects. It works in partnerships with local communities to build the capacity of local people to move toward poverty eradication and empowerment. Muslim Aid UK is a signatory to the Code of Conduct for the International Rescue Committee (IRC) Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, and Muslim Aid Australia is a signatory to the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) Code of Conduct, which requires high standards of public accountability.

Muslim Aid's initial tsunami response was to deliver humanitarian aid, including medicine, food, water, tents, funeral materials, toys and books for children. Five hundred fifty volunteers from around Aceh and North Sumatra were recruited, including five doctors, while another 1,000 volunteers were on the ground early on. They ran over 370 'mobile humanitarian aid camps' in all affected areas and a logistics warehouse in Lhokseumawe.

During the reconstruction and recovery phase, Muslim Aid focussed on housing and livelihood, with capacity building as an overarching strategy. It established an office in Banda Aceh only in July 2005, with eight staff members. Only the director is a foreigner, but he is married to an Acehnese and speaks both Indonesian and Acehnese fluently. He also has a good understanding of the culture and connections in Acehnese society. All the other staff members are from Aceh.

At the time of this evaluation, Muslim Aid was involved in building 170 houses in Banda Aceh and 25 in Sabang, at a cost of US $5,000 each. The modern local house, or *rumah* Aceh, was designed by a group of Acehnese tsunami survivors. Design considerations included earthquake-proof construction, local availability of materials, fast construction time and cultural appropriateness. Being on stilts was

considered particularly suitable for areas subject to high tides. In addition, Muslim Aid elected to use rust-resistant powder-coated corrugated iron for roofing and installed insulation foil that reflects 97 per cent of radiant heat, thus providing a cool environment.

A participatory approach to design took more than a month and included consultations with BRR, the *Bupati* (district head), *Chamat* (sub-district head), *Lurah* (village head) and formal and informal community leaders. Although some community members had doubts about the proposed modern form of *rumah* Aceh, they were convinced after Muslim Aid built a prototype of the house preferred by the majority.

Three local contractors were selected in a public tender process to build 50 houses each; 20 more were built by two other contractors. The programme mandates that skilled labour be hired from the community, and local labour be used for water and sanitation installation. Two community representatives supervise the construction. Problems or complaints are discussed during weekly meetings of the communities, contractors and Muslim Aid field staff; there is also a complaint box at the prototype house. Most complaints are about building materials – for example, about a contractor trying to use materials other than specified. Although there is a basic design and budget, the house owners are free to change the design to suit their individual tastes, which has meant that the Muslim Aid houses are all different and do not look like low-cost public housing.

Muslim Aid had hoped to complete the houses by Ramadan, but only the wood framing had been completed by mid-September. Muslim Aid was waiting for panelling supplies from Java. To date, this community is still living in tents, barracks or with relatives, but some have already moved to the new houses, where they are living in the lower level until the roof and flooring are completed.

In addition, Muslim Aid and IFRC are jointly assisting in building 3,000 transitional shelters for those living in tents. Muslim Aid will select 100 unemployed Acehnese engineers to undergo IFRC training and work with the community on building these shelters. This will help build local capacity for the future. Muslim Aid has also developed a database of 2,000 unemployed Acehnese engineering graduates from different Aceh universities. Together with ILO, a training programme is being developed to teach such graduates English and skills such as quantity surveying, site management, quality assurance and others needed by the construction industry. The programme will include a period of internship to assist in securing subsequent employment.

At the time of this evaluation, Muslim Aid was in the process of seeking multi-donor fund approval for a flood mitigation project in Banda Aceh with World Bank seed funding. This project would involve installing valves to replace sluice and flap gates (to help prevent flooding caused by high tides) and pumps (to replace those destroyed by the tsunami).

Furthermore, Muslim Aid was planning livelihood projects with a focus on cooperation and mutual help among communities to build problem-solving capacities. An additional objective of this project is to strengthen women's groups by providing easier access to micro-credit, such as in Tengku Malem, located 10 kilometres from Banda Aceh. Before the tsunami, local women ran businesses such as tailoring, embroidery, retail shops and small food places, supported by a credit cooperative that was established 10 years ago and had over 100 women members. At the time of this evaluation, tsunami survivors were living in tents, with host families or in renovated houses; their business were defunct due to lack of capital and markets.

Muslim Aid plans to promote groups of five women each (without blood relationships), to enrol in a saving and revolving fund for micro-credit projects. The group of five women will select two members to receive the first loan and begin repayments in the third week. After the second repayment by two initial members, a loan will be given to two others under the same conditions. The group leader will receive the last loan on the seventh week after the first disbursement. Repayments will be collected on a daily basis.

Muslim Aid also has several children-oriented projects underway. One of these is for the *Aiysiyah* Organisation, which runs 25 per cent of the kindergartens in Indonesia. On its behalf, Muslim Aid is building a kindergarten for poor children to replace one destroyed by the tsunami. Another project is the building of a hostel at a traditional school providing accommodation and education for orphans. In addition, Muslim Aid provides cattle for the ritual slaughter during the Muslim festival of *Eidul Adha*, along with food for orphans to break the fast during Ramadan. Charitable gifts and 10 tons of dates were distributed to orphans and needy families all over Aceh during the fasting month.

## ANNEX 3: HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES FOR PARTICIPATION

### Participation in Internationally Accepted Benchmarks

***Red Cross Code of Conduct***

Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid (Code of Conduct Article 7).Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programmes.

There are many good reasons to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of aid, including the acknowledgement of respect and dignity of people, legitimating of aid efforts, enhancing the efficiency of aid, and improving its knowledge base, sustainability and learning capacity.

***Sphere: Minimum Standards in Disaster Response***

Participation: The disaster-affected population actively participates in the assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the assistance programme (Common Standard 1).

Key indicators:

- Women and men of all ages from the disaster-affected and wider local populations, including vulnerable groups, receive information about the assistance programme, and are given the opportunity to comment to the assistance agency during all stages of the project cycle.
- Written assistance programme objectives and plans should reflect the needs, concerns and values of disaster-affected people, particularly those belonging to vulnerable groups and contribution to their protection
- Programming is designed to maximise the use of local skills and capacities

Initial assessment:

- Assessments provide an understanding of the disaster situation and a clear analysis of threats of life, dignity, health and livelihoods to determine, in consultation with the relevant authorities, whether an external response is required and, if so, the nature of the response (Common Standard 2).

Key indicators:

- Local capacities and strategies to cope with the disaster, both those of the affected population and the surrounding populations, are identified.
- The assessment is underpinned by the rights of those affected by disaster, as defined by international law.

Guiding principles on internally displaced persons

Participation of IDPs: The displaced, particularly women, should be involved in the planning and management of the relocation (Principle 7 (3) (d)). In the distribution of humanitarian assistance, special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of women in the planning and distribution of these supplies (Principle 18 (3)). Durable solutions to displacement should be found in consultation with the displaced and this is a key component of respecting the right of the displaced to voluntary return (Principle 12 (1)). Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of IDPs in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration (Principle 28 (2)) (p 21).

***Older people in disasters and humanitarian crises: guidelines for best practice (help age)***

- Recognise and support the contribution of older people. As a result of emergencies older people have increased responsibilities for supporting their families, mobilising resources and caring for children, orphans and other dependants. Earlier emergency experiences, coping strategies, traditional skills and local environmental knowledge are important in mitigating the impact of emergencies. Older people's responsibilities and knowledge should be recognised and built on.
- Organise group meetings using Participatory Rural Appraisal to allow older people to identify, prioritise and begin to address their problems and explore their capacities.
- Ensure that older people are represented on relevant decision-making and advisory bodies such as disaster preparedness committees, emergency co-ordination committees and special issue groups

***Principles and practise of good humanitarian donorship***

Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.