


Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan





COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously:

- Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition.
- Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition.
- Retain supportive individuals.


These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents

 This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams




• An increase in Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development.

 A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.



Coalition







- An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services.
- Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.





stable employment of the workforce.

 Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters.













Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters






Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures


Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents



Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures




Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics



align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and

Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics




Infrastructure, Services, & Economy Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.) **Legit Agric Production** Fraction of Workforce and Agric. Legit vs Illegit **Private Sector** Workforce **Population** Skill & Avail **Basic Needs** Service Levels & Employment Infrastructure Civilian Legit vs Illegit Dev. Adequacy **Legit Other** Services Relative & Sustainment Production (SWET, Economic & Services Healthcare, Opportunity Non-Agric Education) **Private Sector** Ability to Move Legit Economic Infr. Services, Econ, Capital Mgmt, People & **Activity, Trade &** Policy & Execution/ ✓ Investment & Goods Rapidly **Employment** Perceived Fairness ✓ Spending Consulting Group


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Infrastructure, Services, & Economy




Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts




Consulting Group © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well...another key loop)

Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts






Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support




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
Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support






- and recruiting / retention. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF
- capacity over time.


ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional





Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics






WORKING DRAFT - V3





Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population





Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance






Population/Popular Support Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics - GOVERNANCE Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government **Afghanistan Security Forces** Insurgents Crime and Narcotics **Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment** Coalition Damages/ Casualties Total Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Security Force Capacity & Focus ANSF Unit ANSF Coalition Leadership & Tactical Policing_& Capacity & Priorities Knowledge 4 & Underst. Havens / Ability to Operate Capacity of Social Structures ANSF Manpower Support¹ Strategy & Unity ANSF Avg Recruiting & Duration of Operation Coalition Retention Adjustment (Clear & Hold Coalition Ápproach ANSF Appropriate Balance of Effort & Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Institutional & Training & Mentoring Perceived Services ANSF Ties to Coalition Corruption & Coalition Damages & Use of Force Avg COIN Experience - ANSF Execution R.O.L. Policy Favoritism _Capacity & Perceived A4444 Coalition Visibility to Population Fairness Likelihood of Relative Popular Crime/Violence Support/ Folerance Govt vs Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Dev. Ops-Gov't Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods Aid Levels) Population Actively Population ympathizing w/ Gov't Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov't vs Ins US Gov't Support for Operation US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit Breadth of of Gov't vs. Duration of Operation Coalition & I Harshness Support Affiliation Backlash Perception of Coalition Intent & Support Workforce US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Satisfaction Media Ability to Reconcile Structures Cultural Erosion / W/ Gains in Security, Services Sensationalism Visible Gains In Security Services & Coalition Expectations for Security, Services, & Connectedness \ pc Provide **WORKING DRAFT** Reconciliation PA Consulting Group

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Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative

Afghanistan Security Forces

Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions

Physical Environment

Insurgents

Consulting

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made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Message availability is constrained by low "average connectedness" (rural Coalition populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and Casualties most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM Security Force tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. ANSF Unit ANSE Policing & Coalition Leadershir & Tactical Capacity & "Western affiliation backlash" may undermine Government messages if they are Knowledge & Underst. COIN of Social Structures seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an Support Manpower Recruiting & ANSF Avg.
Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
/& Morale overly Western posture Duration of Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Coalition ANSE Appropriate Balance of Effort & Appropriate ANSF Institutional & Execution Of Gov't & Coalition Dev. Ops-ANSF Ties to Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Perceived Corruption & Coalition Damages &
Use of Force R.O.L. Policy Execution Funding Capacity & Priorities ▲ Execution & Perceived ANSF Likelihood o Perceived Damages/Use Coalition Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population Active Ins. of Force by Gov' t & Coalition Perception of Coalition Coalition Insurgent Strength & Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Gov't Acceptance of Levels Strategic Commun./IO Acceptance of Afghan Methods Forces opulation opulation Actively Population Population Aid Levels) Actively the Fence Supporting Insurgent US Gov't Relative WOM Support for Operation Gov't vs Ins Breadth of Attractiveness Terrain of Gov't vs.
 Insurgent Path Western Affiliation Duration US Domestic Support of Operation Perception of Backlash Coalition Intent & Support Of Gov't US Domestic/ Strength & Intent And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Int'l Strategic Strength of Religious Commun & Diplomac Satisfaction Media Structures Cultural Erosion Ability to w/ Gains in Sensationalism Recońcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Visible Gains In Security Ethnic/Tribal Structures Coalition for Security, Services, & Provide Humanitarian Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government

Claim the Information Initiative: "Message" quality and availability impact who

WORKING DRAFT


is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not

Significant

Delay

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics

- Claim the Information Initiative



Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics

- Population Security

